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ABSTRACT
In 1895, George Pierce Baker published The 
Principles of Argumentation, the first modern textbook 
on argument. The major contributions of that work were: 
a commitment to a "practical" argumentation independent 
of the strictures imposed by law, Formal Logic, and 
rhetoric; a comprehensive system of analysis; and an 
unparalleled method of brief-drawing. Subsequent texts 
applied Baker's systems of analysis and brief-drawing to 
the "spoken debate." These works, however, reemphasized 
relationships between argumentation and its parent dis­
ciplines, appropriating rules of evidence, concepts of 
burden of proof and presumption, and procedures for 
arguing a "case" from law; rules for arrangement, style, 
and delivery from rhetoric; and the deductive syllogism, 
Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies from Formal 
Logic.
Two works published in 1917 firmly entrenched the 
"standard tradition." Baker's most famous student, William 
Trufant Foster, revised an earlier edition of Argumentation 
and Debating which set out traditional principles in a 
comprehensive, teachable fashion. James M. O'Neill, 
meanwhile, incorporated detailed original source materials
iv
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and advocated a "game" approach to debating in his revision 
of Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales's Argumentation and 
Debate. The ramifications of that legacy are immeasurable.
Attacks on the "standard tradition" were not long 
in coming. Influenced by developments in sociology, 
psychology, educational philosophy, and, to a lesser 
extent, logic, argumentation and debate writers began to 
re-examine the philosophical bases, the subject matter, and 
the structural forms of their discipline. Debating, the 
most persistent form of the forensic, came under fire. At 
issue were format, standards of judging, and ethical 
questions.
In response to criticisms arising from these 
reassessments, writers updated bibliographies, incorporated 
revised treatments of the proposition (particularly its 
classification), introduced stock issues analyses, and 
expanded the scope of argumentation to include discussion, 
attention to audiences, and balanced rhetorical constructs 
which emphasized persuasion. Such notions of a broad 
philosophical base for argumentation persisted until 
c. 19 55, after which treatments of discussion reverted 
almost solely to separate texts, attention to audiences 
waned, and persuasion was more often considered subsidiary 
rather than integral to argumentation.
Though contemporary writers have retained much 
traditional theory— specific modifications occurring pri­
marily in the area of proof— their texts reflect diverse
v
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philosophical predispositions toward the nature and end of 
argumentation. The inquiry-advocacy distinction, intro­
duced by Richard Whately and popularized by Henry Lee 
Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, provided terminology for, and 
represents the polarity of, these approaches. One branch 
of theory perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry, 
its aim being critical decision-making. The other deter­
mines advocacy— with a view toward the proof of one's 
case— to be the appropriate end of argumentation. Douglas 
Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede occupy one end of the 
continuum; Arthur Kruger is at the other. These philo­
sophical approaches have influenced specific treatments of 
the analysis, structure, and proof of propositions. Though 
such writers as Glen Mills and Austin Freeley have 
attempted to minimize or perhaps resolve these differences, 
synthesizing ideas from both points of view, the critical 
underlying issue, the "proper" end of argumentation and/or 
debate, is still very much in contention.
Much contemporary argumentation and debate theory 
bears little resemblance to that "practical argumentation 
for everyday life" envisioned by George Pierce Baker 
seventy-five years ago. Baker perceived no "academic" 
debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate tournament 
competition. His commitment, rather, was to the discovery, 
selection, and structuring of arguments for the everyday 
affairs of men. This study traces the developments which
vi
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resulted in, and the specific theoretical modifications 
reflected by, that philosophical shift.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Man has engaged in oral argumentation probably 
since he learned to communicate verbally. Man's con­
tentiousness gradually became more refined as he pursued 
excellence, or in more practical terms, victory. He 
developed guidelines and set forth rules for arguing more 
effectively. "Precepts" dealing with eloquence, 
addressed to various Egyptian kings, have come down to 
us from as early as 2900 B.C.1 And rules for arguing 
one's case were systematized by Corax and Tisias in the 
fifth century B.C. The sophists profiteered, while 
Aristotle labored to discover "the available means of 
persuasion." Man has attended to theory as well as 
practice in argumentation; to knowledge as well as 
application; to academics as well as performance.
Academic debating traditionally has been a 
part of higher education in America. By 1642, debating 
was an established part of the curriculum at Harvard
1Giles W. Gray, "The 'Precepts of Kagemni and P tah— 
Hotep,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXII (December, 
1946), 445-54.
1
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College. David Potter has suggested that from 164 2 to 
1900, four main currents in debating existed in the 
colonial chartered colleges, which stemmed from the syllo­
gistic disputation, the forensic disputation, the literary 
and debating societies, and intercollegiate debating. He 
summarized these currents as follows:
The first major form of debating in the 
American colleges was the Latin Syllogistic 
Disputation. Imported along with most other 
early academic ideas from the parent European 
centers of learning, this medieval hold-over 
flourished in our colleges until the middle of 
the 18th century. Emphasizing formal logic as 
its method of proof, Latin as its medium of 
expression, the prescribed curriculum as its 
source of subject matter, and the Bible as 
interpreted by the reverend president or tutor 
as its standard of truth, the Syllogistics 
served as teaching, testing, and exhibiting 
devices, and in the later years, according to 
the students, as a means of academic punishment.
Influenced largely by student and public 
interest in a form of debate which could handle 
the vital questions of an awakening age, the 
written English Forensic Disputation made its 
appearance in the American Colleges toward the 
middle of the 18th century. At first subservi­
ent to the Latin exercise, it gradually dis­
placed it both as a prescribed classroom and 
as an exhibition device. Less formal in 
nature, and with a relatively flexible method­
ology, it allowed eloquent— if "canned"—  
treatises on the pros and cons of . . . diver­
gent topics. . . .
Although the forensic disputation lingered 
on in some college curricula as an exercise in 
composition, its popularity as a form of debate 
declined seriously after the early decades of 
the 19th century. . . .
David Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered 
Colleges (New York: Columbia University Bureau of
Publications, 1944), p. 3.
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Even before the forensic disputation was 
accepted by the college administrations, it 
was a featured exercise in the literary and 
debating societies which sprang up early in 
the 18th century. . . .
An important contribution to debate 
history was the society introduction of 
extempore Disputes in the second half of the 
18th century. . . .
By 1829 the societies were also experi­
menting in still other types of debate. Par­
liamentary debates . . . were commonplace. . . .
The societies were also changing the methods 
of awarding decisions. . . .
By the time the Civil War broke out, how­
ever, the majority of the societies were no 
longer in a flourishing condition. . . . [They] 
did not yield without a struggle. To enliven 
the Halls, inter-society debates were initiated.
. . . It was not, however, until Harvard and 
Yale engaged in their much publicized debate on 
January 14, 1892 that this new addition to the 
intercollegiate craze took root. . . .
As the contests gained in importance, they 
were supplemented, as in the very beginning of 
debating in the colonial colleges, by cur­
ricular offerings in argumentation and debate.
The cycle was almost complete.-*
Historically, then, modern argumentation and debate 
is the product of an evolutionary process, a logical exten­
sion of our educational system; i.e., it has been "influ­
enced and directed by the same forces which shaped the 
contemporary course of higher education and cultural growth 
in America."^ Modern argumentation and debate has operated 
both within the framework of the academic curriculum and 
outside it. And, since 1895, writers in the field have 
developed a relevant body of knowledge for the discipline.
3David Potter, "Significant Changes in Collegiate
Debating, 1748-1948," Gavel, .XXX (May, 1948), 73-74.
^Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered 
Colleges, p. 120.
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Though certainly "breaking new ground," early 
argumentation and debate theorists did not proceed without 
direction. They turned to rhetoric, philosophy, and law^ 
both for rationale and for methodology. These disciplines 
shared similar aims both with argumentation and among them­
selves, though in varying degrees. The discovery and/or 
demonstration of truth was their universal aim. They ques­
tioned and sought answers about the proper relationship of 
subject matter to form. Language was their common 
vehicle.^ And, with the possible exception of philosophy, 
their effectiveness depended on a practical application of 
theoretical principles. Argumentation appropriated spe­
cific rules and strategies from these disciplines. Rheto­
ric provided a system of invention, rules of arrangement, 
style, and delivery.7 Philosophical writings yielded a 
theory of knowledge and a system of logical structure. Law
^Ehninger and Brockriede listed psychology as a 
major source, and omitted law. An interest in psychology 
developed, however, in the "middle period." Douglas 
Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: 
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963), p. 28. Mills suggested that 
the tradition was primarily a rhetorical-dialectical one. 
Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy (2d ed.; Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, 1968), pp. 22-24.
^Even philosophy was dependent. See Aristotle's 
moods of the syllogism.
7The elocutionary movement had appropriated 
delivery from rhetoric and had set it up as a separate 
discipline during the "early period" of this study, teach­
ing it in schools of elocution or oratory. Classical 
rhetoric, however, had considered delivery as a part of its 
body of theory, a notion which regained favor during the 
"middle period."
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furnished not only specific rules of evidence, but it also 
set out practical procedures for the carrying on of oral 
argument.
The purpose of the immediate study is to trace the 
development of argumentation and debate theory from 189 5 
to 19 70. Central to this task is an identification, 
description, and analysis of specific principles or 
hypotheses. To this end the writer has examined argumenta­
tion and debate textbooks and relevant journal articles, 
particularly those published by the national speech associ­
ation. These materials provided the basis for identifying 
the crucial theoretical issues and determining consequen­
tial modifications; i.e., important additions, deletions, 
and/or extensions.
This study is descriptive, historical, and 
analytic in that it reports specific findings, treats 
theoretical developments in terms of chronological periods, 
and synthesizes trends in the development of argumentation 
and debate theory. It can serve, however, neither as a 
checklist nor as an annotated bibliography of the available 
literature in argumentation and debate, specific sources 
being cited to introduce new developments in theory or to 
substantiate trends. This study investigates debating 
practices, moreover, only as they affect or reflect theo­
retical predispositions. Though the research for this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
study was inductive, the writing is, of necessity, largely 
deductive.
A review of the literature indicates that hereto­
fore no study has attempted to trace in detail the develop­
ment of argumentation and debate theory. Certain theses 
and dissertations have isolated segments of the problem,® 
and some textbooks have attempted a synthesis of theory, 
Glen Mills's Reason in Controversy, second edition,® being 
the most comprehensive. In general, those scholars who 
have investigated argumentation and debating (theory and/or 
practice) have approached it either from the historical- 
critical perspective or in terms of quantitative 
research.Paul J. Dovre and Kenneth Andersen reported 
on the status of these studies in separate journal articles 
in 1965 and 1966.^  Mills summarized the Dovre-Andersen 
conclusions as follows:
Research which is historical-critical 
describes, explains, and evaluates the phe­
nomena. There have been histories of debate 
. . . , studies of various theoretical
®Franklin H. Knower has compiled an index of gradu­
ate work in the field of speech from 190 2 to current date, 
which has been published in Speech Monographs, beginning 
with Vol. II, October, 19 35, and in subsequent volumes.
®Mills, Reason in Controversy.
10Ibid., p. 25.
Upaul J. Dovre, "Historical-Critical Research in 
Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II 
(May, 1965) , 72-79; Kenneth E. Andersen, 1 Quantitative 
Research in Debate," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, III (September, 1966), 112-15.
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constructs . . . , evolutionary studies in 
concepts . . . , investigations of landmark 
theorists . . . , textual criticisms. . . , 
studies of debaters . . . , and critical 
analyses of debates. . . .
Quantitative research, including the 
descriptive and the experimental, has been 
in the minority in this field, but it is 
growing. Descriptive studies have included 
surveys of current practices in school 
debating, tabulations of evidence used in 
tournament debates, and content analyses of 
transcribed debates. Experimental studies 
have been concerned with the effectiveness of 
evidence, the influence of arrangement upon 
impact, factors in debate judging, effects of 
debating upon critical thinking ability, and 
other phenomena which can be controlled,
manipulated, and m e a s u r e d . 12
In an article designed to "supplement Dovre's
article by focusing on historical research relating to
debate and forensic activities in American schools and
13colleges," Lee R. Polk found that:
Research to date has taken the form of one
of the following three types of studies:
(1) chronologies of forensic programs at a 
specific school or college, (2) chronologies 
of state, regional, or national forensic 
organizations, and (3) surveys of the use of 
evidence in interscholastic and intercollegiate 
debate tournaments.1̂
Two works have been particularly valuable to this 
study. Arthur Kruger's A Classified Bibliography of
l^Mills, Reason in Controversy, p. 25.
l^Lee R. Polk, "Historical Research in Forensics: 
Its Status and Guidelines for the Future," Journal of the 
American Forensic Association, VII (Winter, 1970), 36.
14ibid.
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1 5Argumentation and Debate is a comprehensive, though 
incomplete source book. It provided a springboard for the 
research and organization of this effort. Also, a series
of articles published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech
16by Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," 
helped to place this study in perspective and to confirm 
certain of its early, tentative conclusions, particularly 
concerning the early period.
The plan of this study is as follows: Chapter II
traces the evolution of argumentation theory from 1895-1917 
in terms of the nature of argumentation, analysis, proof, 
and the forensic itself. This chapter incorporates, 
insofar as possible, the sources of that theory. Chapter 
III synthesizes developments in the theory of the "middle 
period," 1917-c. 1955, examining the same problem areas. 
Chapter IV, using the same criteria, attempts to identify 
and analyze trends in contemporary theory— after c. 19 55. 
Chapter V includes a summary and conclusions drawn from 
the study.
15Arthur Kruger, A Classified Bibliography of 
Argumentation and Debate (New York: Scarecrow Press,
Inc., 1964).
"^Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, April, June, 
and November, 19 32).
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CHAPTER II
THE STANDARD TRADITION— 1895-1917
It has been established that the practice of
argumentation is not a modern phenomenon. Neither, in a
strict sense, is its theory. The essential thrust of
classical invention was the proof of one's case."'’ British
classical rhetoricians, moreover, re-emphasized the close
2relationship between rhetoric and logic. Archbishop 
Richard Whately, "the first modern to treat argumentation
3as a separate discipline," wrote Elements of Logic and 
Elements of Rhetoric  ̂which, numerous cross-references 
suggest, were to be used as companion works. Whately
For a review of the classical concept of proof, 
see Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo Braden, 
Speech Criticism (rev. ed.; New York: Ronald Press, 1970)
Clarence W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical 
Theory in Nineteenth-Century America," in A History of 
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 19 54), p. 86. See also 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, Speech Criticism.
3Orville Pence, "The Concept and Function of 
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately, 
Speech Monographs, XX (March, 1953), 24.
^Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston:
J. Munroe Company, 1854); Richard Whately, Elements of 
Rhetoric (Louisville, Ky.: John P. Morton and Company,
1846) .
9
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wished to treat rhetoric of "argumentative composition 
generally and exclusively. C l a r e n c e  W. Edney concluded 
that "Whately is largely responsible for initiating that 
trend of theory which moved rapidly in the direction of a 
rhetoric of argumentation and debate."*’ Aware of Whately's 
treatment of rhetoric as "argumentative composition," and 
granting his "landmark contributions to the theory of the 
subject," Glen Mills nevertheless contended that "it would 
be inaccurate to say that the academic subject of argumenta­
tion dates from his work."^ Mills cited Rowton's How to 
Conduct a Debate (c. 1840), Holyoake's Public Speaking and 
Debate (1853), and McElligott's The American Debater (1855)
Oas "among the earliest specialized textbooks or manuals."
In addition to these prescriptive texts on oral argument, 
English and American rhetorics appeared which treated
In the Editor's introduction to a recent edition 
of Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, Douglas Ehninger sug­
gested that "rhetoric emerges neither as a method for 
probing judgments nor as an instrument for arriving at 
collective choices and decisions. . . . Its chief business 
is the justification and propagation of a priori truth." 
Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. by Douglas 
Ehninger (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1969), p. xi.
^Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in 
Nineteenth-Century America," p. 84.
7Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy (2d ed.; Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1968) , p. 22.
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argumentation as one of the four processes of composition.
Marie Hochmuth and Richard Murphy noted thatr
Books such as those of Quackenbos1 Advanced 
Course in Composition and Rhetoric and John 
Franklin Genung's The Practical Elements of 
Rhetoric/ and Adams Sherman Hill's The Prin­
ciples of Rhetoric helped to establish new 
categories of rhetoric: narration, descrip­
tion, exposition, and argumentation.̂
In 1895, Ginn and Company published George Pierce
Baker's The Principles of Argumentation,^ "the first
modern textbook on the subject. First not only in date
of publication, but also in prestige, Principles set forth
a practical approach for the argumentation of everyday
life. The influence of the book was profound. Edward Z.
Rowell observed in 1932 that "traditionally, the teaching
of argumentation in our colleges has followed essentially
the system developed in his classroom by Professor George
12P. Baker in hie first years at Harvard." Former students
qMarie Hochmuth and Richard Murphy, "Rhetorical 
Training in Nineteenth-Century Colleges," in A History of 
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), p. 172.
^George Pierce Baker, The Principles of 
Argumentation (Boston: Ginn and Company,1895).
^Giles W. Gray, "Some Teachers and the Transition 
to Twentieth-Century Speech Education," in A History of 
Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 428.
12Edward Z. Rowell,. "Prolegomena to Argumentation: 
Part I. The Problem, Its Nature and Significance," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 2. 
Though agreeing that Baker was interested in demonstrating 
"how to go about satisfying the demands of an argumentative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Raymond Alden (The Art of Debate, 1900), and William T. 
Foster (Argumentation' and Debating, 1908), acknowledged an 
indebtedness to Baker.3-3 And, though Craven Lay cock and 
Robert L. Scales neglected to mention their Harvard 
colleague or his work, their own text (Argumentation and 
Debate, 190 4), "consisted chiefly of restatement and fresh 
illustration of the principles which Baker had laid 
down."3-̂ It has been suggested that their "oversight" was 
"more regrettable . . . inasmuch as Laycock and Scales had 
used Baker's book for the Dartmouth argument course during 
the year previous to the publication of their own book."3-̂ 
Such popular texts as J. H. Gardiner's The Making 
of Arguments and George Pattee's Practical Argumentation
situation," Harry P. Kerr held that Baker's specific 
methodology developed in response to certain philosophical 
predispositions. "The problem for him was to shift the 
student's attention from style to substance and structure." 
Harry P. Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation,"
Speech Teacher, II (March, 1962), 121. Such convictions 
had appeared two years earlier in Baker's Specimens of 
Argumentation. George Pierce Baker, Specimens of: 
Argumentation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 189 3),
p. iv.
^Raymond Alden, The Art of Debate (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1900), p. viii; William T. Foster, 
Argumentation and Debating (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1908), p. ix.
l^Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation, 
p. 123; Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation 
and Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904).
•*-3Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation, 
p. 123. He further noted that: "One of their students
. . . either in 1903-04 when Baker's book was the text, 
or in 1904-05 when their own book was used was James M. 
O'Neill."
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also followed in the Baker tradition.'*'® These works con­
tributed little to the "development" of argumentation 
theory, however, serving largely as restatements and/or 
refinements of existing approaches. Exceptions, of course, 
will be duly noted.
Since the influence of Baker's work was so 
pervasive, it seems appropriate to examine the standard 
tradition of argumentation and debate theory within the 
structural framework of The Principles of Argumentation, 
specifically the 1895 edition and the 1905 revision with 
Henry Barrett Huntington.17 The nature of argumentation, 
analysis, briefing, and evidence occupied separate chapters 
in both editions. Baker was less certain about organizing 
other topics. In the first edition he included sections on 
preparatory reading, the forensic itself, and persuasion.
The revision with Huntington incorporated preparatory read­
ing into the chapters on analysis and evidence, and sub­
stituted the term presentation for forensic, broadening
16These texts were generally included in bibliogra­
phies, the Ketcham and Pattee texts going through at least 
one revision. Ketcham acknowledged the influence of 
Raymond Alden. Victor A. Ketcham, Argumentation and Debate 
(1921 rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1914).
Pattee noted his indebtedness to Baker. George K. Pattee, 
Practical Argumentation (1915 rev. ed.; New York: Century
Company, 1909). Gardiner1s work, moreover, showed the 
influence of Baker's approach. J. H. Gardiner, The Making 
of Arguments (New York: Ginn and Company, 1912).
17George P. Baker and Henry B. Huntington, The 
Principles of Argumentation (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and
Company, 1905). The third edition (1925), written 
exclusively by Huntington, is more properly considered in 
Ch. III.
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the concept to include persuasion. It is useful for this 
study to lump these notions regarding presentation into 
one category, the forensic, to use Baker's original label.
The Nature of Argumentation
Discontented with contemporary treatments of
18argumentation as a form of composition, and unwilling to 
accept argumentation simply as an "off-shoot of logic," or 
as an oral discourse limited by rules of evidence and legal 
procedure,^ Baker sought "to expound simply and interest­
ingly" the principles involved in "the argumentation of 
everyday life."^® He examined the nature of the discipline 
primarily through defining it, assessing its ends, and 
through determining its relation to other subjects.
See Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation," 
for a discussion of "shortcomings Baker found in contempo- 
rary rhetorics and his search for an acceptable alterna­
tive." This is not to imply that Baker rejected contempo­
rary rhetorics totally. Rather, citations in Principles 
indicate that he leaned heavily on such works as John F. 
Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn
and Company, 18 87), and J. B. Fletcher and G. R. Carpenter, 
Introduction to Theme-Writing (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1893).
l^See W. C. Robinson, Forensic Oratory (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1893).
^Baker, Principles, p. vi. Baker's insistence 
on a practical approach was influenced by Robinson,
Forensic Oratory; Alfred Sidgwick, The Process of Argument: 
A Contribution to Logic (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1893); Alfred Sidgwick, The Use of Words in Reasoning 
(London: Adam and Charles Biack, 1901); Austin Phelps,
Theory of Preaching: Lectures on Homilectics (London:
Richard Dickinson, 1882) .
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Though Baker believed that practical argumentation,
1 fundamental to all others . . . exists independent of the
rules which have been formulated to govern the handling of
evidence in courts, independent of legal procedure, and
. . . can be understood without any study of books of 
21Formal Logic," he investigated, nevertheless, the rela­
tion of argumentation both to methods of arguing in law 
courts and to Formal Logic. Baker also claimed that 
argumentation includes persuasive and rhetorical methods 
as well as rules of evidence. He detailed the relationship 
of these divisions as follows:
Clearly, then, knowledge how to distinguish 
good from bad reasoning, Logic, . . .  is but 
the warp which runs through the cloth of Argu­
mentation; and knowledge of the rules of Per­
suasion, of Rhetoric, and of Evidence are the 
threads of the woof. Even as the warp mingles 
with the woof, so it is by careful reasoning 
that each of these special sets of rules is 
applied to the case in hand.22
Conviction and Persuasion 
In the 1895 edition of Principles, Baker defined 
argumentation as "the art of producing in the mind of some 
one else a belief in the ideas which the speaker or writer
9 1Baker, Principles, p. vi.
99 Ibid., p. 20. In the preface to the 1905 
revision of Principles, Baker and Huntington disclaimed 
the need to include the "large amount of justificatory 
and explanatory material" found in the first edition. 
Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
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wishes the hearer or reader to accept."23 Such a result,
he claimed, might be obtained either by
convincing the hearer or reader, through his 
intellect, by the cogency of the reasoning 
advanced; or . . .  by bringing out forcibly 
that in the ideas which will stir the emotions 
of the hearer or reader sufficiently to make 
him act as the speaker or writer desires. 4
Baker failed to acknowledge the influence of the prevailing 
faculty psychology on his w o r k . Neither did other "early 
period" writers, though they treated conviction and per­
suasion separately both as ends and methods appropriate
2 cto argumentation.
Baker believed that "ideal argumentation would 
combine perfection of reasoning, complete convincingness,
23Baker, Principles, p. 1.
24lbid.
25>rhe influence of faculty psychology on Baker's 
approach is evidenced by the following distinctions: "He
who uses . . . only the appeal to the intellect . . . 
employs the method of Conviction only. . . .  He who depends 
entirely on finding in his material what will excite the 
emotions of his hearer or reader uses only the method of 
Persuasion." Ibid.
2^The Baker-Huntington revision added the phrase 
"and of inducing the other person, if necessary, to act in 
consequence of his acquired belief." Baker and Huntington, 
Principles, p. 7. Both Alden and Foster included the 
notion of action as a proper part of argumentation. Alden, 
Art of Debate, p. 5; Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 
1908 ed., p. 85; 1917 rev. ed., p. 123. Though Laycock and 
Scales defined argumentation in terms of belief, their dis­
cussion of conviction and persuasion indicates that belief 
results in action. Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 1-3. In the 1917 revision, O'Neill also 
included the concept. James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, 
and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1917), p. 1.
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27with perfection of persuasive power," though he did not 
clarify the inherent relationship between these elements. 
The Baker-Huntington revision, on the other hand, uncon­
vinced of the validity of a dichotomy, emphasized that 
"conviction and persuasion are not independent but com-
2Qplementary" processes. The authors explained as follows
For purposes of instruction it will, 
however, be convenient to treat first the 
principles which underlie successful convic­
tion and then those which make for effective 
persuasion; but a reader should never forget 
that this separation is artificial and made 
wholly for pedagogic reasons. 9̂
Alden called conviction and persuasion "the two 
great divisions of argument.Laycock and Scales and 
Foster agreed that argumentation should include both 
processes.̂  Evidence does not indicate, however, that 
these authors viewed a separation of the functions as 
"artificial." As Alden said:
These two elements, then, the power of 
reaching the reason, and the power of winning 
the disposition and moving the will, belong 
side by side in all successful debate. It is 
not that one part of a speech is given up to 
the one, and another part to the other; but
27Baker, Principles, p. 7.
28Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 11.
29Ibid.
30Alden, Art of Debate, p. 5.
31Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
p. 4; Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 262
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that the whole, both in matter and manner, is 
to be made to serve the ends of each.
Agreement on conviction and persuasion as essential
elements of argumentation was not universal. Though Baker,
33Alden, Laycock and Scales, and Foster called for a broad 
philosophical base for the discipline, the tendency per­
sisted to restrict argumentation to matters of logic. In 
his text, The Essentials of Argumentation, Elias MacEwan, 
for example, viewed argumentation as "the process of 
proving or disproving a proposition."^ And in another 
early work, A Course in Argumentative Writing, Gertrude 
Buck examined the logical bases of argumentation in terms 
of the prevailing S-R psychological theory. Buck objected 
that "the means to attain the end remains unspecified" in
32Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6. Alden also discussed 
the special characteristics of debate: "If argumentation
is the art of convincing others of the truth or falsity of 
a disputed matter, debate may be said to be the art of 
doing this under conditions such that both sides of the 
case can be heard and that the advocates of each side can 
reply directly to those of the other," p. 1.
33Their definitions of argumentation paralleled 
those found in the first edition of Baker's Principles.
See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6; Laycock and Scales, Argu­
mentation and Debate, p. 1; Foster's discussion followed 
that found in the Baker and Huntington revision. See 
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 85.
"^Elias J. MacEwan, The Essentials of Argumentation 
(Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1898), p. 1. He
restricted his discussion, moreover, to an investigation of 
the processes of reasoning. Alden included the "truth or 
falsity" distinction of formal logic in his discussion of 
conviction. Alden, Art of Debate, p. 1.
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both the Baker and MacEwan definitions, and he preferred to
delineate argumentation as
the act of establishing in the mind of another 
person a conclusion which has become fixed in 
his own, by means of setting up in the other 
person's mind the train of thought which has 
previously led you to this c o n c l u s i o n . - * 5
Formal and Applied Logic
In differentiating "Formal Logic" (logic treated
as a science) from "Applied Logic" (the reasoning of
"everyday" affairs), and in determining to "study Logic
only in its practical application in controversy of what- 
36ever kind," Baker relied on the pronouncements of the
British philosopher Alfred Sidgwick. In the preface to
The Process of Argument, Sidgwick had aimed for:
the extension of a knowledge of the more 
useful parts of Logic. It is written for 
those who are interested rather in the war 
against fallacy than in the grammatical 
inquiries which form so large a part of the 
Logic taught in the text-books.3•
Baker quoted Sidgwick extensively to substantiate
his own position that a knowledge of Formal Logic is not
3 8essential to careful study of argumentation. Two objec­
tions seemed particularly important to Baker: that the
35 . . . .Gertrude Buck, A Course m  Argumentative Writing
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1901), p. 3.
36Baker, Principles, pp. 24-25.
37Sidgwick, Process of Argument, preface.
3 8Baker, Principles, pp. 21-25.
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technical terms of Formal Logic are of little practical 
use; and that the discipline gives little help in distin­
guishing between sound and unsound i n f e r e n c e . Baker also
40cited the work of W. Stanley Jevons, another philosopher 
intrigued with how man "commonly" reasons. Jevons' spe­
cific methodology, more traditional than Sidgwick's, found 
greater favor with Baker's followers, however, than with 
Baker.
Legal Procedure 
Though Baker contended that to assume argumentation 
to be simply a legal method was to "mistake a species for 
the genus, he, nevertheless, admitted a close relation­
ship between the disciplines. His belief that "the special 
knowledge necessary for a lawyer, depends upon, is sur­
rounded by, knowledge of the universal methods of reason­
ing"^ harkened back to W. C. Robinson's distinctions:
Every issue in a cause [in law] presents 
two questions, either or both of which may be 
disputed. (1) What were the facts in which 
the controversy originated? (2) What are the
39Sidgwick, Process of Argument, pp. 74-76,
199-200.
40W. Stanley Jevons, Elementary Lessons m  Logic: 
Deductive and Inductive (new ed.; London: Macmillan
Company, 1881).
41Baker, Principles, p. 9.
^2Ibid., p. 11.
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rules of law by which, in view of these facts, 
the issue is to be determined? 3̂
Baker further believed that
A complete treatise on Argumentation must . . . 
include a chapter on rules of law, . . . but 
it would be but a part of, and secondary to, a 
treatment of those principles upon which 
Argumentation universally depends.44
Though aware of argumentation's debt to other 
disciplines, writers who followed Baker did not belabour 
the point.4® It was not, in fact, until the publication 
in 1917, of James M. O'Neill's revision of Laycock and 
Scales' Argumentation and Debate, that a full-fledged 
attempt at comparisons appeared. O'Neill not only dis­
cussed specific sources of theory in an introductory 
chapter to his work, but he also cited many "direct 
quotations from recognized authorities” throughout the 
text.4® His summary chart follows:
4^Robinson, Forensic Oratory, sec. 60, cited by 
Baker, Principles, p. 9.
44Baker, Principles, p. 11.
4®See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. vi-vii; Laycock 
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. vii; Foster, 
Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 85-90.
A CO'Neill, Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. x, 3-11.
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Having detailed the nature of argumentation both
by definition and by examining it in its habitat, Baker
listed three conditions necessary for successful argument:
"(1) What the question means; (2) What you believe about
it, and why; (3) How you are to state your case so that
47(a) you shall convince, and (b) persuade." Corresponding 
to these three questions were Baker's three divisions of 
argumentative composition: analysis; study of the rules
of evidence; and rhetorical structure and persuasion, the 
two parts of the third division. It is with these topics 
that the remainder of this chapter will be concerned.
47Baker, Principles, p. 30.
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Analysis
One of the most significant contributions of
Principles was its exposition of argumentative analysis.
For Baker, it was analysis which defined the question in
dispute and set out the work to be done. Ten years after
Principles first appeared, Baker and Huntington revised
extensively Baker's original treatment of analysis. As a
result of this "restating for greater accuracy and sim- 
4 8plicity, Edward Z. Rowell observed that "this feature 
became one of the most valuable of the new discipline.
The 190 5 edition clarified the scope of analysis and, though 
reducing the number, developed more fully its specific 
"steps." While the Alden, and Laycock and Scales texts 
followed Baker's first probings, Foster benefited from the 
clarifications and extensions, as well as from the per­
spective, of the Baker and Huntington revision.
Baker delineated the nature of analysis in his 
first edition as follows:
To find out what the real point in dispute 
is, we must carefully examine the material we 
can collect in regard to the subject, and by 
placing on one side all the ideas upon which 
our opponent admits his readiness to agree 
with us; by excluding bit by bit all ideas 
that must be admitted to be irrelevant; by 
subordinating what is less important to what
4 8Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
^9Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation:
Part II. The Historical Roots of the Problem," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XVIII (April, 1932), 243.
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is more so; reach the pivotal idea or ideas.
. . . The process by which we find these 
natural inter-relations of the material—  
what may be called the primary or inherent 
structure— is again analysis.
Baker set out "five important steps" in analysis in the 
first edition of Principles; finding propositions; 
defining them; determining a question's origin; dis­
covering the "special issue"; and relating the central 
idea to ideas essential to a case.5  ̂ Baker and Huntington 
refined and revised the categories in their 190 5 edition 
and included: phrasing the proposition; defining the
terms; finding the special issues; and constructing the 
52case.
The Proposition 
For Baker, "the first work of analysis is to find
out what is the real point at issue, on what it is that
5 3the basal difference of opinion rests." Distinguishing
54a term from a proposition, he counselled that one should
cnBaker, Principles, pp. 30-31.
^ Ibid., pp. 33-77.
C O Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 14-60.
For similar statements of methodology see Laycock and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 17-27; Foster, 
Argumentation and Debating, 1917 ed., pp. 19-20; O'Neill, 
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 21.
53Baker, Principles, p. 32.
^Relying on Jevons' idea that, "A logical term 
may consist of any number of nouns, substantive or objec­
tive, with the articles, prepositions, and conjunctions
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"seek first of all to find whether what he or his opponent 
wishes to treat argumentatively can be phrased as a 
proposition."^
Though Laycock and Scales talked about "formulating 
a proposition,"^ and Baker and Huntington substituted the 
term phrasing for finding the proposition, neither discus­
sion differed appreciably from Baker's earlier pronounce­
ments.^ It was, rather, Alden's treatment of the
required to join them together," and following the reason­
ing that, "When we join terms together we make a proposi­
tion; when we join propositions together, we make argument, 
or piece of reasoning," Baker contended that "when we join 
the arguments, or pieces of reasoning together, we have 
Argumentation." W. S. Jevons, Primer of Logic (New York: 
Appleton and Company, 1878), pp. 12-15, cited in Baker, 
Principles, p. 33.
^Baker, Principles, p. 39. Baker defined a propo­
sition as "an assertion m  regard to a term or terms," 
p. 33. Laycock and Scales made a similar distinction, 
defining a proposition as "a statement that something is or 
is not." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
p. 13. Whereas Baker was interested in both the analysis 
for and o£ a proposition, most writers who followed him 
treated the phrasing of a proposition as a step preliminary 
to analysis. Though Baker and Huntington's approach moved 
toward "phrasing," they, nevertheless, retained the organi­
zational scheme of the first edition which placed finding 
the proposition as the first step in analysis.
^They set out specific methodology which corre­
sponded to Baker's "steps" for analysis: finding out what
is the real question at issue; "formulating the question 
in words"; and "comparing the meaning of the statement so 
expressed with the meaning of the real question in issue." 
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 17-27.
57They made some practical suggestions for choosing 
a topic which they relegated to a footnote. Baker and 
Huntington, Principles, pp. 19-20. They also suggested a 
conference to determine agreement on the meaning of the 
proposition, p. 404.
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debate proposition that presaged new developments in 
theory.
Alden believed that the "subject for debate . . . 
must be such that it can be reduced to the form of a 
proposition; for a proposition is the only form of words 
which has two distinct sides, an affirmative and a
r pnegative." He further suggested that, "where accuracy
is demanded, or where a decision . . . is to be rendered,"
59a stated proposition "is almost necessary." Alden's 
influence lay, however, not in any original theoretical 
construct, but rather in the application of the concept 
of the proposition (as developed by logic and rhetoric) to 
debating. His specific prescriptions for stating or 
phrasing a proposition for debate, moreover, provided a 
rationale for subsequent systems of classifying proposi­
tions as well as criteria for "good" propositions.
Classifying Propositions
Though Alden had suggested the impossibility of 
classifying debatable questions "in any thoroughly 
systematic way," his own discussion of phrasing propositions
^Alden, interested in practical debating, took 
"legal argument . . .  as the basis for the general subject 
of debate." Alden, Art of Debate, pp. vi, 10.
^ Ibid., p. 11. Laycock and Scales determined 
that: "The proposition may be expressed or not as cir­
cumstances seem to require." Laycock and Scales, Argumen­
tation and Debate, p. 15.
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for debate foreshadowed later classification systems.®® He 
said:
The principal verb of the proposition will 
state the affirmative; if a negative word is 
added, it will state the negative. If the 
question is one of pure fact, the verb will 
commonly be the verb to be; if it is one of 
theory or policy, the verb will frequently 
be ought or some similar auxiliary.®^
James M. O'Neill recognized in 1917, that certain 
writers in argumentation had begun to classify proposi­
tions.®^ He cited specifically the works of J. H. Gardiner 
and George K. Pattee. Gardiner had distinguished proposi­
tions of fact and propositions of policy practically, in 
terms of "the different form and degree of certitude to 
which they lead."®-* He had anticipated, moreover, a 
third classification, questions of taste or value, when 
he observed: "Finally, there are the arguments of
®®Alden, Art of Debate, p. 30. Logic of course 
had included detailed systems of classification. See 
J. H. Hyslop, Elements of Logic (New ¥ork: Charles
Scribner's Sons^ 1901), p. 121.
®̂ -Alden, Art of Debate, p. 10.
6 2O'Neill's observation that "A proposition of 
fact aims at belief, a proposition of policy aims at 
action," harkened back to questions of the philosophical 
bases of argumentation; i.e., the inclusion of action 
(persuasion) as an appropriate end of argumentation. 
O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
p. 19.
°~>Gardiner, Making of Arguments, p. 14.
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policy which deal with matters of taste and aesthetic 
preference.1,64
Pattee made similar distinctions:
A common and convenient method of clas­
sification divides propositions into two 
groups: propositions of policy, and proposi­
tions of fact. The first class consists of 
those propositions that aim to prove the truth 
of a theory, that indicate a preference for 
a certain policy, for a certain method of 
action. The second class comprises those 
propositions that affirm or deny the occur­
rence of an event, or the existence of a fact. 
Propositions of policy usually, but not 
always, contain the word should or ought; 
propositions of fact usually contain some form 
of the word to be.^
O'Neill stated his own position as follows:
But since most arguments of policy rest 
upon questions of fact, since many questions 
can be so phrased as to fit either type with­
out altering materially the nature of the 
case, and since the work to be done in find­
ing, phrasing, supporting, or attacking, is 
practically the same for both kinds of proposi­
tions, it is hardly worthwhile to try to make 
much of this classification. It is wise,
Ibid., p. 23. Aware of the interrelationship of 
the various kinds of propositions, Gardiner said: "In
practice these three kinds of arguments, which turn on 
moral, practical, and aesthetic considerations, tend to be 
much mingled. . . . Furthermore, one must never forget that 
an argument of policy which does not involve and react on 
subsidiary questions of fact is rare; and the questions of 
fact must be settled before we can go on with the argument 
of policy. . . .  On the other hand, there are some cases 
of questions of fact in which our practical interests 
deeply affect the view which we take of the facts. . . .
Yet the distinction between the two main classes is a real 
one, and if one has never thought it out, one may go at an 
argument with a blurred notion of what he is attempting to 
do," pp. 24-25.
^Pattee, Practical Argumentation, 1915 rev. ed.,
pp. 20-21.
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however, to decide, among other things, whether 
we are arguing facts (as such) or policies, 
before planning our argument.66
Characteristics of "Good"
Propositions
Alden had recommended avoiding propositions which 
are obvious, which depend on ambiguous terminology, and 
which are difficult to demonstrate or involve more than 
one issue.6  ̂ These suggestions, along with the following 
prescriptions for wording a proposition, appeared in later 
works as "characteristics" or "qualities" of "good" propo­
sitions. Alden advised that:
Propositions for debate should be worded so 
that the affirmative will be under the first 
responsibility of proof, should be as brief 
as may be consistent with exactness, should 
make the issues involved as distinct as pos­
sible, and should avoid every appearance of 
partiality.68
Foster's "requirements" of a proposition suggest 
similar standards:
1. The proposition should be debatable.
2. The proposition should not employ ambiguous 
terms.
3. The proposition should not be too broad.
660'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 19.
c. 7Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 11-17. Alden noted 
that some propositions have little interest for an 
audience. See also Baker and Huntington, Principles, 
pp. 398-401.
68Alden, Art of Debate, p. 22.
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4. The proposition should embody one central idea.
5. The proposition should give to the affirmative
the burden of proof.
6. The proposition should be interesting.
7. The proposition for first practice should cover
familiar ground.
8. The proposition should be phrased briefly and
fiQsimply.0:7
O'Neill's "desirable characteristics or qualities
of a good proposition," admittedly similar to Foster's 
70and Ketcham's criteria, follow: propositions for debate
are stated as an assertion? are single, unambiguous,
unprejudiced, brief, simple, concrete, and specific; place
burden of proof on affirmative; and are debatable and 
71interesting./x
Definition
Baker believed that central to determining whether
a proposition "phrased the matter really in dispute," is an
investigation of:
(1) What the terms in each proposition mean, 
and hence the proposition as a whole; and
^Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed. , 
pp. 3-12; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 3-11.
70See Ketcham, Argumentation and Debate, 1914 ed.,
p. 12.
710'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 27-31.
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(2) whether this meaning of the whole proposi­
tion states the question calling for debate.
. . . When, then, the meaning of the terms of 
a proposition, or of a proposition as a whole, 
is not self-evident, definition is the second 
important step in analysis.^
Baker relied on traditional rhetorical distinctions in 
discussing this "step," his criteria for a "good" defini­
tion^ not differing significantly from those included in 
contemporary composition texts.^ Baker believed that:
In defining we shall be forced very often 
to turn aside from the dictionaries and by 
search in essays, books by specialists, in our 
own experience, by careful examination of the 
words, and by thought upon them, to reach 
through analogy, exemplification, analysis of 
the word, detailed description, iteration, 
antithesis, their real meaning.75
Agreeing that "definitions should have reference
not to theoretical meanings, but to the meaning of the
words under the circumstances," Alden suggested turning to
"the sources, surroundings, and present conditions of the
76subject discussed." Meanwhile, Laycock and Scales
72Baker, Principles, p. 40.
73Baker included clarity, convincingness, brevity 
and "should not . . . define in a circle, . . . beg the 
question." Ibid., pp. 44-49. See Henry N. Day, Elements 
of the Art of Rhetoric (New York: Barnes and Burr, 1850);
Adams Sherman Hill, The Principles of Rhetoric (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1878).
7^Baker specifically acknowledged an indebtedness 
to Genung's system of classification. Baker, Principles, 
p. viii.
75Ibid., p. 59.
7^Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 33-34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
devised specific methodology for "testing the meaning of
the proposition." They advised:
First, find its ordinary acceptation. Second, 
determine whether it may have any meaning that 
is technical or in any way peculiar. . . .
Third, even after the definition is obtained 
from a good authority, consider the questions:
Are the terms of this definition that I have 
found exact? Are there any exceptions to the 
general statement?77
"Defining the terms" received increased attention
in the 1905 revision of Principles of Argumentation.
Casting around for an alternative to dictionary meanings,
Baker and Huntington suggested defining from the history
of the question and incorporated a study of the origin
of the question,7® the immediate cause for discussion,
7Qand clash of opinion into this "safer method." Though
7 7Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 25.
78In his first edition, Baker had contended that 
"some study of the origin of the question" is involved in 
defining the terms of a proposition, andcalled it the 
"third, if subordinate, step in analysis." He elaborated: 
"In accepting the definitions as not merely clear but as 
satisfactory for our purposes, we test them, by examining 
the origin of the question, to see whether the definitions 
give to the proposition as a whole a meaning that phrases 
the general question we wish to discuss." Baker, Prin­
ciples , pp. 67, 70. This distinction was dropped as a 
separate "step" in the 1905 revision. Foster, however, 
treated the history of a question and its origin as sepa­
rate steps in analysis, comparable to definition. Foster, 
Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 18-24. He added 
"the immediate cause for discussion" in his revision, 1917 
rev. ed., p. 22.
7®Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 26-40.
They noted two other classes of topics, those on which 
there is not much printed matter and questions not
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reiterating the criteria of the first edition, Baker and 
Huntington clarified the relationship of definition to 
argumentation as follows:
It is advisable to remember the essentials 
of any good definition: clearness, convincing­
ness, and as much brevity as the other two 
qualities permit. The definition must be clear 
and convincing, not merely to the writer but to 
his audience; for the aim in any discussion is, 
of course, to make the interpretation of the 
question by opponent or audience coincide with 
that of the writer.̂ 0
Baker and Huntington also suggested that a preliminary
definition of terms helps rid the discussion of vagueness
and of technical terms and avoids confusion from
ambiguousness.
D 1Foster agreed that clearnessOJ- and convincingness 
are essential in formal debate. Believing, moreover, 
that "a dictionary definition is at best but a nucleus or
discussed before. In the first instance, they pointed out 
that if men known to hold opposing views on the questions 
are interrogated, "immediate cause, origin, and clash will 
promptly develop, and, as a consequence, the needed defini­
tion." In the other case, Baker and Huntington pointed out 
that "the chief difference between this kind of question 
and the other two classes is that in it the definitions 
used may not arise from the question itself," p. 37.
80Ibid., pp. 37-38. Alden had earlier suggested 
that "words should never be allowed to obscure the real 
question." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 34.
81Foster listed six requisites of clearness in 
definition: cover all cases included; exclude all cases
excluded; be simple; not employ terms to be defined; stated 
positively; be as brief as possible. Foster, Argumentation 
and Debating, 190 8 ed., p. 26. Foster deleted the last two 
of these criteria in his revision, 1917 rev. ed., p. 29.
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core, which must be supplemented and amplified and
82explained," he offered the following "special methods
of definition": etymology; authority; negation; exemplifi-
83cation; and explication.
O'Neill isolated two purposes of definition in
argumentation:
It serves, first, to enable the writer, in the 
beginning of his work in preparation, to find 
out the real meaning of the question.
Secondly, it serves to make the meaning clear 
to the reader or hearer.84
Satisfied with the sufficiency of Laycock and Scales's
distinctions for the first purpose, O'Neill nevertheless
advised additional methods of definition for the second.
He included authority, etymological derivation, context,
8 5analogy, illustration, exclusion, and analysis.
Issues
Discovering Issues
Baker identified the fourth step of analysis,
®^Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 30. See Sidgwick, Use of 
Words in Reasoning, p. 42.
8 3For a discussion of these methods and their value 
in definition, see Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 
ed., pp. 30-36. Foster relied on Genung's descriptions of 
explication and exemplification. See John F. Genung, The 
Working Principles of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn and Company,
1901), pp. 565“, 578.
84O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 300.
8 5O'Neill included examples from speeches to demon­
strate the various approaches to definition. See O'Neill, 
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 300-307.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
finding the special issue in a case, as follows:
In every case . . . there is one central 
idea, or group of ideas, about which the 
others centre. To prove this central idea, 
or group of ideas, to be true or false, is 
to win the case for the affirmative or the 
negative. . . . That is the special issue 
in the case. As we answer it affirmatively 
or negatively, the case is settled for one 
side or the other; on this question the 
debate turns.86
One discovers issues, Baker further suggested, by settling
what facts are admitted by both sides, and by cutting out
ft 7 ft ftextraneous ideas. Both Alden, and Laycock and Scales00
built on that analysis. Insisting that "the work of
analysis clearly presupposes a full understanding of the
OQquestion on both sides," Alden enlarged the scope of
analysis to include
not only the questions, Just what does the 
proposition maintain? and, What must chiefly 
be shown in order to prove the truth of
88Baker, Principles, p. 70.
^ Ibid., pp. 74-77.
88Alden defined the "main issue" as "that which it 
is chiefly necessary to prove, in order to prove the whole 
proposition." He suggested that "it is found by discarding 
all minor matters connected with the question, and fixing 
the attention upon that which properly forms the central 
portion of the argument." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 35. 
Laycock and Scales suggested that ''the issues are the ideas 
or matters of fact upon the establishment of which depends 
the establishment of the proposition." Laycock and Scales, 
Argumentation and Debate, p. 28.
88Alden, Art of Debate, p. 42. Laycock and Scales 
agreed. Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
p. 42.
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it? but also, What objections are made to it? 
and, How far are the objections significant?
Laycock and Scales, moreover, added to Baker's distinctions
those of certain other contemporary writers. Their dis-
Q 1cussion of "stress of the controversy," for example,
9 2reflected the influence of John Ward's System of Oratory,
while their treatment of "primary" and "subordinate" issues
9 3came chiefly from Robinson's Forensic Oratory. From 
these sources, Laycock and Scales derived a clear statement
^°Alden, Art of Debate, p. 43.
91Laycock and Scales said: "In any discussion the
'stress of the controversy' inevitably falls upon the 
proving or disproving of a few points, which are the centre 
and soul of the question; whichever side wins in the 
struggle over these points wins the whole contest. These 
points are always the same in the same question: they
exist independently of the wills of the disputants; they 
are to be discovered, not invented. These facts are the 
issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
pp. 29-30.
92Laycock and Scales cited John Ward's distinc­
tions : "But in all disputes it is of greatest consequence
to observe where the stress of the controversy lies. For, 
without attending to this, persons may cavil about dif­
ferent matters, without understanding each other or 
deciding anything." John Ward, System of Oratory (London: 
J. Ward, 1759), cited in Laycock and Scales, Argumentation 
and Debate, p. 29.
^For the influence of Robinson see Laycock and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 30. Laycock and 
Scales also investigated the relationship of subordinate 
to primary issues ("issues are related directly to the 
proposition; the subordinate issues, indirectly") and con­
cluded: "In selecting the issues, then, points should be
chosen which are nearly equal in value to one another, and 
which are of such a nature that all the evidence and argu­
ments that it is desirable to use in the case can be 
logically grouped around them," pp. 39-40.
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of methodology for determining the issues which emphasized
9 4the "direct clash of opinion."
In their 1905 revision of Principles, Baker and
Huntington appropriated the term "clash in opinion" to
describe "the most essential part of analysis," that which
9 5provides the special issues. J
By . . . exclusion from the clash in 
opinion, of all extraneous, admitted, waived, 
and granted matter, the investigator reaches 
a set of statements all of which directly or 
indirectly are essential to the discussion of 
the question.
From the clash, they reasoned, one "will find at least part
of the definition of terms; from it he will draw first, the
ideas essential in the case, and finally, the special issues 
9 7themselves." Foster's discussion followed suit:
After the meaning of the proposition has 
thus been set forth with clearness and pre­
cision, and with satisfaction to the audience, 
and after the extraneous matters have been 
ruled out and the admitted matters stated, the
94"To summarize, in finding the issues: (1) put
aside all matters that are not related directly to the 
proposition; (2) but be sure to understand the question in 
all its phases and all its details; (3) know both sides of 
the question thoroughly; (4) exclude all irrelevant matter 
and all matter that each side can admit without damaging 
its cause; (5) select the points on which there is a direct 
clash of opinion between the opposing sides or which cannot 
be admitted by the one side or the other; (6) discriminate 
between the issues and the subordinate issues; (7) study 
the origin and history of the question." Ibid., p. 42.
9^Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 58.
96Ibid., p. 49.
^Ibid., p. 58.
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next step is the terse, impartial, and com­
plete enumeration of the arguments which may 
be held on the affirmative and those which 
may be held on the negative. The Clash of 
Opinion thus presented will reveal . . . the 
issues of the proposition. The main issues 
are the controversial points which, if proved, 
directly support the proposition. The sub­
ordinate issues are the controversial points 
which, if proved, indirectly support the 
proposition by directly supporting the main 
issues.
O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales's theory
of issues, though subtle, was significant. The issues,
O'Neill said,
are not simply "important main points," or 
"points on which there is a clash of opinion."
They are the smallest possible divisions of 
crucial points, each one of which the affirma­
tive must establish in order to establish the 
proposition. 9
O'Neill minimized "clash" as a method for determining
issues but continued to advise excluding unimportant and
indirect matter.
Stock Issues
Though the application of common questions to 
propositions is not a new phenomenon,to suggest that
9 8Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., 
pp. 42-43. See 1917 rev. ed. for identical treatment, 
p. 45.
9 9O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 43.
^^For O'Neill's system of finding issues, see 
ibid., pp. 58-66.
■^^See historical background in Lenore Evans, "The 
Development of the Concept of Analysis by Modern Writers on
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stasis in classical rhetorical theory is the same as stock
issues of modern argumentation and debate theory probably
is to overstate the case. Modern stock issues have
operated in many cases not as a method for discovering
issues but, rather, ae the issues or at least the major
102points in partition. One of the earliest argumentation
writers to advocate applying stock issues to debate
propositions, J. R. Pelsma, implied such a position when
he suggested that analysis can be lessened by using a
special formula of standard issues. He and Henry
Bainbridge Goughpublished separate, though similar,
such "formulae" in the November, 1917, issue of the Public
Speaking Review. Pelsma said:
When a proposition is up for debate, it 
usually, if not always, rises from an attempt 
to remedy some manifest evil; . . . It is 
obvious, therefore, that those in favor of the 
measure must establish two points, namely:
(1) That there are such defects or evils, and
(2) That the proposed measure will remedy the 
defects or cure the evils. If these two points 
can be established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
he has gained his purpose; for pray, what else 
is there to prove?
Argumentation" (unpublished thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1954), pp. 16-25.
10 2For a discussion of the relation of the issues 
to the partition, see section on Brief-Drawing.
10 3J. R. Pelsma, "A Difficult Problem for the 
Debater: The Special Issues," Public Speaking Review, III
(November, 1913), 1.
10 4Harry Bainbridge Gough, "Formulas for the 
Special Issues," Public Speaking Review, III (November, 
1913), 6.
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To some questions a third point is 
manifest— the practicability. However, it 
may be plainly seen that this point would 
logically be included under our second 
division; but at times it is advisable, 
especially when there are three debaters on 
a side, to make it a separate i s s u e . 10^
Pelsma outlined as follows:
The affirmative proves:
1. Cause for action, or 
Evils in present system, or 
Necessity for change.
2. Method of action, or 
Remedy for evils, or 
Feasibility of plan.
3. Best plan.
Practicability of method, and
The negative proves:
1. No adequate cause for action, or 
Evils do not exist, or
No necessity for changes proposed.
2. Method not adequate, or 
Evils incurable, or 
Plan not adequate.
3. Method not practicable, or 
Better plan.106
Gough's listing was similar:
A. Formula for the Affirmative
1. Is it (the proposed policy or 
solution) necessary?
2. Will it be efficient (practical)?
3. Will it prove superior?
B. Formula for the Negative
1. Is the existing policy or condition
106Pelsma, "A Difficult Problem," p. 2.
10~Ibid., p. 3. Pelsma recognized, however, the 
following limitations: "The issues enumerated above do
not carry equal weight in every question. The amount of 
time placed on the various issues will depend on the nature 
of the question. But if the proposition be a good debat­
able one and be stated affirmatively, the outline suggested 
can, with very little modification, be adopted in nineteen 
out of twenty cases, and all minor points will fall logi­
cally under one of the six special issues," pp. 3-4.
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inherently evil?
2. Could the evil be removed and the 
present plan thus perfected?
3. Would the present policy or method 
of treatment thus perfected be 
superior to the one proposed by the 
affirmative?*0'
O'Neill was among the first to include stock issues 
in a textbook on argumentation. Recognizing the impossi­
bility of finding formulae "that can be applied to all
10 8different kinds of questions," he, nevertheless, suggested 
that stock issues might provide a "start" in analyzing
1 nopropositions of policy. O'Neill further considered it
"unsafe" to accept stock issues as "the exact issues."
Why?
First, because analysis may show a more 
specific and concrete wording for these 
general questions. . . . Second, and princi­
pally, because on accurate analysis it may be 
found that one of these questions . . . will 
break up into say three questions, each of 
which must be proved by the affirmative.̂ °
107Gough, "Formulas for Special Issues," p. 6.
10 8Pattee had drawn up separate lists of issues for 
policy and fact questions. See Pattee, Practical Argumen­
tation, 1909 ed., pp. 63-72; 1915 rev. ed., pp. 61-72.
l^o'Neill listed two stock issues: "(1) Is the
present unsatisfactory? Are there evils in the existing 
situation? Is there a cause for action? Is there a 
disease? Do we need a change? etc. (2) Is the proposed 
action an improvement? Will it cure the evils? Is this 
the action we should take? Is this the proper remedy? Is 
the proposed change the right one?" O'Neill, Laycock, and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 56-57.
•^°Ibid., p. 57. The essential test of an issue 
was, for 0 'Neill, that it be vital. He also distinguished 
issues from points of partition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Case
In the first edition of Principles, Baker labeled
the fifth step of analysis "to find the relation to the
111central idea of ideas essential in the case."
Or, to put it differently, we must decide what 
ideas are to be proved true, and in what order, 
if the special issue is to be settled as we1 Iwish. ■L ± *
Baker used an historical example to show the relation of 
the issues in a given case, but he gave no specific methods 
for determining the structure of the material in a 
proposition.
In their 1905 revision, though Baker and Huntington 
continued to treat "constructing the case" as a step in 
analysis, they devoted less than a page to its discussion, 
simply saying:
Even, however, as a student takes the 
three steps in analysis,— phrasing the propo­
sition, defining the terms, and finding the 
special issues, he acquires material which 
may be used to support his views or to combat 
his opponent's ideas. He must next learn how 
to value all this correctly, and hew to mass 
it about his special issues so as to give it 
the strongest presentation. In this construc­
tion of a case a knowledge of evidence and a 
knowledge of brief-drawing are essential. 13
Many "early period" writers treated case in terms 
of brief-drawing. Though most outlined the work of
■̂ ■̂Baker, Principles, p. 77.
ll2Ibid.
113Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 60.
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individual speakers in a debate, they did not call it 
case. These prescriptions appear, therefore, in a later 
section of this chapter which examines the forensic.
O'Neill included one of the first modern treatments 
of case in his 1917 revision of the Laycock-Scales text.
He laid out, though sketchily, the work of the affirmative 
and examined negative alternatives. Regarding the affirma­
tive "case" he said:
The work of the affirmative in a debate 
differs somewhat from that of the negative.
The affirmative has the burden of proof in 
all properly worded questions. The affirma­
tive case then must establish the affirmative 
of all issues— ail potential issues not 
admitted by the negative. The question should 
be analyzed to find the issues. . . . Then a 
partition should be decided upon that will 
back up the affirmative of all issues on which 
there is a fight.
O'Neill also outlined four "types" of negative case:
1. Pure refutation. The first, and weakest, 
negative is a case of pure refutation.
The negative simply attacks what the 
affirmative offers and seeks to destroy 
it without taking any responsibility for 
"the situation." . . .  It is simple 
denial. It is simply resting on their 
presumption and trying by pure refutation 
to prevent the affirmative from establish­
ing a prima facie case. . . . This type 
should never be used when there is any 
good or truth at all in the affirmative 
contentions. It is practically never found 
in contest debating.
2. Defense of the present. The second type 
of negative is a positive "defense of the 
present" (in addition to refutation of
'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 376-77.
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course). The affirmative is wrong because 
no change is needed at all. . . . This is 
little better than pure refutation of the 
affirmative, but does have the added ele­
ment of actually defending the negative 
presumptions. . . .
3. Adjustment. The third case is one of 
adjustment, repairs, some changes, but not 
an adoption of the affirmative case. It 
is a liberal view of the situation, ready 
to make what changes are necessary. Admit­
ting the present is not perfect, but still 
denying that the affirmative is right, it 
substantially defends the present. This
is a very common type of negative in con­
test debating and everywhere else. This 
case is also cumulative, adding "repairs" 
to "defense" and "refutation."
4. Counter proposition. The most radical case 
possible for a negative is that of a counter 
proposition. This is admitting that there 
is a situation which demands remedy, admit­
ting a cause for action, but advocating a 
different remedy. . . . There are two prin­
ciples that must always be lived up to in 
this case: (a) The counter proposition 
must be stated with perfect clearness. The 
negative has to take the burden of proof on 
this proposition, and for safety and clear­
ness the proposition must be carefully 
worded and stated. (b) A counter proposi­
tion must be counter. It must be mcon- 
sistent with the proposition of theaffirmative. ^
The Brief
The Nature of the Brief
Argumentation and debate writers appropriated the 
term, brief, f r o m  law to distinguish "a particular kind
*-^Ibid., pp. 377-78.
■'■^Warren C. Shaw felt that claims for the brief 
were over-estimated insofar as providing systematic 
analysis of debating problems. Shaw said: "As a means for
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of plan or summary that shall have the greatest possible
117clearness of exposition with the least number of words." 1
Baker viewed the brief as an outgrowth of analysis. He
said:
Study of analysis has shown that the 
process of finding what is the question to be 
discussed and what the work to be done gradu­
ally develops in our minds a rough diagram of 
the field we are to cover. We learn that 
there is one essential idea, or one essential 
group of ideas, to prove true or false, and 
that a variable number of other ideas bear 
certain relations to the special issue and to 
one another, and must be taken up with some 
regard for this fact. It is evident that to 
put this inherent structure on paper must help 
us in gathering evidence, for we shall know 
what proof will be needed first, and shall 
have pockets, so to speak, into which we may 
put evidence bearing on the idea with which 
each pocket is labeled. 18
For Baker, this plan "must . . .  be something that will
make a person who has not given any special thought to the
securing system in the arrangement of arguments, the brief, 
of course, is invaluable; but as a means for securing 
systematic analysis of the problem that is to be briefed, 
it does scarcely more than to emphasize the necessity of 
finding what we are looking for. To be sure, it makes all- 
important the discovery of the issues; and it requires 
that all material shall be tested by its relevancy to these 
issues; but it does not really help us in the practical 
operations of analysis, because it does not tell us how to 
find the issues. The brief really presupposes that the 
work of analysis has been done, and it is in itself the 
means of preserving in crystallized form the thought that 
has been analyzed." Warren C. Shaw, "Systematic Analysis 
of Debating Problems," Quarterly Journal of Public 
Speaking, II (October, 1916), 344.
13 7Baker, Principles, p. 85.
118 T , • j  n  -3Ibid., p. 83.
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case in question see exactly what is to be discussed and
119exactly what the student wishes to do with it."
It must tell the examiner what the question 
is: must, that is, state the proposition;
make clear in what sense important terms are 
used; show him the origin of the question; 
by making him understand what is generally 
admitted in regard to the subject and what 
matter usually associated with it is really 
extraneous, put the special issue before him; 
and make him see clearly what relations the 
other ideas bear to the main idea and to one 
another. That is, it must convey to another 
person just the information that the writer of 
the plan found it necessary to gain before he 
could treat his topic intelligently. More­
over, this outline must convey to a reader an 
idea of the general treatment the writer 
intends to give the structure just mapped 
out, an i^f§r that is, of the nature of his 
evidence. 29
Most early writers accepted Baker's rationale of 
brief-drawing.They agreed, moreover, that the forensic
1 nnwas "really but an expansion of the brief itself. it
was not until 1917 with the revision of Laycock and
Scales's earlier work that O'Neill clearly separated the
123brief from the outline of a given speech. The major
developments which culminated in this split follow.
119Ibid., p. 84.
120Ibid., pp. 84-85.
1 ? 1See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52; Laycock and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 141; Foster, Argumen­
tation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 220-42.
■'■̂ Baker, Principles, p. 269 .
123O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 211.
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Alden believed that the outline or brief "will put 
into visible form the results of analysis"; i.e., "the one 
or two principle points to be proved," these points pro­
viding "the main headings of the outline."12 4 He SUggested 
three reasons why an outline is important: it maps the
argument; it frees the faculties "for the perfecting of 
phraseology"; it helps make the structure of the argument
T O Cclear to an audience. J
Recognizing that "it is all too easy to confuse
the issues with . . .  a partition," Laycock and Scales
made the following distinction:
A partition . . . is a statement of the points 
the arguer intends to prove; the issues are 
the points he must prove in order to prove his 
case. If the points of the partition are well 
chosen, they will usually correspond closely 
with the issues; but they may be entirely dif­
ferent, and they are not in any case neces­
sarily identical. 26
Foster perceived the brief to be "an outline guide"
with the following functions:
With one good look at his brief, a writer sees 
his whole work in its broad aspects; he under­
stands the relation of parts; he perceives the 
right arrangement of the main divisions, and 
he is able to develop them one by one. He is
Alden did not distinguish between the terms 
brief and outline though he used both when discussing a 
plan for argument. Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52.
^•^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
^^Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
pp. 43-44.
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constantly guided by his brief in the selec­
tion and rejection of material. It warns 
him when he is in danger of inserting evi­
dence out of its place, or of omitting evi­
dence necessary to the proof. Finally, the 
brief serves as a test of the firmness and 
logical sequence of the finished s t r u c t u r e . ^̂ 7
In a chapter entitled "Developing the Argument from the
Brief: Relation of the Brief to the Complete Argument,"
Foster suggested that "the relation of the brief to the
complete written argument may best be seen by observing
128them side by side." From his "specimen," it is clear
that Foster perceived "the argument" to be merely a
1 99development of the headings in a brief.
Though relying on Laycock and Scales's earlier
distinctions that "the completed brief should contain
130nearly all the proof of the whole case," and though
recognizing that "it sometimes happens that . . . the
131brief itself may be the presentation of our argument,"
O'Neill nevertheless viewed the brief as "impersonal" and
127Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 192.
128Ibid., p. 219. Foster recommended an exchange 
of briefs between opposing teams.
129Ibid., pp. 220-42. In his 1917 revision,
Foster limited his discussion of developing the argument 
from the brief to "principles and qualities of style."
1917 rev. ed., pp. 243-56.
130See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 142; O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation 
and Debate, p. 20 8.
131O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 250.
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tooadvocated making an outline for a given speech. He
said:
In drawing up the outline the speaker should 
always keep his particular audience in mind, 
and adapt his speech carefully to the audience 
which he must meet. In preparing an argumen­
tative speech one may differ from the order of 
the brief as much as is desirable. It is a 
mistake to suppose that a brief is always a 
good outline for a speech. As a matter of 
fact it is rarely if ever so. An outline of 
almost any great argument will not coincide 
with a brief of the material in the argument.
This is as it should be.-*-33
Formulae for Brief-Drawing
Baker's specific method of brief-drawing was based 
on the system "developed during the last five years of the 
work in forensics at Harvard College. The essential
tenets of this system are enunciated in the following 
discussion.
For Baker, a good brief ordinarily had three 
divisions: the introduction; the brief proper; and the
conclusion. In the 189 5 edition of Principles, he outlined 
the functions of those divisions: ̂ 33
TOO"The brief is determined by the nature of the 
impersonal case which it is possible to build up on our 
side of the proposition; the speech outline (or the speech) 
is determined by the kind of presentation (both m  sub­
stance and order) which it is most desirable to make to a 
particular audience or set of judges.1 Ibid., ~p~! 213.
133Ibid., p. 211.
^34Baker, Principles, p. 83.
135Ibid., p. 86.
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The Introduction should state as concisely 
as possible, by suggestive phrases of a line 
or two, the facts necessary to an understand­
ing of the discussion: namely, how the ques­
tion arose; what are the facts admitted by 
both sides; and, by definition and exposition, 
what is the exact point at issue. It should 
clear away all extraneous matter and should 
place the essential idea, or group of ideas, 
clearly before the reader. ^
The Brief Proper should, by a series of 
headings and sub-headings, very concisely make 
clear . . . the development of the argument by 
which the writer expects to prove the affirma­
tive or the negative of the question he has 
clearly stated in the Introduction. The writer 
should first select the main ideas that prove 
his conclusion. These he should arrange so 
that his plan shall show the relations they 
naturally bear to one another and to the 
essential idea or group of ideas. In arranging 
the material he should as far as possible 
regard climax. . . . All the main headings and 
sub-headings should read as reasons for the 
conclusion. The correlation of all the parts 
should be distinctly marked by letters and 
numbers. '
lotBaker suggested that "the test of an introduc­
tion to a brief is that it shall iupply a reader with what­
ever information must be needed by him, if he is to read 
the brief proper understanding^. ibid. , p~l 92. He also 
insisted that the brief includes "only what both sides must 
admit to be true," p. 10 8.
137Summarizing his discussion of the brief proper, 
Baker set forth the basic principles and procedures fol­
lowed by later writers. He said: "In the brief proper,
then, a student should state clearly and very succinctly 
the ideas by which he hopes to prove the correctness of his 
opinion. Separating direct proof from general refutation,
. . . he should phrase his ideas as reasons and connect 
them by for and because. Vagueness in phrasing and in 
transitions from idea to idea he must carefully avoid. He 
must so correlate his ideas that their correct relation­
ships one to another will be clear at a glance. He should 
remember that one letter or number is enough for one idea. 
He should break up and correlate crowded headings. As far 
as possible he should aim at climax in arranging his 
material." Ibid., p. 150.
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The Conclusion simply sums up briefly the 
argument, showing clearly how it has led to a 
decision in the case. This decision— unless 
it is given at the beginning of the Brief 
Proper as the proposition— should always be 
stated.138
Laycock and Scales systematically enumerated rules for
*j O Qbrief-drawing.  ̂ In their revision, Baker and Huntington 
also tabulated criteria which "should be memorized and in 
the class room may be referred to by number." That listing 
follows:
GENERAL
I. A brief should be divided into three 
parts, marked "Introduction," "Brief 
Proper," and "Conclusion."
II. Ideas should be phrased in complete 
statements, arranged in headings and 
subheadings.
III. The relation of each idea to every
other should be indicated by means of 
numbers, letters, or other symbols.
IV. A change of symbol should always denote 
a change of relation.
V. Headings or subheadings should never be 
marked twice.
INTRODUCTION 
VI. The Introduction should contain all the 
information necessary for an intelli­
gent reading of the Brief Proper.
VII. The Introduction should always contain 
a statement of the Special Issues.
VIII. In the Introduction ideas bearing upon 
the truth or the falsity of the propo­
sition in dispute should be so phrased 
as not to produce immediate discussion.
IX. In the Introduction the connectives
"for" and "because" should be avoided.
^■^Ibid. , p. 86.
139Laycock and Scales listed general rules for 
brief-drawing along with specialized ones for the intro­
duction, brief proper, and conclusion. See Laycock and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 142-80.
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BRIEF PROPER
X. In the Brief Proper every main heading 
should read as proof of the truth of 
the proposition, and every subheading 
as proof of the truth of the heading 
to which it is subordinate, never as 
mere explanation.
XI. The relation between subheadings or
series of subheadings and their head­
ings is never expressed by "hence" or 
"therefore," but by "for" or "because."
XII. Subheadings should be arranged in the 
order of climax, unless this order 
violates the logical order.
XIII. Each heading or subheading should con­
tain but a single proposition.
XIV. Refutation should be so phrased as to 
make the objection perfectly clear.
XV. Refutation of objections, not to the 
proposition, but to details of proof, 
should meet such objections where they 
arise.
CONCLUSION
XVI. The Conclusion should state concisely 
the steps by which the decision is 
reached.
XVII. The Conclusion should never contain 
new evidence.
XVIII. The decision should never qualify the 
proposition but should be an affirma­
tion or denial of it in its originalform.*40
Early period writers failed to depart significantly
from Baker's system of brief-drawing. Some substitutions
of terms occurred. 141 Various rules were qualified,
rephrased, or shifted from one section to another, 142 and
a few new criteria appeared. In his 1917 revision, Foster
140Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 256-57.
141Laycock and Scales called the "brief proper" 
discussion, while Foster termed it proof.
142See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 
ed., pp. 191-218.
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prescribed: "When two or more statements do not stand in
the relation of proposition and proof, but as coordinate
parts of one piece of evidence, this relationship should
143be shown by symbols." And, under "general rules,"
O'Neill added:
Every coordinate series of statements should 
be arranged in order of climax, unless this 
violates time order in expository matter or 
logical order in argumentative matter. 44
O'Neill also suggested that "all references and sources of
information should be accurately stated in the brief, on
the same page on which the information is given."^4^
Proof
Burden of Proof
Though rhetoricians had applied the legal phrases
"burden of proof" and "presumption" to argumentation at
least since the time of Whatley,^-4® Baker largely ignored
the concepts, simply distinguishing presumption from
147assumption in a footnote in a section on residues. It
^~*Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 89.
14 4O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 213.
14^Ibid. O'Neill introduced the "parallel column" 
brief which set out affirmative and negative issues, 
pp. 238-39.
146See Whatley, Elements of Rhetoric, pp. 86-99.
'1'4^Baker relied, moreover, on the definition of 
Adams S. Hill who defined presumption as occurring when a 
proposition "is assumed to be true in the absence of proof 
to the contrary." Hill, Rhetoric, p. 332, cited in Baker, 
Principles, p. 308.
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was rather Raymond Alden who gave the terms currency in
the new discipline and identified them with debating.
Believing that legal definitions "are perfectly applicable
. . . to the question of 'burden of proof' in the debate
of ordinary life," Alden turned to legal opinions and legal 
14fttreatises. He relied particularly on the distinctions
of J. B. Thayer who suggested:
In legal discussion, this phrase, "the 
burden of proof" is used in several ways. It 
marks (1) the peculiar duty of him who has the 
risk of any given proposition on which parties 
are at issue,— who will lose the case if he 
does not make that proposition out, when all 
has been said and done. . . .  (2) It stands
for the duty . . .  of going forward in argu­
ment or in producing evidence; whether at the 
beginning of a case or at any later moment 
throughout the trial or the discussion.
(3) There is an undiscriminated use of the 
phrase, perhaps more common than either of the 
other two, in which it may mean either or both 
of the others.149
Alden tended to equivocate on the controversial
issue of whether burden of proof shifts. Though pointing
out that "in one sense of the term, the disputant on whom
rests the burden of proof must cheerfully accept it, and
150never forget or attempt to evade the responsibility,"
^■^Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 62-65.
149James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1896-1898), cited in Alden, Art of Debate, 
pp. 65-66; Baker and Huntington, Principles, p~ 40"2.
Alden, Art of Debate, p. 67.
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he recognized that "on the other hand, as in law, there 
is a sense in which the burden of proof may shift back and 
forth. "•'-51 Alden summarized his position as follows:
Briefly to recapitulate: the burden of
proof is, in the first place, the obligation 
resting upon the affirmative to prove the 
proposition it lays down at the outset,— an 
obligation which it never escapes; and, in 
the second place, the obligation of either 
disputant to produce proof at any moment 
when, in the absence of such proof, the other 
side would be judged to be in the right. In 
a word, it is simply the demand of the 
audience: Show your proof, if we are to
believe!152
ICOAlden's approach had much influence. Baker and
Huntington, for example, followed his distinctions, even 
citing his authorities, in their 190 5 revision of 
Principles.l^4 Foster, moreover, stated that "the propo­
sition should be so phrased as to place the burden of
Ibid. Alden went on to point out that "at the 
close of his argument, then, a prima facie case will have 
to be made for his [affirmative's! side, and the burden 
will be upon the negative to show why his claim cannot be 
maintained," p. 67. He further suggested that: "In a
sense, of course, any proof offered by the affirmative at 
the opening of a debate, is a means cf shifting the burden 
of proof; but very commonly the most convenient method of 
doing so is to establish a presumption in favor of the 
proposition by showing that it is more reasonable, on the 
face of it, than the opponents have supposed," pp. 69-70.
152Ibid., pp. 75-76.
163Laycock and Scales avoided the whole issue 
of "shift." They simply advised that "the burden of 
establishing the truth of any statement rests upon the 
person who originally makes the assertion." Laycock and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 62-63.
^54Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 402.
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proof upon the affirmative and make the presumption in favor 
of the negative” though he recognized that "the burden of 
proof and presumption vary with time and place."155 poster 
agreed that "all argument is intended to shift the actual 
burden of proof, "156 but decried the use of technicalities 
to accomplish this end. He believed that much too much
had been made of burden of proof and presumption in
debating.157 Hugh Wells did not agree, arguing rather that 
burden of proof should be the most significant factor in 
determining the outcome of a debate. Wells queried:
Why is it impossible to see who wins a 
debate? Why is it difficult for a judge who 
is experienced in weighing evidence to follow 
the shifting burden of the issue and to deter­
mine whether the burden of proof has been
carried successfully?
The difficulty arises from the fact that 
these burdens are not clearly defined.
The "burden of proof" is the duty resting 
upon the affirmative to establish a prima 
facie case in respect of the main proposition, 
by a preponderance of the evidence and rests 
upon the affirmative throughout. It does not 
shift. This burden is not onerous, for it 
only requires the establishing of a prima 
facie case, and the maintenance of that case 
to the end of the debate. It does not require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The burden of the issue" is the duty 
resting intermittently upon both the affirma­
tive and the negative to produce evidence in 
respect of the subsidiary questions arising 
out of the main proposition. Issues are the
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subsidiary questions which arise out of and 
are inherent in the main proposition. As is 
said by Professor Ketcham, on page 29 of his 
work upon Argumentation and Debate:
"The burden of proof never 'shifts'; it 
is duty of producing evidence which 
'shifts.'"158
Though O'Neill recognized the two legal denotations
of the term "burden of proof," he limited its meaning in
159argumentation to the "risk of the proposition." As 
such, he precluded the shifting of the burden of proof, 
introducing, rather, into argumentation the phrase 
of rebuttal"'*'60 invented by Dean H. W. Ballentine, 
writer. ̂'6'*' O'Neill summarized as follows:
1. The burden of proof, then, always rests 
upon the actual affirmative.
2. The affirmative is the party who will lose 
if no evidence or argument is offered— if 
nothing is done. The affirmative is the 
dissatisfied party, the one who wants a 
change, the attacking party.
3. Care must be taken that propositions be so 
phrased that the actual affirmative and 
nominal affirmative coincide, that the 
affirmation of the proposition is actually
ICQHugh Neal Wells, "Judging Debates," Quarterly 
Journal of Public Speaking, III (October, 1917), 343.
159O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 35.
160Ibid. O'Neill contended that: "The duty of
going forward with evidence or argument at any given time, 
of course, may shift from time to time in the course of the 
trial or discussion. But the proper term to apply to this 
shifting burden is neither 'burden of proof' nor 'duty of 
going forward,' but 'burden of rebuttal.' This 'burden of 
rebuttal' may shift."
W. Ballentine, "Apportionment of Proof and 
the Burden of Rebuttal," Law Notes, December, 1912, p. 168.
burden 
a legal
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taken by the one upholding the burden of 
the controversy. . . .
4. When the affirmative has carried its 
burden of proof sufficiently to establish 
a prima facie case, it has created for the 
negative a burden of rebuttal.
5. The burden of rebuttal (a more accurate 
term than "the duty of going forward with 
argument or evidence") may shift from side 
to side during the conduct of the debate.-1-62
The Nature of Proof
Law, logic, and rhetoric provided the concepts of
evidence and reasoning inherent in most modern approaches
to argumentative proof. Difficulties arose early, however,
over the "proper" relationship of the elements of proof.
In the first edition of Principles, Baker relied on the
definition of a contemporary legal writer, William Best,
who determined proof to be "anything which serves, either
immediately or mediately, to convince the mind of the truth
or the falsehood of a fact or proposition." Baker
reflected briefly on the relation of evidence to proof and
then turned to a discussion of evidence. In his chapter
on "Evidence," he contended:
Whatever, then, a writer or speaker offers in 
support of his statements— quotations, logical 
deductions, skillful analysis, illustrations, 
figures, etc., etc.— is, taken as a whole, his 
proof of their truth. Each portion of his
1.62O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 38-39.
163Wiiiiam M. Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's ed. 
(Boston: Boston Book Company, 190 8) , cited in Baker,
Principles, p. 180.
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proof is evidence, for the latter is 1 that 
which generates proof. Any matter of fact, 
the effect/ tendency/ or design of which is 
to produce in the mind a persuasion affirma­
tive or disaffirmative of the existence of 
some other matter of f a c t . 1^4
Recognizing that "the attempt to classify processes 
of proof has always been the bugbear of students of argu­
mentation," Alden postulated that "reduced to its lowest 
terms, all our processes of reasoning, great and small 
are simply inferences based on experience.” He identified 
three classes of proof for legal argument— facts, 
authority, and reasoning— and discussed them in relation 
to argumentation."^®®
Laycock and Scales divided proof into evidence and 
arguments, differentiating the terms as follows:
1. Evidence consists of all matters of fact 
that may be used in the generating of 
proof. It is the raw material from which 
the finished product, proof, is to be 
manufactured.
2. Argument, in its restricted meaning, is 
the name used to designate the process by 
which, from knowing the existence of one 
fact, or a certain number of facts, we 
infer the existence of other facts. This 
meaning of the word "argument" must not be 
confused with other meanings. The word 
may be used to refer to a finished dis­
course as a whole; it may refer to an 
entire debate or discussion; or, as here, 
it may mean simply a single process of 
reasoning. There is, perhaps, no better 
definition of an argument, in this sense, 
than Cardinal Newman's definition of 
reason, as "any process or act of the mind
164Ibid.
^®®Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 77-86.
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by which, from knowing one thing, it 
advances on to know another!" . . .An 
argument is the machinery by which the 
raw material, evidence, is turned into 
the finished product, proof.
In the 1905 edition of Principles, Baker and
Huntington recognized the need to revise "the difficult
1 6 7subject of evidence, especially refutation. Though
defining evidence and proof in essentially the same terms
16 oas the first edition, Baker and Huntington included the 
notion of evidence as the material of proof in their 
revision.
Foster held steadfastly to Baker's delineation of
1 CQreasoning as a kind of evidence. D Yet, his own treatment
^^Laycock and Scales defined proof essentially as 
had Baker. See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 59.
167Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
16 8Baker and Huntington continued to delineate 
reasoning as a form of evidence, defining the "broad field 
of evidence" to include "facts, reasoning, and authorita­
tive opinions." Ibid., p. 72. Baker and Huntington 
examined causes for disagreement and concluded that "since 
all evidence— the material of proof— consists of inferences 
from experience and is open to disagreement, it is impor­
tant that students train themselves in selecting and 
presenting evidence." They listed the three following 
causes of disagreement: "(1) because one man's experience
is different from that of another; (2) because he draws 
his opinions from a different authority; (3) because the 
inferences drawn from the same experience differ," 
pp. 78-82.
1 6Q "The first kind of evidence— testimony of 
authorities as to facts— we shall consider at once. The 
second kind of evidence— reasoning about facts— we shall 
consider in the three succeeding chapters." Foster, Argu­
mentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 56; 1917 rev. ed., 
p. 97.
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of proof balanced the two elements. Citing a contemporary
legal treatise, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, which defined
proof as "the sufficient reason for assenting to a propo-
170sition as true," Foster concluded that:
The material of Proof is Evidence. Evidence 
is everything which ought to bring or tend to 
bring the mind to the conviction of the truth 
or falsity of a proposition. The finding 
and employing of Evidence is the business of 
argumentation.^71
O'Neill recognized that the term proof is used to
refer to the "effect of evidence" as well as to the "medium
172by which truth is established." He followed, neverthe­
less, Laycock and Scales in determining evidence and argu­
ment to be "subdivisions" of proof.
Finding the Material of Proof 
Most early period writers at least mentioned the 
gathering, selection, and tabulation of the materials of 
proof. Baker summarized his chapter on the preparatory 
reading for argumentation as follows:
170Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence in Criminal Issues (8th ed.; Philadelphia: Kay
and Brothers, 1880) , p. 3*i
171Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., 
p. 51; 1917 rev. ed., p. 92.
172O'Neill relied primarily on distinctions by 
Best and Greenleaf. Best, On Evidence, p. 5; Simon 
Greenleaf, Law of Evidence, 3 Vols. (1st ed.; Boston:
C. C. Little and J. Brown, 1842-1853), cited in O'Neill, 
Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 82.
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In brief, then, in preparing for the 
discussion of a proposition a student should
(1) examine the content of his own mind on the 
subject and clear it for action; (2) strive to 
understand the case for his opponent as well 
as he does his own; (3) read (a) widely,
(b) with careful, critical consideration of 
the material for and against him; and (4) by 
passing all the material through his own 
thought transmute it into new shapes, give it 
a new significance, impart to it something of 
himself,— in a word, make it his own,^-^
Baker also cited specific "rules" for quoting and para­
phrasing the writings of others. ̂ 74 Alden specified 
procedures for tabulating materials in addition to general 
comments on the gathering of material. Laycock and
Scales advised using a notebook when reading; suggested 
an "effective method" for reading from general to specific 
recommended reading on both sides of a question; and dis­
cussed what to look for in reading, assimilation being 
their ultimate aim.^7  ̂ Baker and Huntington omitted 
Baker's entire chapter on materials. Foster limited his 
discussion to the selection, use, and recording of 
evidence.^77 O'Neill, on the other hand, expanded Laycock 
and Scales's original treatment of gathering material and
i 7 oBaker, Principles, p. 175.
174Ibid., p. 172.
■̂7^See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 44-50.
-*-7^Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, 
pp. 47-57.
177Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed. ,
pp. 76-80.
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included a systematic plan for reading, recording, and
*| 70assimilating materials.
Kinds of Proof
Disagreeing on the nature of proof and the relation 
of evidence to reasoning, early writers in argumentation 
also failed to concur on systems of classification. They 
did, however, follow Baker in precluding assertion as 
proof. Pointing out that unsupported assertion is "safe" 
only in argument from authority, Baker had said:
There are men and books which are regarded 
as authorities on the subjects they treat, and 
their testimony as to facts and inferences 
from facts is accepted unquestioningly. . . .
These men give, not a careful statement of the 
reasons for a belief held by them, but merely 
an unsupported statement of another; that is, 
they use the so-called Argument from Authority.
When it is proper to use this, then, and then 
only, is an unqualified affirmation of some­
thing as true permissible.1̂ 9
Baker cited numerous examples illustrating the 
proper support of assertion. Having observed in his first 
edition that evidence in argumentation is bound by none of 
the rules of evidence in the law courts, he, nevertheless, 
borrowed from law and rhetoric the following classifica­
tions of evidence: testimonial and circumstantial; direct
and indirect; and argument from antecedent probability,
i 7 o'“O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 68-80.
179Baker, Principles, p. 177.
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180sign and example. Dissatisfied with these distinctions,
Baker proposed a complicated fourth possible division of
evidence which attempted to classify arguments according
181to resemblance. He summarized this system in a detailed
189chart and explained its significance as follows:
This chart shows, then, that it is pos­
sible to divide the field of evidence on the 
basis of completeness of resemblance between 
two phenomena, and that in so doing a student 
moves by graduated steps from a resemblance 
that has no probative value to complete 
resemblance. It must make clear, too, that 
this method of division but renames what has 
already been considered as Direct and Indirect 
(or Circumstantial) Evidence; or as the Argu­
ment from Antecedent Probability, the Argument 
from Sign, and the Argument from Example. The 
chart shows, also, that all Evidence must be
1 ftfiIbid. Baker distinguished the rhetorical 
classification as follows: "The argument from Antecedent
Probability tries to account for something that is assumed 
to be true,— to find a motive for it," p. 20 2. The Argu- 
ment from Sign, as defined by Whately, "is an inference, 
from a part of a process, object, or fact, of the presence 
of another part, or of the whole,— is an argument from 
an effect to a condition," p. 203. Cited from Richard 
Whately, Elements of Logic (New York: Sheldon and Company,
1869). "The Argument from Example rests on the idea that 
objects which resemble each other in two or more respects, 
connected with the point in discussion, will resemble each 
other in this particular point." Baker, Principles, 
p. 204.
181This scheme included "argument from a 
resemblance which, if it be found that the result really 
occurred, may have produced this result; argument from a 
resemblance known in a past case to be an essential part 
of a process leading to the result in question; argument 
from a series of such resemblances; and argument from com­
plete resemblance," p. 206. Baker's system was strongly 
influenced by Fletcher and Carpenter, Introduction to 
Theme-Writing.
1 89Baker, Principles, pp. 213-14.
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from a man's own experience or from that of 
other men.^°3
The 1905 revision of Principles abandoned Baker's 
chart and detailed prescriptions but not his conviction 
of the value of arguing from resemblances. It revealed, 
moreover, a clearer and more coherent view of evidence:
Evidence . . . consisting of facts, the 
opinions of authorities, and reasoning (infer­
ences from the facts or opinions) can be clas­
sified as testimonial and circumstantial, 
facts and opinions being testimonial and 
inferences being circumstantial. Testimonial 
evidence needs no subdivision beyond the 
natural division into facts and the opinions 
of authorities, since the same tests are 
applicable to all witnesses and to all 
authorities. Circumstantial evidence, how­
ever, can be more surely tested if we sub­
divide it into deductive and inductive 
reasoning. Deductive reasoning, moreover, 
for our purposes may be tested without con­
sidering the subdivision which formal logic 
applies to it. Inductive reasoning, on the 
other hand, it is helpful to separate somewhat 
arbitrarily into generalizations, arguments 
based on a causal relationship and arguments
based on resemblance.
Most of the early writers at least mentioned the 
common classifications of evidence to which Baker had
IOCreferred. They also agreed that evidence includes both
183Ibid., p. 214.
184Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 109.
185O'Neill added real evidence to his classifica­
tion. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 90-92. He cited Best's definition: "By real
evidence is meant evidence of which any object belonging 
to the class of things is the source, persons also being 
included, in respect to such qualities as belong to them 
in common with things." Best, On Evidence, p. 16.
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facts and authoritative opinions. The rub came with 
reasoning. In an attempt to minimize Formal Logic in 
argument, Baker had treated reasoning as subsidiary to 
evidence. Though he did not reject the logical substratum 
of argument, Baker did not detail its processes. He simply 
took them for granted. At least two early writers took 
a different tack. Both Elias MacEwan, writing in 1898, 
and Gertrude Buck, writing in 1899, viewed logical reason­
ing as the core of proof, and their respective texts
emphasized Formal Logic as central to a study of 
187argumentation.
Though many early writers applied Baker's label 
of "practical argumentation" to their own systems, rela­
tively few were content to reject the rigid super-structure 
of Formal Logic. Pedagogically, Formal Logic provided the 
security of a concrete and time-honored subject matter; 
its terminology made possible precise differentiation; 
and, its historical roots gave its result the aura of 
"truth." Baker's notion that such a system bears little 
relation to the "argumentation of everyday life" seems to 
have gotten lost in the jargon. Baker, moreover, was able 
to offer no concrete, teachable alternative. In his most 
precise description of this "practical application" of 
logic, he said:
■^^See Baker, Principles, Ch. I.
187MacEwan, Essentials of Argumentation; Buck, 
Argumentative Writing.
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When we argue, we try to make a listener 
or reader believe that this or that is true, 
because for the reasons, a, b, £, it seems to 
us true, and because the special exciting 
interest, d, that the idea has for him, must 
stir him to act on the belief that we are 
seeking to inculcate. . . . These reasons with 
which we support our belief are but thoughts, 
and all argumentation is an aggregation of 
reasonings, or varied processes of thought.
Even, however, in the simplest reasoning some 
structure is involved, for we do not think at 
random, and it is evident that it may have 
been possible to examine these processes of 
thinking, to study their structure, and to 
derive rules of correct thinking therefrom.
This has been possible, and the result is 
called Logic, "the science of the laws of 
thought," or that which teaches us to know howto think correctly.^88
Those writers who followed Baker approached
reasoning in varying ways, though in general they moved
collectively toward a greater dependence on Formal Logic.
Alden opted for a rhetorical approach. Believing that the
induction-deduction distinction "is only a matter of the
189point of view taken," he examined "processes of
reasoning," "according as they are based on matters before
the fact in dispute" (antecedent probability and analogy
or example), and "on matters after the fact" (a 
19 0posteriori) .
Laycock and Scales differentiated argumentation
18 8Baker, Principles, pp. 13-14. Baker's "reasons 
for" argument corresponded to certain modern theories of 
the enthymeme.
189Alden, Art of Debate, p. 78.
190Ibid., pp. 86-98.
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from Formal Logic both in method and p u r p o s e .  ^ 1  They
ignored the induction-deduction distinctions altogether
and suggested that the classification of arguments should
"make clear, as far as possible, on what the strength of
19 2the various kinds of arguments depends.1 Insisting 
that "in nearly every argument the validity of one infer­
ence depends upon a connection of cause and effect between 
the facts from which we infer and the facts to which we 
infer," they determined that "this connection is, . . .
in most cases, the source of strength or weakness in the 
19 3reasoning." Laycock and Scales's own particular system
of classification, however, which divided arguments into
antecedent probability, sign, and example, paralleled that
19 4of "nearly all writers on the subject of rhetoric."
191x"Logic aims merely to investigate and explain 
'the operations and processes of thought,'" while argumen­
tation purposes "to make practical rules and suggestions 
which will facilitate correct reasoning and the producing 
of beliefs in the minds of others." Laycock and Scales, 
Argumentation and Debate, p. 84. They explained, moreover 
that "Logic explains the different ways in which the mind 
may work in making an inference or reasoning," while 
argumentation wishes "to make clear the rules that must be 
followed in order to make arguments that will be valuable 
for the purpose of convincing and persuading others," 
pp. 84-85.
192Ibid., p. 86.
194Ibid., p. 85. Laycock and Scales divided 
argument from sign into arguments from effect to cause, 
effect to effect, and association of phenomena in the past 
They treated generalization and analogy as types of argu­
ment from example, pp. 9 5-113.
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Foster examined the relation of argumentation and
logic similarly to, though more precisely than, Laycock 
19 5and Scales. Though insisting that "an extensive study
of Formal Logic is not necessary,"196 Foster, nevertheless, 
detailed the rules and structure of the syllogism, "the
IQ nusual form in which logic presents reasoning."  ̂ He 
advised, moreover, "any one who does not understand the 
nature of the false inferences resulting from a violation 
of these rules . . .  to study . . . some elementary 
treatise," and recommended W. S. Jevons' Primer of 
Logic.198
Recognizing deficiencies in the methods of Formal
Logic as applied to argumentation, Foster relied on the
rationale of probability in argument:
Whereas syllogistic logic sets forth the 
conditions under which a conclusion is neces­
sarily true, argumentation, on the other hand,
195See Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1908 ed., pp. 85-86.
196Ibid., p. 88. He went so far as to suggest that 
"an extensive study of syllogistic logic is not only of 
little help to a student of argumentation and debating, 
but . . . may actually prove a hindrance," pp. 89-90. 
Referring to the danger of overlooking "attendant circum­
stances," he substantiated his view by citing the logicians 
Alfred Sidgwick and Bernard Bosanquet. Sidgwick, Process 
of Argument, p. 74; Bernard Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic 
(London: Macmillan Company, 1895), p. 99.
197Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., 
p. 86. He also defined the enthymeme as "a syllogism with 
one or more of its propositions suppressed."
19 8Ibid., p. 87. Jevons, Primer of Logic.
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is concerned mainly with attempts to show 
merely that the chances are in favor of the 
truth of a given conclusion, under condi­
tions which demand action at the same time 
that they preclude the possibility of ade­
quate tests of t r u t h . 199
In his own discussion of proof, Foster utilized "a classi­
fication provided by the science of logic," inductive and 
deductive argument. He defined the processes as follows:
The process of reasoning by which we 
arrive at a general law through the observa­
tion of particulars is called inductive 
reasoning. . . . The opposite process, by 
which from a general law we draw a conclusion 
with regard to a particular case, is called 
deductive reasoning. . . . Inductive argument 
is inference from the specific to the general; 
deductive argument is inference from the 
general to the specific.200
Within this framework, Foster set forth a representative 
and detailed analysis of the "typical forms of inductive 
and deductive reasoning," argument from example and 
argument from causal relation. Though his treatment of 
these "kinds" of reasoning was clearer in the 1917 revi­
sion, it did not differ appreciably in content from his 
1908 pronouncements.
Foster divided argument from example into two 
parts; generalization and analogy. By generalization, 
he meant imperfect induction. Analogy gave him more 
trouble. Having cited the wide disagreement among writers
•*-̂ Ibid., p. 89; 1917 rev. ed., p. 126.
2°°Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 91-92.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
201over the meaning of the term, Foster incorporated the 
logician William Minto's definition into his own treatise:
In the argument from analogy the ground 
of inference is the resemblance between two 
individual objects in a certain number of 
points; and the inference is that they 
resemble one another in some other point, 
known to belong to the one, but not known 
to belong to the other. ®2
By 1917, Foster had crystallized his own thinking and
described the argument from analogy as
201Foster pointed out m  footnotes in both editions 
that Baker followed Whately in confining the term analogy 
to resemblances "not so much in the things themselves as in 
the relations in which things stand to other things. . . . 
'Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, but 
bear a like relation to the parent bird and to her young 
nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant 
on the other, respectively.' Genung regards an argument 
from analogy as one which takes 'relations that exist in 
one sphere of life or experience, as indications of what 
may be regarded as true of another sphere whose relations 
are similar.' But whether the argument is based on simi­
larity between objects in the same sphere of life or in 
different spheres of life, and whether the argument is 
based on similarity in the objects or in relations, the 
force of the argument depends on precisely the same condi­
tions; we should apply the same tests, and expose its 
insufficiency by the same methods. For practical purposes, 
therefore, the distinctions would hardly be worth insisting 
upon, even if there were any agreement among writers. In 
this chapter, the term Argument from Analogy is used in the 
wider sense to include all arguments from example which do 
not amount to an induction, that is to say, all arguments 
from resemblance in which the operating principle is sup­
pressed. Anyone who prefers the term Argument from 
Resemblance for the whole class, with the Argument from 
Analogy as a sub-class, can readily make the distinction." 
Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 150. See also 1908 ed., 
pp. 109-110.
20 2William Mmto, Logic: Inductive and Deductive
(London, 1893), p. 368, cited in Foster, Argumentation and 
Debating, 1908 ed., p. 109.
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the inference that if two objects resemble 
one another in certain points/ they also 
resemble one another in some other point, 
known to belong to the one, but not known 
to belong to the other. . . .  An argument 
from analogy is, therefore, that kind of 
argument from example which steps from one 
particular case to another particular case.
It does not amount to a complete or even 
attempted generalization. 03
In his first edition, Foster had insisted that analogy
"may create an exceedingly high degree of probability,
but never conclusive p r o o f . " I n  the 1917 revision,
he noted that argument from analogy "taken alone should
205rarely be regarded as conclusive proof."
Believing that the ultimate justification of all
argumentation is causation, Foster concluded that:
We may derive considerable help in our own 
reasoning by studying arguments which direct 
attention to causal connections. All such 
arguments proceed from effect to cause, from 
cause to effect, or from effect to effect.
All rest on the universal belief in causation: 
nothing happens without sufficient cause. 06
in')Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 
rev. ed., pp. 150-51.
204Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 112.
205Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 152.
^ ^ Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 124; 1917 rev. ed. , p. 170. 
Foster equated effect to cause argument with a posteriori 
reasoning and cause to effect with a priori reasoning. He 
suggested, moreover, that the latter *is sometimes called 
argument from antecedent probability." He concluded, 
however, that "the use of the latter term is so much con­
fused that we have thought best to get along without it; 
though the argument itself is illustrated under various 
topics," 1908 ed., pp. 125, 132.
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Foster attempted to bring "the so-called 'argument from
sign'" within the framework of causation. Pointing out
that most writers, though using the classification
"argument from sign" disagree on definition, he said:
If we made no mistake when we asserted . . . 
that all arguments rest on generalization, 
stated or implied, and that no argument, 
not even a generalization itself can commend 
itself to a rational mind, except on the 
assumption that a causal relation exists, we 
ought to be able to explain all so-called 
arguments from sign by reference to generali­
zation or causation, or both.2®7
O'Neill recognized that forms of arguments are 
classified and studied mainly from two points of view—  
logic and rhetoric. He examined the "kinds" of arguments 
applicable to rhetoric using the traditional outline 
employed by Laycock and Scales: antecedent probability,
sign, and example. His section on logic, however, was 
new.
O'Neill differentiated Formal Logic from argumen­
tation much as had his predecessors. He went further, 
however, to suggest that "anyone who is trained in argu­
mentation should be familiar with the vocabulary of argu-
20 8ment whether he ever makes practical use of it or not. 
O'Neill synthesized the views of certain contemporary 
logicians toward deduction, induction, and the syllogism, 
admitting that his own discussion was "taken almost
207Ibid., pp. 137-38.
208O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 116.
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entirely from the standard text-books of recognized 
authorities on logic (Jevons, Creighton, Bode, Hibben, 
Hyslop, Sidgwick)."209 O'Neill included the notion 
that the real process of inference is the same in induc­
tion and deduction, the object being a "necessary con-
210nection of facts according to some general principle," 
and he reasserted the "mutual dependence" of the 
processes.2^
O'Neill included Hyslop's detailed description
of the kinds of induction: perfect; imperfect; and the
212inductive method. He also expanded Laycock and
Scales's original discussion of John Stuart Mill's methods
of induction which had appeared in their section of 
213fallacies. Both texts, however, quoted from Jevons'
214analysis rather than directly from Mill's work. Jevons,
as Mill, began with causation. Wishing to "supplement" 
rather than "supercede" the old logic, Mill had isolated 
certain methods for discovering causal connections and 
had arrived at four variants of induction by elimination:
21°Ibid., p. 119.
2~^Ibid., p. 120.
212Hyslop, Elements of Logic, pp. 29 5-9 8.
213Baker and Huntington also included certain of 
Mill's distinctions in their discussion of fallacies. 
Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 144-46.
2^See Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 239-53.
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agreement; difference; residues; and concomitant varia-
21 Ktions. O'Neill included these as methods appropriate
for argumentation.
O'Neill examined deductive reasoning through
2 1 6exploring the syllogism, sorites, inferences in quanti-
217 218tative relations, and enthymemes. He agreed,
moreover, with Sidgwick's analysis of the weaknesses of
219the syllogism for assessing the strength of inferences.
Tests of Proof 
Whereas the early writers in argumentation had 
clashed on the nature and kinds of proof, they largely 
agreed on its tests. Disparities arose primarily with 
regard to terminology and emphasis, differences which
215See John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic 
(New York: Harper, 1852) .
216O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 131-33. He quoted extensively from Jevons* 
Lessons in Logic, lifting rules of the syllogism and defi­
nitions of premises and terms directly from his work. 
Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 127-29.
217O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 133-35. O'Neill cited Bode on sorites and 
"inferences in quantitative relations." B. H. Bode, An 
Outline of Logic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910),
pp. 78-80.
218O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 135-36. O'Neill quoted Creighton's definition 
of an enthymeme as an argument with one premise lacking.
J. F. Creighton, Introductory Logic (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1907), p. 41.
219See Sidgwick, Process of Argument, p. 46.
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reflected the various authors' predispositions regarding 
the nature and kinds of proof. The same general princi­
ples, however, pervaded most of the early works. Repre­
sentative methods of detailing these tests follow.
In the first edition of Principles of Argumenta­
tion, Baker set forth "the place of rules of evidence in 
argumentation." "We must learn," he said, "not only how to 
attack incorrect drawing of conclusions from data given,
but how to test whether the data are correctly
2 20reported." Baker included external tests which corre­
sponded to traditional tests of evidence and internal 
tests which essentially evaluated reasoning. Tests which 
examine evidence externally, he said,
consider the man who gives the testimony, the 
conditions under which it was given, whether 
the evidence as a whole coincides with other 
testimony known to be true, whether it is 
self-contradictory; they do not say: "Is
there anything faulty in the process of 
thought, the logic that has produced the 
opinion?" If they did, they would not be 
external, but internal tests. . . .
The external tests ask: "Is there good
reason to think that the evidence, if inter­
nally examined, will be found to be logically 
unsound?" The internal tests ask rather:
"Just what is the logical unsoundness of the 
argument?"
The examination of evidence for internal 
weaknesses is a search for fallacies. By a 
fallacy is meant any unsound mode of arguing 
which appears to demand our conviction, and 
to be decisive of the question in hand, when 
in fairness it is n o t .  ^ 1
220 Baker, Principles, p. 20.
221 Ibid., pp. 242-43. Baker used Whately's
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Baker's list of tests may be catalogued as follows: 
I. External Tests:
A. Testing the Statement
1. Evidence should be consistent with 
ordinary experience.
2. Evidence should be consistent with the 
other known facts of the case.
3. Evidence should be consistent with 
itself.
B. Testing the Conditions Under Which the
Statement Was Made
1. Is the witness willing or reluctant?
2. Was the testimony given under 
compulsion?
C. Examining the Witness Himself
1. Is the evidence prejudicial, does it 
show personal interest?
2. Is the witness intellectually strong?
3. Are the physical powers of the witness 
sound?
4. What is the moral character of the 
witness? Is he naturally truthful?
definition of a fallacy. See Whately, Elements of Logic, 
1869, p. 168. Baker included three kinds of evidence 
which he believed were trustworthy in themselves and 
which, therefore, needed no testing. He labeled them as 
follows: undesigned testimony; negative testimony; and
hurtful admissions or concessions. Baker, Principles, 
p. 238. Here Baker is indebted to Genung. Baker con­
tended, however, that "of these three kinds of evidence, 
although all three are self-commendatory, only hurtful 
admissions are convincing without the successful applica­
tion of one of the other tests of evidence already 
considered," p. 241.
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II. Internal Tests of Evidence:
A. Fallacies Arising from Lack of Definition
1. Words with two common meanings left 
undefined.
2. Using at will different meanings of the 
same word.
3. Words used as identical because they 
look alike.
4. Confusion of the etymological and the 
common meanings of a word.
5. Unexplained words used with meanings 
which do not belong to them.
B. The Fallacy, Begging the Question, Petitio 
Principii
1. Assuming the truth of an unsupported 
assumption which is equivalent to the 
conclusion or results from it.
2. Undue assumption of a premise as true.
a. Stating without support what should 
be proved true.
b. Two fallacies arising from an 
attempt to find a cause for an 
effect.
1) Mistaking a sign for a cause
2) Post hoc ergo propter hoc
c. Arguing from a false assumption.
d. Referring to ambiguous evidence as 
if it could have but one 
interpretation.
C. The Fallacy, Ignoring the Question, 
Ignoration Elenchi
1. Direct ignoring of the question.
2. The fallacious use of the argumentum 
ad hominem.
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3. Shifting ground.
4. The fallacy of objections.
5. Proving something true of a part 
only, not of the whole. 22
In addition to labeling fallacies, Baker pointed out that 
a conclusion is not necessarily true or false because a 
premise is. Neither is a premise necessarily true or 
false because a conclusion is. He included in this dis­
cussion the non sequitur argument, "the name applied to an
argument whenever the conclusion does not logically follow
223from the two statements from which it is drawn."
The 1905 revision of Principles incorporated 
Baker's original listings and terminology relative to 
external tests of evidence. The discussion of internal 
tests (fallacies), however, differed from the first edition 
in arrangement, emphasis, and, to a lesser extent, in 
content. Here Baker and Huntington examined three sources 
of fallacies: lack of definition; errors of observation;
and errors in reasoning. The section on definition closely 
followed Baker's earlier edition. The second division, 
fallacies arising from errors of observation, was entirely 
new. Relying on John Stuart Mill's analysis, Baker and 
Huntington contended that "non-observation and erroneous 
observation result in errors due to inattention or to
222jbid., pp. 220-68, passim.
223 Ibid., p. 245.
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preconceived theory, in the neglect of significant 
circumstances, and in the confusion of an incorrect infer­
ence with a direct sense impression."^24 Their discussion 
of the third major source of fallacies, those arising from 
erroneous reasoning, combined two major divisions of 
fallacies labeled in the 189 5 edition of Principles 
(begging the question and ignoring the question) with hasty 
generalization and non sequitur arguments. A subdivision 
of these areas resulted in a representative, if not com- 
prehensive, check list of fallacious argument. ^
Most writers who followed Baker related fallacies 
to refutation. Alden's only discussion of tests of proof 
came in a chapter entitled "Methods of Refutation" where 
he suggested:
In general, one may refute the argument of 
an opponent either (1) by showing that the 
facts in the case are not true as alleged; or
(2) that the fact being admittedly as alleged, 
the inferences drawn from them are incorrect; 
or (3) that the alleged facts are not true, 
and that even if they true, the infer­
ences are unwarranted.22°
Alden's particulars incorporated tests of facts, opinions,
224Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 166.
22^Baker felt no further classification of 
fallacies was necessary for the student of argumentation. 
Rather, within this broad framework, he recognized falla­
cies when he confronted them. For other detailed treat­
ments of fallacies see Buck, Argumentative Writing, p. 94, 
and MacEwan, Essentials of Argumentation, pp. 9 7-10 8.
22®Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 128-29.
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227examples/ and causal reasoning. He treated fallacies
228as "gaps" in the reasoning process and labeled the 
reductio ad absurdum and the dilemma as "particular" 
methods of refutation.
Laycock and Scales examined tests of proof from 
several different perspectives. They included specific 
"methods of refuting" arguments from antecedent proba­
bility, sign, and example,^29 devoted an entire chapter to
227Ibid., pp. 107-117.
2 2 pJAlden's listing of fallacies was similar to
Baker's.
229These "methods" may be outlined as follows:
I. Antecedent Probability
A. Is the connection of the cause and effect 
complete?
B. Is the cause adequate to produce the effect in 
question?
C. The operation of other causes in the case in 
question may prevent the action of the assumed 
cause.
D. Might not the fact in question be accounted for 
by the action of some other cause?
II. Arguments from Sign
A. Argument from effect to cause.
1. May not the known effect be due to some other 
cause than the one alleged?
2. Is the alleged cause capable of being the 
real cause of the effect in question?
B. Argument from effect to effect.
C. Arguments from the association of phenomena in 
the past.
1. Point out that the cases are too few to 
establish a law of occurrence.
2. Produce definite examples where the one 
phenomenon has occurred without the other.
III. Argument from Example
A. Argument by generalization
1. The resemblance between the cases given as
examples must be such as to justify the 
making of a general law concerning them.
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230fallacies, and in a later section advised "exploring 
fallacies" as one of "certain peculiar methods of arranging 
and presenting the material of destructive proof.
Foster presented tests of evidence and arguments, 
fallacies, and special methods of refutation in a well- 
organized, teachable form in his 1908 edition of Argumenta­
tion and Debating. His delineation of specific tests of
proof, which remained essentially intact in the 1917
23 2revision, was particularly influential.
2. The case in question must be such that the 
general law is applicable to it.
3. The resemblances must be such as to have a 
direct bearing on the argument.
B. Argument by analogy
1. The case or cases given as examples must 
resemble the case in question, in the rela­
tions which they respectively bear to 
surrounding facts or circumstances.
2. The resemblances must be such as to have a 
direct bearing on the argument.
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 87-113.
2 30They examined false cause (including Jevons' 
discussion of Mill's canons of induction), ambiguous terms, 
composition, and division, ignoring the question or 
arguing beside the point and begging the question, "the 
more important [material fallacies] for purposes of 
argumentation." Ibid., p. 114.
2 31They suggested the following: (1) State clearly
the argument to be answered, (2) Exploring any fallacy,
(3) Reductio ad absurdum, (4) Dilemma, (5) Residues,
(6) Showing an opponent's proof to be a proof of your own 
side of the case, and (7) Refutation should be followed by 
positive proof. Ibid., pp. 254-70.
2 32Foster's tests of evidence from authority in the 
1917 revision deleted the "hearsay" requirements of the 
1908 edition. Rules for evaluating argument from generali­
zation were identical, while those testing argument from
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Foster suggested the following criteria for 
evaluating evidence from authority.
1. Is the reference to authority definite?
2. Is the authority capable of giving expert
testimony?
3. Has the authority had sufficient 
opportunity to know the facts?
4. Is the authority prejudiced?
5. Is the authority reluctant?
6. Is the authority aware of the significance
of his testimony?
7. Is too great reliance placed on one 
authority? __
8. Is the authority used by opponents?
He also set out specific tests of inductive and deductive
argument, argument from example, and argument from causal
relations. Advocating reducing a deductive argument to
the syllogistic form, Foster believed that one can "readily
test its validity by inquiring whether the conclusion
234inevitably follows from the premises." He suggested:
A deductive argument has the fundamental 
requisites of effectiveness if it satisfies 
these conditions: First, if the generaliza­
tion on which it is based is proved true or 
accepted without proof; second, if the term 
about which something is affirmed in the con­
clusion is brought unmistakably within the
analogy simply dropped obvious or repetitive phrases. 
Foster did not specifically list tests of causal reasoning 
in his 1917 revision, but his discussion included the 
essential criteria set out in the 1908 edition. See 
Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 51-141; 
1917 rev. ed., pp. 92-184.
233Ibid., 1917 ed., pp. 99-111. It is interesting 
to note that Foster ignored the test, consistency, which 
appeared in most of the contemporary literature.
234Ibid. , p. 131.
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class about which the generalization asserts a 
truth; third, if the conclusion inevitably 
follows from the two propositions thus estab­
lished. In other words, a deductive argument 
has the primary requisites of conviction if 
the two premises are true, and if the infer­
ence from them violates none of the rules of 
logic.235
Foster devised the following system to test induction;
i.e., to test arguments from generalization and analogy,
236the two categories of argument from example:
I. Argument from Generalization
A. Is the relative size of the unobserved 
part of the class so small as to warrant 
the generalization?
B. Are the observed members fair examples of 
the class?
C. Are we reasonably sure that there are no 
exceptions?
D. Is it highly probable that such a general 
rule or statement is true?237
II. Argument from Analogy
A. Are the points of similarity outweighed 
by points of difference?
B. Is the fact known to be true of the 
analogous case even more likely to be 
true of the case in question?
C. Are the alleged facts on which the analogy 
is based really true?238
235Ibid., p. 129.
236He was influenced here by Baker. See Baker and 
Huntington, Principles, p. 109.
227poster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 ed., 
pp. 142-50.
238Ibid., pp. 153-63.
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Foster also set out tests for causal reasoning:
I. Argument from Effect to Cause
A. Could any other cause have produced the 
observed effect?
B. Is the assumed cause sufficient to produce 
the observed effect?
C. Was the operation of the assumed cause 
prevented by other forces?
II. Argument from Cause to Effect
A. Is the known cause adequate to produce 
the cause in question?
B. Are there other causes sufficient to
prevent the known cause from producing 
the effect in question?
C. Is there any positive evidence tending to 
verify or refute the presumptions furnished 
by the argument from cause to effect?239
Interested in refuting opposing arguments,240 as 
well as in testing one's own proof, Foster included a 
detailed section on fallacies. His outline follows.
I. Fallacies of the Argument from Example
A. Hasty Generalization
B. False Analogy
II. Fallacies of Mistaken Causal Relation
A. Mistaking the Cause
B. Mistaking the Effect
239Foster included effect to effect reasoning and 
"the so-called" argument from sign, but did not list 
separate tests for them. Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 125-41.
240Foster defined refutation as "argument which 
weakens or destroys the contentions of the other side." 
Ibid., p. 142.
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III. Fallacies of Ignoring the Question
IV. Fallacies of Begging the Question
A. To argue in a circle.
B. To assume the point at issue directly under
cover of confused language.
C. To assume a more general truth which 
involves the point at issue.
D. To assume a particular truth which the 
proposition involves.
E. To employ "question-begging" words.
F. To assume a point at issue in defining the
terms.241
Foster discussed six "special methods" of refutation: 
reductio ad absurdum; residues; dilemma; syllogism; 
exposing inconsistencies; and turning the tables.*242 
O'Neill amplified and clarified Laycock and 
Scales's tests of proof in his "rewriting" of that work
in 1917. Following Laycock and Scales in examining the
243quality and source of evidence and in citing specific 
"methods of attack" for arguments from antecedent
241Ibid., pp. 146-72. Foster's 1917 revision 
refined his discussion of fallacies, but included essen­
tially the same concepts, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 192-216.
242Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 177-89. In the 1917 
edition he shifted the syllogism to the chapter on 
inductive and deductive argument and treated the dilemma 
as a form of the fallacy, ignoring the question.
243His specific tests did not differ significantly 
from those of the earlier work. O'Neill did add the 
"hearsay" test. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumenta­
tion and Debate, pp. 101-112.
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2 4 4probability, sign, and example, O'Neill departed from
his mentors in his treatment of fallacies. Whereas Laycock
and Scales had limited their discussion to material logical
fallacies, O'Neill explored the rhetorical (error in 
0 4interpretation) and formal logical (violations of rules 
of the syllogism) varieties. 2^  He reorganized the dis­






1. Ambiguous middle (specific accident)
2. Simple accident
3. Converse accident
244O'Neill's major contribution here was a 
clarification of tests of the example. Regarding generali­
zation, he asked: Fair specimens? Large enough part of 
field? He applied the tests of generalization to the 
literal analogy and advised attacking a figurative analogy 
as "false." Ibid., pp. 155-69.
2^5He included incorrect obversion (changing a 
proposition from affirmative to negative or vice versa 
without changing its meaning); incorrect conversion 
(transposing subject and predicate without changing mean­
ing) ; amphibology (ambiguous grammatical structure which 
produces misconception); and accent (ambiguity arising from 
misplaced accent or emphasis). Ibid., pp. 172-76.
246Gertrude Buck had earlier brought formal logical 
fallacies within the scope of argumentation. See Buck, 
Argumentative Writing, p. 94. For O'Neill's specific 
tests, see O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 176-82.
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II. Presumption
A. Begging the Question
1. Assumption of an unproved premise
2. Arguing in a circle
B. Irrelevant Conclusion— Ignoring the 
Question
1. Argumentum ad hominem
2. Argumentum ad populum
3. Argumentum ad ignorantiam
4. Argumentum ad verecundiam





O'Neill's contribution to the testing of proof lay 
primarily in his perspective rather than in the development 
of original rules. His discussion of "methods of refuta­
tion" brought under one umbrella the various evaluative 
criteria included in most argumentation and debate texts: 
tests of evidence; attacks on forms of arguments; exposing
fallacies; and special rhetorical devices (reductio ad
248absurdum, dilemma, residues and turning the tables).
The 1917 revisions of both O'Neill and Foster thus provided
247see ibid., pp. 182-96.
248Ibid., pp. 355-65.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the essential framework for "middle period" approaches to
proof.
The Forensic
George Pierce Baker defined the forensic as
a written argument resulting from careful 
analysis that has taken form in a good brief, 
careful selection of evidence, and literary 
skill that knows how, placing the carefully 
selected evidence at the places where the 
brief proper calls for it, to expand the brief
into the complete argument.^49
This predisposition toward a written argumentative essay 
was not, however, necessarily the majority view. Inter­
collegiate debating, though on less than a grand scale,
250was already a fact of life. During a relatively short
period of time, the forensic, as it was called, expanded 
beyond sectional contests to become a national affair.
Not only did individual schools meet, but debating leagues 
were formed, debating contests were organized on statewide
249Baker, Principles, pp. 269-70. In the preface 
to his 1895 edition of Principles, Baker, the English 
professor, justified his position as follows: "It is
because I believe that for the speaker as well as the 
writer the principles which lead to convincingness merely- 
not to persuasion— are practically the same; and, most 
important of all, because I am convinced that the easiest, 
the most rapid method for a speaker to acquire good form, 
and ability to handle evidence well, is for him to write 
out his work until he has mastered the principles in this 
book which lead to convincingness merely," p. vii.
250For an account of the various claims of which 
was the first intercollegiate debate, see Ralph C. 
Ringwalt, "Intercollegiate Debating," Forum, XXII (January 
1897), 633-40; Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeifery Auer, 
Discussion and Debate (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941),
pp. 395-400.
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2 5 1bases, and debate trips were instituted. This rapid
expansion of intercollegiate debating resulted in highly 
structured, fairly sophisticated debate programs.̂ 2
Early textbooks in argumentation reflected this 
emphasis on debating. Alden, for example, called his work 
The Art of Debate, while Laycock and Scales, and Foster
251Princeton, Harvard, and Yale established the 
first triangular league (1895) and Michigan, Minnesota, 
Northwestern, and Chicago Universities formed the first 
quadrangular league (1897). See Leroy Cowperthwaite and 
A. Craig Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," in A History 
of Speech Education in America, ed. by Karl Wallace 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), p. 260. "The 
University of Denver was the first institution to schedule 
more than one debate on a trip into neighboring states.
In 1913, a Denver team journeyed to Kansas and debated 
Ottawa University on April 16, and to Missouri for an 
engagement with William Jewell College on April 18. Almost 
immediately other colleges and universities began sending 
teams on cross country tours until by 1916 the debate trip 
had become a popular feature," p. 269. See also Edwin D. 
Shurter, "State Organization for Contests in Public 
Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (April,
1915), 59-64.
In 1916, J. R. Pelsma sent a detailed question­
naire on debating to "about fifty of the most prominent 
colleges and universities." From Pelsma's comprehensive 
survey one may conclude that debate continued to operate 
both within the academic curriculum and outside it. The 
debate coach, moreover, emerged. For controversy over the 
"proper role" of the coach, see Rollo L. V. Lyman, "Some 
Suggested Reforms in Intercollegiate Debating," Public 
Speaking Review, III (January, 1914), 144-54; Frank H.
Lane, "Faculty Help in Intercollegiate Contests," Quarterly 
Journal of Public Speaking, I (April, 1915), 9-16; Thomas
C. Trueblood, "Coaching a Debate Team," Public Speaking 
Review, I (November, 1911), 84-85. Finances, derive# from 
university appropriations, student appropriations, admis­
sion fees, blanket taxes, and alumni gifts influenced the 
size of debate programs, the number of men on a team, and 
the number of debates in which a team participated. See 
J. R. Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," Quarterly 
Journal of Public Speaking, II (April, 1916J7 l3o-40.
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respectively included the terms debate and debating in the
titles of their texts. Though proclaiming debating to be
"for the most part, but oral application of the principles
of analysis, structure, evidence, and presentation," and
though believing it "a pity that in many instances study
of argument is regarded only as a stepping stone to suc-
253cessful debating," Baker and Huntington succumbed to the 
prevailing trend and included a short chapter entitled 
"Debating" in their 1905 revision.
253Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. vii, 398.
254Baker and Huntington treated— though perfunc­
torily— such problems as choice of subject, burden of 
proof, and attitude toward colleagues. They believed that 
"topics, whether for intercollegiate contests or class 
debates, should be chosen much more carefully than they 
often are." That their list of prescriptions contained an 
inordinate number of "do nots" probably reflects some of 
the prevailing excesses. They suggested that: "The
desideratum is not any debatable question, nor one which 
gives the affirmative or the negative an advantage, and 
least of all is it a question which involves some trap for 
opponents. The last is unpardonable, for what is wanted 
is a two-sided question which will give each group of 
speakers a chance under approximately equal conditions to 
show what it can do evidentially and persuasively with a 
definite case. Avoid, then, those questions on which it 
is practically impossible to reach any final decision.
. . . In choosing a question, then, consider carefully the 
probability that evidence is accessible, in print, through 
interviews, or from one's own thinking. Avoid also topics 
that produce little except haggling over definitions. . . . 
Again, avoid topics which in the last resort can be made 
conclusive only for certain temperaments, that is, which 
rest more on persuasion than on conviction. . . . Select, 
too, topics which can be treated in the time allowed for 
the debate. Many questions of the day are hydra-headed.
. . . As a rule, reasonably fresh topics, the really 
current questions of the day on which public opinion is 
still forming, are the best training. Use the negative
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Probings into the nature of the forensic varied in 
the identification as well as treatment of relevant and/or 
appropriate material. The very early writers emphasized 
the construction of the forensic, while later ones attended 
more to the presentation, ethics, and evaluation of contest 
debating.
Constructing the Forensic 
Though early period writers perceived the forensic, 
at its core, to be the issues derived from analysis 
buttressed by proof and laid out in a quasi-legal brief, 
they did not discredit the importance of "rhetoric" or 
"composition" in argumentation. Conversely, early texts 
included sections on arrangement and style.
Arrangement
Baker divided the forensic into three parts—  
introduction, argument, and peroration— and discussed each
phrasing with caution. . . . Usually this phrasing, turning 
affirmative into negative and negative into affirmative, 
leads before the end of the debate to double negatives and 
to confusion in the minds of the audience. . . . One 
tendency in phrasing, much fostered by intercollegiate 
debating, to select questions in which the negative need 
only show that the proposition of the affirmative does not 
hold good, but need itself support no case of its own, is 
not productive of the best training in argument. This 
leads to overestimating the value of rebuttal in debate, 
with the result that often speakers skillful in rebuttal 
fail utterly when forced to support a constructive case. 
Would it not be much better, both in class and inter­
collegiate debates, to find questions which oblige both 
sides to work both destructively and constructively? Any 
comparative question does this." Ibid., pp. 398-402.
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2 5 5in terms of conviction and persuasion. Agreeing that 
"the structure of the brief should be the basis of the
2C/Tstructure of the finished argument," both Alden 30 and 
Laycock and Scales2^  applied Baker's divisions of the 
written forensic to debating. These texts emphasized par­
ticularly the work of the introduction, anticipating later 
discussions of division of labor among speakers in a
2!̂ Baker believed that the work of conviction in 
an introduction "is to develop, always with as much clear­
ness and force as possible, and with degrees of elegance 
varying according to circumstances, the outline of the 
well-planned brief introduction." Baker, Principles, 
p. 279. An introduction may "endeavor to persuade*1 under 
the following circumstances: a technical or otherwise
difficult subject; unknown speaker; hostile audience. Con­
viction in the argument results from "giving in a literary 
form the evidence for which the carefully constructed brief 
proper calls," pp. 279-93. "Persuasive value may be given 
to arguments either by a direct appeal, suggested by them, 
to the emotions, or by pointing out or suggesting that 
significance of the ideas advanced which, for any reason, 
is likely to stir the audience to action," (italics 
omitted), p. 322. The work of conviction in the peroration 
was, for Baker, two-fold: recapitulation of the argument;
and amplification and diminishing the importance and con­
clusiveness "to take advantage of the last opportunity 
offered the writer to win the sympathy of his audience for 
himself or his subject"; and "to stir the passions of his 
hearers," p. 329.
2!̂Alden, Art of Debate, p. 152. See also Laycock 
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 342-43.
257Laycock and Scales also included the need for 
"strategy" as a distinguishing characteristic of debate; 
i.e., "How to open the battle, when to use light cavalry 
and when to use artillery, when to attack, when to give 
way, how to plan an ambuscade, how to retreat." Laycock 
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 274. They 
observed, moreover, that preparation for argumentation 
varies according to the form of the finished product.
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258debate. Their treatments of the argument proper and
of the peroration differed little, moreover, from most 
contemporary rhetorics. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Alden also stressed the structuring of proof s.
By Baker and Huntington's revision, and certainly 
by Foster's first edition, one could perceive a clear 
shift in emphasis regarding the structure of a forensic. 
Baker and Huntington relegated the divisions of intro­
duction, argument, and conclusion so prominent in the 
first edition of Principles to a short section on form in 
which they included the classical dictum; "Let a speech
2 58Alden suggested that the introduction should 
set out the nature and origin of the question; state 
fundamental facts in the case; admit if side has the 
burden of proof or presumption; show how side proposes 
to shift the burden; and set out issues. Alden, Art of 
Debate, pp. 138-39. Laycock and Scales listed similar 
duties for the "first speaker on the affirmative." They 
included: "to win sympathy for himself or his view of
the subject, and so to present the question as to persuade 
his audience that his method of treating this question is 
just and sensible." Laycock and Scales included "explain 
the origin and history of the question, and . . . present 
the issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate 
p. 280. They also suggested the importance of definition 
of terms in the introduction, p. 29 3. Laycock and Scales 
also included specific prescriptions for the "first 
speaker on the negative"; "he must . . . overthrow the 
influence of his opponent who has introduced the debate," 
p. 281. Laycock and Scales also examined such strategies 
as argumentum ad hominem and questioning, pp. 315-23.
2^Alden labeled Baker's "argument," the "body of 
proof." He also believed that "the nature of the proof 
must determine the best order for its presentation," and 
offered some special rules for ordering proofs. See Alden 
Art of Debate, p. 141.
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have a beginning, a middle, and an end."260 Interested, 
moreover, in the unity in each side of a case and in 
progression as well as unity in the whole debate, they
outlined in more detail than had their predecessors the
2 61work of individual speakers, setting out this work in 
terms of "class debates" rather than a contest format.262 
Foster ignored the introduction, argument, conclu­
sion distinctions except in discussing the brief. He 
clarified, moreover, Baker and Huntington's suggestions 
for the work of individual speakers and presented the 
following concise, usable rules. The first speech for the 
affirmative, Foster said, "should present all the steps in 
analysis which are necessary for an understanding of the
debate and no more."263
260Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 412.
261See ibid., pp. 415-21. The mechanics of 
debating were only beginning to become crystallized during 
the early period. Since "practically all the early debates 
were conducted on the basis of the single debate 'contract1 
arrangement," which set its own rules and format, there 
was little continuity. For a summary of prevailing pro­
cedures, see Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate 
Debating," pp. 260-62; Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," 
p. 135.
26 2Baker and Huntington's "class debate" used the 
following format: "there are usually two persons on each
side, allowed, for instance, ten minutes in which to open 
the discussion, fourteen minutes for the main speech, and 
six minutes for final rebuttal, with some five or six 
speeches from the floor of four minutes each." Baker and 
Huntington, Principles, pp. 415-16.
261Foster contended that this introduction should 
be "unprejudiced." Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1908 ed., p. 288.
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After presenting such introductory matters 
as the proposition demands, the opening speaker 
should take up the first issue and endeavor to 
make definite progress with the case of the 
affirmative. He should show the relation of 
his work to the work of the other speakers on 
his side; and he should make clear just what 
he understands to be the bearing of his argu­
ment on the negative side, and what, conse­
quently, his opponents must do to meet the 
contentions of the affirmative.^®^
Foster believed that "the first requisite of the 
opening speech for the negative is adaptation to the
n/rcpreceding speech." He further suggested that:
The speaker must make clear to what extent 
he accepts the work in analysis presented by 
the affirmative.
If the affirmative speaker has failed to 
analyze the proposition and set forth the 
issues, the negative speaker must supply the 
deficiency. . . . Furthermore, the first nega­
tive speaker must either refute the arguments 
just advanced or show good reason for post­
poning the refutation.
At the close of his speech, the first 
speaker for the negative should summarize his 
own argument, show its bearing on the argument 
of the other side, and point out just what 
work, in view of these facts, the affirmative 
still has to perform.2®®
As for the other main speeches, Foster counselled
For the other speakers, the first 
requisite is adaptation. They must adapt 
their work to that of the other side, as the 
debate proceeds, and they must adapt their 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
the duty of each speaker to summarize, not 
only what he.has said, but all that has been 
said on his side up to that point.^67
^ ^ Ibid., p. 302. Pattee took a different view, 
approaching what speakers must do largely in terms of 
affirmative and negative prerogatives. Pattee said: "The
first speaker for the affirmative— Upon the first speaker 
falls the duty of interpreting the proposition. . . . Since 
the burden of proof always rests on the affirmative, the 
first speaker in the argument proper, as a rule, points 
out the weaknesses in existing conditions, leaving to his 
colleague the task of presenting the advantages of a 
change. In handling his proof he must be sure so to 
correlate his work with the work of his colleague that, 
in the minds of the audience, it will all hang together 
as a united whole. To accomplish this object, he may, as 
he finishes with his partition, state what points he will 
discuss himself, and what points will be handled by the 
affirmative speakers that are to succeed him; and he must, 
without fail, when he nears the end of his allotted time, 
hastily summarize the proof he has given, and outline the 
proof to follow. . . .  It rests with the first speaker 
for the negative to determine whether the introduction as 
presented by the affirmative has erred in any respect, it 
is the duty of the first negative debater to supply the 
deficiency or make the correction; otherwise he errs 
equally with the affirmative. . . . Two courses are open 
to him; he may at once refute his predecessors' arguments, 
or he may proceed to take up his constructive proof, 
giving reason for postponing the refutation. . . . About 
the only practical suggestion that can be made to the 
other speakers is that they adapt their constructive work 
to that of their colleagues, and deploy their refutation 
so as to hammer the principle positions of their 
opponent. . . . Good speeches of refutation deal largely 
with main ideas . . . and the offer [of] some opposition 
to every main heading used by his opponents. . . .  The 
work of the last speaker on each side differs somewhat 
from the work of his colleagues. All the speakers try 
to overthrow the opposing arguments, and by means of 
summaries keep their case as a whole before the audience. 
The last speaker devotes far less time to pure refutation, 
gives a more detailed summary, and in addition, compares 
and contrasts the arguments of his side with the argu­
ments of the opposition. This last process is called 
amplifying and diminishing." Pattee, Practical Argumen­
tation, 1915 rev. ed., pp. 241-50, passim.
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Foster insisted on thorough preparation for 
rebuttal.
The debater must decide at once what is the 
bearing on the question, and what is the rela­
tion to his own case of the argument advanced 
against him. He must decide whether it is 
worth answering; if so, when and by what 
method.26 8
The first function of the closing rebuttal speech was, for 
Foster, "to make clear what has been done by both sides." 
He advised the following procedure:
To make this clear, the speaker must take 
up the issues, one by one, in a logical order, 
which is usually the order determined at the 
outset. His purpose is to show, by contrast­
ing the arguments which the course of the 
debate has left standing on each side of each 
issue, that his side has the weight of proof 
in its favor. He thus emphasizes his own 
arguments at the expense of his opponent's 
arguments. . . .  He must subordinate the 
insignificant odds and ends, which are more 
or less confused in the minds of the hearers, 
to the main issues. His task is to muster the 
whole forces of his side for an orderly,
unified, final a t t a c k . 269
Agreeing that "the debate should be one— should 
have absolute unity," and insisting that "it should be 
fundamentally the same if delivered by one or two or three 
speakers," O'Neill returned to the framework of introduc­
tion, discussion, and conclusion for examining the main
2^®Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
p. 305.
269 , „ .Ibid., p. 306. Foster was also concerned with
the organization of rebuttal material and gave specific
prescriptions for writing specimen rebuttal cards.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
270speeches in a debate, treating the divisions similarly 
to Laycock and Scales. O'Neill progressed beyond the 
scope of the earlier work, however, at least in two major 
areas: outlining duties for the first affirmative speaker;
and differentiating rebuttal from refutation. The first 
affirmative, according to O'Neill, should "explain the 
case, set forth the issues, accept the burden of proof, 
outline your case as far as seems advisable, and then
0 7  Istart the argument. In a detailed section on rebuttal
27 2of speeches, O'Neill made the following critical
distinctions:
Refutation is the broader term . . . and 
rebuttal is the refutation that is given in 
a special speech which has properly no (or 
very little) constructive material in it.2^2
Style
Most early writers integrated discussions of style 
into their treatments of structure. Baker, for example, 
labeled clearness, force, and elegance as characteristics
270O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 39 3.
271Ibid., p. 394.
272As had Foster, O'Neill advocated detailed 
preparation for rebuttal but advised against memorized 
rebuttal speeches. He suggested that a speaker must know 
the other side and "be ready for surprises." For O'Neill, 
as for Laycock and Scales, "the great fundamental principle 
which should guide the preparation of all rebuttal speeches 
is: Answer the whole case of the other side." Ibid.,
p. 425.
272Ibid., p. 421.
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of a good introduction; unity, clearness, and force "the
great essentials in the argument proper, . . . both from
274the argumentative and from the literary point of view";
and an element of surprise, avoidance of statements not
in the argument proper, brevity, clearness, and elegance
as "the requisites of a good peroration."
Sensing a close relationship between structure 
2 7 6and style, Alden examined paragraph structure, tran­
sitions, and distinguished the compact from diffuse 
277styles. Recognizing that "it is common for rhetoricians
to classify the qualities of a good style under the three 
heads of Clearness, Force, and Elegance," he added to
274Baker believed that "whether elegance is 
desirable will . . . depend on the nature of the public 
address." Baker, Principles, p. 293.
27 5With the exception of an element of surprise, 
Baker followed the requisites given by Phelps, Theory 
of Preaching, pp. 520-22, cited in Baker, Principles, 
p. 335.
276Laycock and Scales posed several questions 
which indicated a similar awareness. They asked: Is
the introduction phrased so as to arouse interest? Is 
the connection between the main points of the proposition 
made perfectly apparent? Is the arrangement in any way 
defective? Are there well managed transitions? They 
suggested, moreover, that transitions, summaries, and 
partitions are valuable aids to unity in the proof itself. 
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debating, pp. 232, 
356.
2 77He advised a compromise between the compact 
and liffuse style. See Alden, Art of Debate.
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278these qualities unity, proportion, continuity, and an
279element of general truth.
For Baker and Huntington, "clearness, force, and
movement are not, however, everything needed in argument."
They believed that "style depends . . . primarily on
thought; secondly on imagination . . . ; and finally on
an accurate, copious, and responsive vocabulary."280
Baker and Huntington did not offer specific suggestions,
281however, for oral style.
282Foster gleaned from contemporary rhetorics 
certain "principles" and "qualities" of style, and sug­
gested that "observance of these principles of Unity,
Emphasis, and Coherence tends to secure the qualities of
283Clearness, Ease and Force." For Foster, these "prin­
ciples" and "qualities" were of value, however, only
278Ibid., p. 164. Alden also discussed figures of 
speech in relation to the force of an argument, p. 176.
279Ibid., p. 184.
280Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 385.
281Neither did most writers who followed them.
282Foster recommended particularly two works:
Barrett Wendell, English Composition (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1891); Hammond Lamont, English Composition 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907). His treatment
is essentially the same in the 1917 revision.
28 3Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., 
p. 250. His treatment is essentially the same in the 1917 
revision.
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inasmuch as they helped to secure the "paramount quality
of Force."284
Though O'Neill contended that "a 'speech style' or
'oral style1 is always preferable in argumentation and is
285practically always used in good argumentation," his own 
treatment was traditional. He discussed style primarily 
in relation to the introduction, discussion, and conclusion 
of a speech, much as had Laycock and Scales.
Presentation 
Raymond Alden was among the first to treat
TOCextensively "the spoken debate." Not only did he
2 8 7explore the relation of written and spoken speech, but 
he also examined in detail kinds and qualities of delivery.
Alder, recommended the writing out of an argumentative
2 8 8 2 89speech, but warned against memorizing or reading the
document. He preferred an extemporaneous delivery using
284 "For this purpose," he said, "Clearness and Ease 
are invaluable; and to them we should add the rhetorical 
aids of Brevity, Concreteness, and Illustration.1 Ibid., 
p. 250.
28 5O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 11.
285See Robinson, Forensic Oratory; George Jacob 
Holyoake, Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate (1st 
American, from 2d London ed.; New York: McElrath and
Barker, 1853).
287See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 187.
288Ibid., p. 194.
289Ibid., pp. 191-92.
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notes. Alden also included "characteristics of a good
delivery" which he "stated in the same words as the quali-
290ties of a good style": clearness (enunciation and
purity of tone); force (vigor and variety of pitch); and
291elegance (posture and gesture). He believed, however,
that:
All these matters of delivery can, from one 
point of view, be reduced to a single prin­
ciple. The successful speaker is one who is 
able to reach and move his audience. To do 
this he must . . . talk to them.^92
Baker and Huntington included a short section on
"external form" in their chapter on debating in which they
stated: "Debaters should remember that their appearance
before an audience may have a large persuasive effect for
293or against them." They advised that "any beginner in
debate will save himself much if he will take as prelimi-
29 4nary a good course in voice-training, pose, and gesture."
Though Foster believed that "matter is more 
important than form," he, nevertheless, recognized the 
importance of a speaker's delivery. Of the five "methods" 
which he labeled, Foster precluded both writing out a
290Ibid., p. 205.
291Ibid., pp. 205-214; Alden believed that little 
should be said about posture, and little gesture is needed 
in debate.
2923 Ibid., p. 205.
29 3Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 413.
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2 9 5speech and reading it, and memorizing it. He recognized 
problems in transition with the third method, "memorizing 
important parts and adapting the rest to the occasion," 
and suggested that the use of an outline or brief might
29 6even "detract . . . from the effectiveness of delivery."
He argued rather that "most successful of all— other things
being equal— is the speaker who extemporizes his whole
address, without even a scrap of paper between himself and 
297his hearers." Foster also recognized the importance of
voice, enunciation, position, and gestures, and referred 
his readers to several contemporary texts which stressed 
delivery.298
In addition to rules of good delivery, early period 
argumentation texts offered advice on manners in debating. 
Baker and Huntington, for example, talked about attitudes
79 6^Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev. 
ed., pp. 299-300. Foster agreed that a direct quotation 
that is read may be quite effective "provided that the 
speaker knows how to read," p. 30 3.
^ ^ Ibid. , p. 300.
297Ibid. Foster suggested, nevertheless, that 
"even a speaker who has followed the extempore method with 
some success feels more confidence if he has adequate notes 
in his pocket. They have been compared to life-preservers 
under the berth, ready for use if the ship is sinking," 
p. 300.
298Irvah L. Winter, Public Speaking (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1912); S. S. Curry, Mind and Voice 
(Boston: Boston Expression Company, 1910); Henry Evarts
Gordon and Rollo L. Lyman, Vocal Expression in Speech 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1911); w! B. Mitchell^ School
and College Speaker (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1901) .
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toward colleagues. Though viewing debating as a "kind of
game," Foster stressed that it should not be mere
"contentiousness."3^  He advised caution in the use of
ridicule, satire, invective, and epithet, and decried the
tendency in debating to "quibble." In a section entitled
"attitude toward opponents," Foster said:
No speaker can carry conviction who 
imagines all truth to be on his side and all 
who differ from him to be in obstinate error.
Such an attitude arouses antagonism.300
O'Neill also emphasized "personal attitude and
bearing." Though agreeing that sarcasm, ridicule, and
personality attacks "are undoubtedly admissible and
helpful, under certain circumstances and when properly
handled, in discrediting an opponent," he warned of dangers
301in using such techniques inadvisedly.
Ethics
Most early period writers made some mention of the 
ethics of debating. Baker and Huntington, for example,
labeled "fairness" as one of "the special characteristics
30 2of good debate," while Foster included sections on
3^Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
pp. 280-81.
300Ibid., p. 3C9.
301O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 379. O'Neill also warned against personal 
inconsistency and wished for self control among debaters.
on oBaker and Huntington, Principles, p. 421.
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"honor" in both the 190 8 and 1917 editions of his text. It 
was, however, the issue of debating both sides of a ques­
tion that provoked most conflict. Baker, who sanctioned
such a procedure, purportedly suggested that "few college
30 3students have any deep convictions on public questions." 
Even so august a figure as former President Theodore 
Roosevelt felt compelled to comment:
What we need is to turn out of our colleges 
young men with ardent convictions on the side 
of the right; not young men who can make a good 
argument for either right or wrong as their 
interest bids them. Our present method of 
carrying on debates . . . encourages precisely 
the wrong attitude among those who take part 
in them. There is no effort to instill sin­
cerity and intensity of conviction. On the 
contrary the net result is to make the con­
testants feel that their convictions have 
nothing to do with their arguments.^04
Criticism came, moreover, from within the ranks. Foster
urged students "to refuse— even for the sake of practice,
even for the supposed honor of the college— to speak
against their convictions."^05 He argued:
■^^Baker, cited in Pelsma, "Questionnaire on 
Debating," p. 133.
3Ĉ Theodore Roosevelt, "Chapters of a Possible 
Autobiography," Outlook, CIII (February 22, 1913), 406.
305Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., 
p. 326; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 307-308. "At once the objection 
arises that it is good training for a person to study both 
sides of a question. Certainly it is. By all means let a 
debater earnestly study the side of the question in which 
he does not believe; let him be honest and diligent in his 
efforts to find all that can be urged against his own 
beliefs, in his efforts to get the point of view of 'the 
other fellow1; but let him decline to stand before an
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A speaker who, even in a formal contest, 
endeavors to convince an audience of the truth 
of what he believes to be false engages in an 
undertaking of doubtful morality. Here is the 
dilemma. If he simulates sincerity and 
earnestness, he is deceiving his hearers, 
emulating the most contemptible speakers in 
public life, preparing to swell their ranks.
If he does not even appear to be sincere and 
earnest, he lacks the primary requisites of a 
persuasive speaker, and becomes the lifeless 
kind of debater of whom we hear complaint. 06
O'Neill offered one of the better defenses:
It certainly is_ the duty of the colleges 
to turn out "young men who can make a good 
argument" on either side of such questions 
without regard to their convictions. Whether 
a man will argue against his convictions in 
actual life, where the "merits of the ques­
tion" are really to be decided, is a very dif­
ferent thing. Surely he must be mentally 
capable of doing it. . . . Argument that is 
worth while has an intellectual basis. It is 
built upon facts and logical inference rather 
than on ardent convictions. Skill in the use 
of the facts and inferences available may be 
gained on either side of a question without 
regard to convictions. Instruction and prac­
tice in debate should give young men this 
skill. And where these matters are properly 
handled, stress is not laid on getting the 
speaker to think rightly in regard to the
audience and attempt to convince them of the truth of 
statements which he believes to be false. It is said, 
further, that the prevailing methods in classroom and 
intercollegiate debates offer practical difficulties in 
the attainment of this ideal. If so, let the methods go. 
Let us not sacrifice the ends for the sake of the means.
If the rules of the game prevent the attainment of its 
supreme objects, let us discard the rules. The supreme 
objects of argumentation and debating are to train citizens 
who shall be, first, keen and sound and enthusiastic 
thinkers, second, leaders of men, fearless, able, devoted, 
but, above all, honest," 1917 rev. ed., p. 30 8.
306Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 308.
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merits of either side of these questions— but 
to think accurately on both sides.
Judging
Attitudes toward judging reflected philosophical
divergencies regarding the "proper" end of contest 
308debating. William H. Davis set out the nature of the
dispute as follows:
If my analysis is correct, two fairly 
distinct conceptions of debating are recog­
nizable. According to the first of these 
conceptions, debating is a game; the contests 
in debating exist in and for themselves and 
are conducted accordingly.
The opposite conception of debating . . . 
is that of training for the wise disposition 
of important matters in legislatures, public 
gatherings, club and society meetings— wherever 
men collect, as they must constantly be doing, 
at least in a democracy, for counsel and effec­
tive action. Debating, according to this con­
ception, is an approximation of actual 
conditions, of "real life." The "contest" 
feature, the "sport" element, while still 
present, becomes secondary; and superiority, 
skill, becomes inconceivable apart from the 
total persuasive effect secured by the 
contestants.309
■^^O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation aud 
Debate, pp. 374-75.
30 8Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," p. 136. 
Almost one-third of those responding to Pelsma's question­
naire did not consider judges essential for intercollegiate 
debates. And of those who answered, many considered them 
to be a "necessary evil."
309William H. Davis, "Is Debating Primarily a 
Game?" Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, II (April,
1916), 172-73. Davis noted, however, that these concep­
tions do not exist "absolutely." Rather, he was concerned 
with "the emphasis, the chief tendency, the predominating 
element."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
The battle over the issue of "game" versus "tool"
was largely fought in the pages of the Quarterly Journal of
Public Speaking. Its editor, James M. O'Neill, advanced
time and again in articles, editorials, and book reviews,
his conviction that "the object of any particular team
is to demonstrate its superiority over its opponent in
debating."3 ®̂ Debating should be judged "like other sport
on the skill shown, by experts who are qualified to pass
311on the quality of that skill." In rendering decisions,
O'Neill contended,
The proper question to be answered by the 
award is, "Which university has the better 
debating team?" It is not right either to 
expect judges to have no opinions on the ques­
tions debated or to expect the debaters to 
change the opinions of the judges. Each judge 
should know enough about debating (regardless 
of his knowledge or opinions in economics, 
politics, theology, etc.) to give an expert 
opinion on the comparative skill of the 
opposing teams, entirely aside 'rom his 
private opinion on the question debated, 
either before or after the debate.
Unless we accept this as the proper basis 
of judgment we must either assume that the 
debater is actually supposed to change the 
opinions of the judges on these great civic 
questions, or we must be content with an 
opinion which could as well be obtained by 
mail weeks before the debate.
James M. O'Neill, "A Disconcerted Editor and 
Others," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (April,
1915), 82-83.
311Ibid.
3-'-20'Neill agreed, however, that "judges should be 
chosen who know enough about real debating to know that
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O'Neill's pronouncements did not go unchallenged.
The first volley of magnitude came from William H. Davis
who, "impressed by the reality involved in the debating 
313contest," argued that "frankly accepted as a game,
314debating becomes a monstrous affair." Davis' predic­
tions were dire:
The erection of specious structures of 
argument can hardly be ruled out; the more 
cunningly specious they are, the more com­
mendable, as the fruit of brilliancy and 
industry, they become. As participants in a 
game, debaters may devise artfully misleading 
arguments or wordings, affirmatives may post­
pone answerable refutation until negatives 
have no opportunity to answer, negatives may 
withhold treatment of an "alternative plan" 
in order to diminish their opponents1 oppor­
tunity for refutation, and no one can sensibly 
find fault; it is all in fun. It is hard to 
see why minor fabrications may not be regarded 
as venial. Surely the whole nauseating 
machinery of "colleagues," "opponents,"
"previous speaker," "we of the negative,"
"the gentlemen of the affirmative," becomes 
justified and essential and each debate will 
be a wordy quarrel between individuals 
restricted only by their having to speak 
within time limits and but one at a time.
O'Neill countered in an editorial entitled "Game or
on c.Counterfeit Presentment," and by the time Hugh Neal
skill does not consist in glibness of tongue, trickery of 
phraseology, nor superficiality of thought." Ibid.,
pp. 81-82.
Davis, "Is Debating a Game?" p. 177.
314Ibid., p. 175.
315Ibid.
3^James M. O'Neill, "Game or Counterfeit Present 
ment," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, II (April,
1916), 193-97.
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Wells entered the fray in October, 1917, debate ensued on 
a full scale.
Wells argued that the only valid basis for judging
a debate is to assess "the respective merits of the case
317or argument presented by the opposing teams." "Skill
in 'reasoning, research, and speaking' should be judged by
■31 Oresults," he said.
Debate decisions must be rendered upon the 
merits of the argument presented by the 
debaters, irrespective of the personal 
opinions of the judges concerning the merits 
of the resolution.
The judges must pass upon the arguments 
presented as though they were exhaustive of 
the subject. The task of the judge, there­
fore, is to place himself in the position of
one who has no opinions or knowledge of the 
subject, other than what has been presented, 
and to make the decision which any reasonable 
and intelligent person would predicate upon 
the premises. ̂ 19
Meanwhile, Howard S. Woodward was experimenting with
320decisionless debates. Lew Sarett constructed one of
the more popular paradigms, a "Board of Judges" composed of
321"one expert judge," which he explained as follows:




320Howard S. Woodward, "Debating Without Judges," 
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, I (October, 1915), 
229-33.
3 21Lew Sarett, "The Expert Judge of Debate," Quar­
terly Journal of Public Speaking, III (April, 1917), 136.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
The system rests upon the idea that a 
single expert judge who has reached a high 
degree of efficiency through much experience 
as a debater and as a judge, car give a more 
fair and helpful decision than can a board of 
from three to five judges, in part, or in 
whole, incompetent and inexpert. To secure 
the highest type of judge it is customary to 
pay a fee, and to require in addition to his 
formal decision, a detailed analysis of the 
debate with a statement of the basis of his 
conclusion. At once the question arises: who
shall be deemed an "expert judge?" His quali­
fications should include most, if not all of 
the following: a thorough knowledge of the
ins and outs of debate secured through 
(1) actual participation in intercollegiate 
debate, (2) experience as a coach of inter­
collegiate debate, (3) experience in serving 
as a judge. It is desirable in addition that 
he possess by virtue of his training or pro­
fession, a fair knowledge and a proper per­
spective of the fields of economics, sociology, 
and political science, in which most of our 
debate questions lie.
322Ibid. Sarett required that a judge substantiate 
his decision by reading a brief analysis of the debate.
The form he advocated is as follows: "1. Which team was
superior in the clear, coherent, and effective organization 
of its material? . . .  2. Which team better supported its 
contentions with sound proof? . . .  3. Which team estab­
lished and maintained the most crucial issues? . . .
4. Which team was superior in destroying its opponents' 
crucial issue? . . .  5. Which team, through greater free­
dom in departing from prepared speeches, and through 
superior extempore speaking and resourcefulness, more 
readily adapted its arguments to the arguments actually 
made by its opponents upon the platform? . . .  6. Which 
team in its constructive argument manifested a superior 
analysis of the question? . . .  7. Which team manifested a 
superior analysis of the debate as it actually progressed 
on the platform, i.e. which team was superior in discover­
ing and following the strategic issues rather than the 
minor or irrelevant points? . . .  8. Which team was 
superior in team work? . . . 9. Which team was superior 
in delivery, aside from effective delivery presumed in 
other questions? . . .10. Which team in general— aside 
from the rebuttal work presumed in other questions— was 
superior in rebuttal? . . .11. Which team was superior
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Other writers continued to explore various other 
alternatives to judging. R. 0. T. Hollister advocated 
faculty judging,323 while Raymond Pease believed the 
audience to be the most desirable "jury." Pease contended 
that:
College audiences should function as 
nearly as possible as audiences in the world 
at large; that there should be the largest 
possible influence of and appeal to the 
audience; that we cannot otherwise expect the 
greatest good either to the audience or to 
the speakers; that to secure these ends the 
audience must have a part in the "game."2^
Criteria for judging appeared, Pattee's listing being
representative:
I. Which side has the better analysis?
II. Which side has the stronger proof?
A. Consider the preponderance of the 
evidence.
B. Consider the quality of the 
evidence.
C. Consider the skill used in 
reasoning.
III. Which side offers the better
refutation?
A. See which side has more main 
points left standing after the 
refutation has been given.
in debate strategy? On the basis of the above analysis, 
it is my judgment that the most effective debating was 
done by the . . . team," pp. 137-38.
323R. 0. T. Hollister, "Faculty Judging," 
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 
235-41.
324Raymond B. Pease, "The Audience as the Jury," 
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 
218.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 5
IV. Which side has the better delivery?
A. Consider general bearing, voice,
and language. 25
Summary
George Pierce Baker had envisioned a "practical 
argumentation for everyday life" when he first published 
The Principles of Argumentation in 1895. It was his 
task to formulate its theoretical bases. Relying primarily 
on legal and philosophical writings, Baker developed 
precise systems of analysis and of briefing. His approach 
to proof, moreover, sidestepped the strictures imposed by 
Formal Logic. Baker's interest in the discovery of argu­
ments and in their relation to a proposition was particu­
larly influential. His approach to proof has less impact. 
Most writers simply were not prepared to reject the rela­
tive security of formal validity in favor of some vague 
"practical argumentation."
Several notable texts published during the "early 
period" followed in the Baker tradition. By 1917, with 
the revisions of Foster's Argumentation and Debating and 
O'Neill's "rewriting" of Laycock and Scales's Argumentation 
and Debate, traditional theory had crystallized. Not that 
total agreement prevailed in all areas, but a consensus 
had been reached on major theoretical issues. Discussions 
of the nature of argumentation accommodated debating, that
o ? cPattee, Practical Argumentation, 1915 rev. ed.,
p. 277.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
kind of argumentation which was gaining great currency, if 
not necessarily great respectability around the turn of 
the century. Baker's system of analysis assimilated stock 
issues as well as expanded treatments of the proposition.
The concept of proof as revised by Foster and O'Neill set 
the standard not only for argumentation and debate texts, 
but for general works in public speaking. Differences 
arose largely out of a philosophical split over the end 
of contest debating. The ramifications of this "game" 
versus "tool" debate, as hotly argued as any contest 
proposition, reached into and influenced the "middle 
period" as well as contemporary debate theory.
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CHAPTER III
THE MIDDLE PERIOD— 1917-c. 1955
By 1917, argumentation and debate had established 
a tradition in the academic world. Many college curricula 
included courses in the discipline. Intercollegiate 
debating had become a "big-time" activity, rivaling 
athletics in certain eastern universities. Traditional 
theory, moreover, encompassed a solidified and comprehen­
sive body of knowledge, many of the early problems and 
controversies having been resolved. There were rumblings 
and dissatisfactions, of course, particularly regarding 
the "proper" end of intercollegiate debating, but the 
theoretical bases of the discipline remained largely 
unquestioned. The attack on the standard tradition was 
not long in coming, however. Mary Yost of Vassar fired 
the first volley, but Charles H. Woolbert largely assumed 
the bombardment.1 The Yost-Woolbert criticisms prompted a
^ary Yost, "Argument from the Point of Vic v of 
Sociology," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III 
(April, 1917), 109-124; Charles H. Woolbert, "Conviction 
and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," Quarterly
Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 249-64; 
Charles H. Woolbert, "The Place of Logic in a System of 
Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, IV 
(January, 1918), 19-39; Charles H. Woolbert, “Persuasion: 
Principles and Methods," Quarterly Journal of Speech
117
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reassessment of argumentation and debate theory, particu­
larly its philosophical underpinnings, and resulted in an 
interest in new argumentative forms. This chapter outlines 
the developments spawned by this reevaluation.
The period from 1918 to 1955, though long
2chronologically, exhibited homogeneity in writers, m  
textual materials, and in philosophy. Though certain 
isolated texts attempted to revamp the whole of argumenta­
tion and debate theory in terms of the Yost-Woolbert
3approaches, and though others ignored the attacks alto­
gether,^ most "middle period" writers sought to broaden 
the philosophical base of the discipline to accommodate 
contemporary findings in psychology, sociology, and
Education, V, Part I: "Principles" (January, 1919), 12-25;
Part II; "Analysis" (March, 1919), 101-119; Part III: 
"Synthesis" (May, 1919), 212-38; Edward Z. Rowell, "Prole­
gomena to Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
XVIII, Part I: "The Problem, Its Nature and Significance"
(February, 1932), 1-13; Part II; "The Historical Roots of 
the Problem" (April, 1932), 224-48; Part III: "The Critics
of the Standard Tradition" (June, 1932), 381-405; Part IV: 
"An Empirical Analysis of Argumentation" (November, 19 32), 
585-606. See also Gladys Murphy Graham, "Logic and Argu­
mentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, X 
(November, 19 24), 350-6 3; Gladys Murphy Graham, "The 
Natural Procedure in Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech 
Education, XI (November, 1925), 319-37.
2Such important writers as Baird and O'Neill 
spanned the entire period.
3See, for example, Ceorge R. Collins and John S. 
Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1927).
4See William T. Foster, Argumentation and Debating 
(rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin Company,
1932).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 9
educational philosophy. The Baker tradition not only 
survived, it prospered as it accommodated new drifts in 
contemporary thought.
The 1917 Foster and O'Neill revisions set the 
standard for traditional theory during the "middle period." 
Nor were these works discarded early. Foster's text com­
manded wide usage during the early part of the period and
Cwas revised as late as 19 32. O'Neill, meanwhile, expanded 
the scope of his writing, venturing into discussion, and 
co-authoring books on argumentation with McBurney,
Cortright, and a revision with McBurney and Mills. Such 
thoughtful works as W. C. Shaw's The Art of Debate,
A. Craig Baird's Public Discussion and Debate, and Russell 
Wagner's Handbook of Argumentation  ̂were at core tradi­
tional, as were the vast majority of texts which appeared 
during the period. These texts refined and/or restated 
traditional principles of analysis. They recognized, even 
belaboured, the inadequacies of a logic-oriented system of
^In a review of that revision, Raymond Howes com­
mented: "It has lost nothing of the authority which has
made it, for many years, the massive rock on which lesser 
men have reared their little spires toward the light of 
fame." Raymond F. Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (February,
1933), 92.
^Warren C. Shaw, The Art of Debate (New York:
Allyn and Bacon, 19 22); A. Craig Baird, Public Discussion 
and Debate (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928; 1937 rev.
ed.); Russell H. Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation 
(New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 19 36).
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argument; yet their own lists of prescriptions from Formal 
Logic increased. The forensic, moreover, drew fire from 
those writers, particularly in the journals, who wished 
to bring contemporary debate practices into line with 
revised notions about the nature of argumentation. The 
long-range results of these efforts, however, threatened 
neither the primacy nor the prestige of intercollegiate
7debating. The major changes in argumentation and debate 
theory during the "middle period" involved, rather, the 
nature of argumentation and resulted in, as well as from, 
a broadening of its scope.
The Nature of Argumentation
"Middle period" writers defined argumentation
Qessentially as had their predecessors. Their theory, 
moreover, continued to draw heavily from law and Formal 
Logic. An increased interest in persuasion, however, 
along with a call for a "total" organic theoretical 
construct, brought psychology and rhetoric to the fore­
front. In a 19 38 journal article, Baird examined "the
7See section on the forensic.
8Different writers perceived different relation­
ships, however, between the terms argumentation, debate, 
discussion, and persuasion. See Baird's excellent 
analysis. A Craig Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and 
Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950),
pp. IcT-12. For an interesting assessment of the nature of 
argumentation in terms of discussion and debate, see 
Wayne N. Thompson, "Discussion and Debate: A
Re-examination," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXX (October, 
1944), 288-99.
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educational philosophy of the teacher of speech" and 
concluded that "the conflicting attitudes of the educa-
gtional world are mirrored in our own field." Baird's 
analysis helps to clarify the differing views on the nature 
of argumentation as well as the specific principles and 
procedures advocated. "We are by turns humanists, 
realists, scientists, and much else," said Baird.
Speech humanists,^ . . . are among us 
aplenty. We humanists usually have a strong 
English background, a predilection for 
Aristotle, a faith in the seven liberal arts 
(or at least the first three), and we insist 
upon course content.
Among our speech fraternity are also the 
disciples of reason, followers of John Locke 
and Adam Smith. We Lockeians specialize in 
contemporary history and economics; and we are 
not averse to statistics. We rationalists 
constitute the robust progeny who direct 
debate teams and encourage business and pro­
fessional speaking.
A third group of philosophers are the 
speech aesthetes. We who fall into this 
category believe in beauty of vocal diction 
and correctness of posture. We talk much of 
standard pronunciation as the central problem 
and of linguistics for all.
Still another group of us have fallen heir 
to scientific determinism. We follow Lord 
Bacon, Herbert Spencer, and modern science; we 
interest ourselves chiefly in physical and 
physiological aspects of speech science.
Yet another branch of us have, especially
QA. Craig Baird, "The Educational Philosophy of 
the Teacher of Speech," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIV 
(December, 1938), 546.
10Ibid.
^See A. Craig Baird, "Argumentation as a 
Humanistic Subject," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, 
X (June, 1924), 258-64.
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since 1920, adopted the ways of behavioristic 
and other varieties of psychology. We have 
given new and more exact names to speech 
attributes. We have, no doubt, contributed to 
a new insight into our speech discipline.
Finally, a few of us have attempted to 
adjust our teaching and thinking to the ways 
of the social experimentalists, the progressive 
educators. With these progressives we have 
hoped to reconstruct the social order, provide 
freedom for pupil and teacher, guidance rather 
than discipline, life rather than school. 2
Conviction and Persuasion 
Probably the most critical theoretical issue of 
the "middle period" involved the "proper" relationship 
between conviction and persuasion and their respective 
roles in argumentation and debate. Early argumentation 
and debate writers, influenced by the prevailing faculty 
psychology, had introduced the conviction-persuasion 
dichotomy into their theory of the nature of argument. 
Though Baker and Huntington had advised against considering 
conviction and persuasion to be independent processes, sub­
sequent writers failed to heed their counsel. In 1917,
Mary Yost observed that "all of the usual textbooks . . .
approach the subject of argument from the point-of-view of 
1 2logic." Likewise rejecting "outmoded psychological prin­
ciples" as valid basis of argument, Yost preferred the 
"conception of the mind as an organic unit performing a
12Baird, "Educational Philosophy of Teacher of 
Speech," p. 546.
■^Yost, "Argument from View of Sociology," p. 112.
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particular function— reasoning, feeling, willing— as may 
be demanded by the situation the individual is meeting. 
Though Yost wished her own analysis to be consistent with 
current psychology, it was "the situation the individual 
is meeting" that interested her most. Accordingly, and as 
the title of her article suggests, she viewed argument 
within the social context and approached it from the point 
of view of sociology.
Yost's thesis that argumentation must begin with a 
view of the social situation in which the argument appears, 
rather than with subject matter, presented three problems:
First, there is the search for charac­
teristics of the typical social group in which 
argument arises, which will distinguish it, 
as a species is differentiated from its genus, 
from social groups in which any act of dis­
course may arise; second, the search for 
characteristic effects which argument as an 
act of communication has on both members of 
the social group, speaker as well as audience; 
and third, the search for characteristic 
stages in the process of the act of communica­
tion by which these effects are produced.
Yost judged, and rightly so, that "the most important
bearing the discussion of argument in this paper has upon
the teaching of argument is in regard to the treatment of
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The question of how to attract the 
audience's attention and eventually to focus 
this on the subject, of how to present the 
idea so that there is no chance of being mis­
understood, of the choosing from the evidence 
found trustworthy just that which will touch 
the audience's experience most closely, of the 
translation of the subject in terms of the 
audience's interests, of making specific 
suggestions as to how the ideas finally domi­
nating the audience's attention can express 
themselves in action which will further the 
interests of the group, all these problems 
must be faced bv the student as problems of a 
real situation.
"Such a study does not deny the value of the logical
analysis of argument," Yost added. "Rather its results
should be in harmony with the sound logical principles
18underlying argument."
Professor Charles H. Woolbert agreed that "any 
division of appeal and speech into conviction and per­
suasion is unsound from the point of view of psychology
and unnecessary from the point of view of rhetorical 
19theory." Contending that "mental processes can be 
described and explained only in terms of psychology," he 
turned to that "one concept that describes what happens 
when an organism is stimulated in any and all possible
17Ibid., p. 123.
18Ibid., p. 113. For Yost, it was a matter of 
emphasis. She treated the brief, therefore, as a pre­
liminary test of thinking rather than an outline guide for 
the presentation of arguments.
■^Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion," p. 249.
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20ways, . . . and which is expressed in the term action." 
Woolbert concluded that "as a matter of the theory of 
public address and appeal, all dualistic attitudes sepa­
rating response into action and non-action are untenable
2 1and misleading." One tends to delineate "not in terms of
what the responder actually does," he said, "but in terms
22of what the observer perceives him doing." To phrase 
it differently, Woolbert believed the conviction-persuasion 
duality to be simply a means of distinguishing between 
overt and covert response. Recognizing that "if one aim, 
response, covers all attempts to get results, then either 
there is no place for logic in a system of persuasion in
its broader sense, or logic must be shown to run throughout
2 2the whole process." Woolbert opted for the latter 
alternative and called for a rewriting of "the whole theory 
of argumentation, conviction, persuasion, the rhetoric of 
public address . . .  to fit the facts of mind as accepted 
today." Such an attempt, "tantamount to restating them in 
terms of stimulus-response, object-subject, and




2 2Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion,"
p. 20.
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A  M
environment-attitude," should, according to Woolbert, 
follow certain standards:
It will be one that will recognize the 
monism of action; that will not concern itself 
with any division of the mind into intellect, 
emotions, and will; that will take the woof 
and warp figure of Baker and Huntington at its 
full value and hold to it; that will perceive 
that if attention is the key of persuasion 
we must not tolerate a dualism which prevents 
us from showing how it unlocks all possible 
processes; that will make the hearer the basis 
of all divisions and not the subject-matter;
. . . that will reveal the full influence that 
social relations play in securing response; 
and finally, that will state the accepted 
principles of composition and rhetoric in 
terms of stimulus-response, stimulation-action. 5
In 1919, Woolbert attempted a restatement of
rhetorical theory. Whether it met all the standards he had
set is outside the scope of this study. What he said,
however, is vital, for it represented a new departure in
argumentation and debate theory. Woolbert set out his
statement of principles and methods of persuasion in a
series of three articles in the Quarterly Journal of
Speech Education. The first article, dealing with
"Principles," specifically involved the nature of 
7 7argumentation. Though Edward Z. Rowell was, for the most 
part, an unsympathetic reviewer, he summarized fairly
^Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion," p. 264.
25Ibid., p. 263.
^Woolbert, "Persuasion: Principles and Methods."
7 7The second and third articles will be included 
in appropriate later sections of this chapter.
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and concisely Woolbert's first essay. "In handling the sub 
ject of 'Underlying Principles,'" Rowell said, "Woolbert 
argues, in general, as follows":
All verbal communication involves one 
fundamental aim, and that is response. All 
responses have in common the element of 
acceptance. In every act of acceptance 
propositions are involved. When we come upon 
these propositions we treat them as truths.
Responding to stimulation, therefore, is the 
same as responding to truth, which, in turn, 
is the same as accepting propositions as 
true. All persuasion, accordingly, must have 
for its one fundamental aim the acceptance as 
true of some one or several propositions.
This implies (1) that sufficiency to gain 
acceptance must be the ultimate standard for 
all rhetoric even as regards the logical 
principles of truth; (2) that the basis of 
this sufficiency must be sought in the 
occasion; and (3) that since each occasion is 
dominated by such variable factors as the 
speaker, the audience, and the ideas used to 
secure the response desired, any sound system 
of persuasion must possess the principle of 
flexibility.28
The Critics' Influence 
Stimulated by the ideas of Yost and Woolbert, 
textbooks in argumentation and debate based on a reformula­
tion or revision of persuasion theory began to appear. 
Rowell cited four: Persuasion and Debate by George Collins
and John Morris; Public Discussion and Debate by A. Craig 
Baird; Argumentation by James A. Winans and William E.
TOUtterback; and The Method of Argument by Charles Fritz.43
28Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part III, 
pp. 396-97.
29Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate; Baird,
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Collins and Morris1 Persuasion and Debate, perhaps 
the most radical work, both in point of view and in 
methodology, rested largely on the hypotheses of Woolbert. 
The authors proposed "to provide a thoroughly modern 
exposition of the basic logical and psychological prin­
ciples and practical methods of oral and written persua- 
30sion," and "to present a brief but comprehensive
discussion of that specialized form of persuasion commonly
31known as debate." Collins and Morris extended Woolbert's
system of persuasion envisioned in his journal articles,
incorporating both his organizational scheme and his 
32terminology. They rejected the conviction-persuasion 
dichotomy along with the traditional divisions and 
terminology of logic. Subsequent texts, however, incorpo­
rated few of Collins and Morris' innovations.
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.; James A. Winans and 
William E. Utterback, Argumentation (New York: Century and
Company, 1930); Charles Fritz, The Method of Argument 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1931). Though purporting
to approach argument from "the psychological rather than 
the logic" point of view, Fritz's book was nevertheless 
largely traditional.
^Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,
p. vii.
31Ibid. This will be considered in a later section 
of this chapter.
32Ibid., p. ix. Of Woolbert's influence, they 
said: "The authors owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to
Professor Charles Henry Woolbert of the University of Iowa, 
who read the manuscript minutely and offered invaluable 
criticism and advice," p. xi.
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Baird also wished to "restate familiar argumenta­
tive principles in terms of present-day speech, logic,
33and psychology." Preferring to "update" and "restate" 
rather than "rewrite" traditional theory, Baird incorpo­
rated ideas of the New Logic as represented by Bernard 
Bosanquet, Alfred Sidgwick, and John Dewey, as well as 
psychological principles advocated by William James,
Carl E. Seashore, E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and 
Floyd H. Allport. He acknowledged, moreover, a "great 
debt to Professors G. P. Baker, H. B. Huntington, W. T. 
Foster, J. M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and W. C. Shaw."^ 
Wishing to refine traditional theory, to modify it where 
it was inconsistent with contemporary scientific and 
philosophical findings, and, most of all, to incorporate 
these new developments within the standard tradition,
Baird enunciated principles and worked out "accommoda­
tions," both in his textbooks and in his teaching.^ His
legacy to subsequent discussion and debate works is 
3 6immeasurable.
3 3Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. iii.
3 4 k .„Ibid., p. lv.
35Baird's specific theory is detailed m  a sub­
sequent section on discussion. See Baird, Public 
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.; 1937 rev. ed.; Baird, 
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.
36A later section on discussion indicates that 
though the Ewbank-Auer texts cite Baird's works but
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The fact that Winans and Utterback wrote from the 
psychological-sociological perspective does not neces­
sarily demonstrate the influence of Yost or Woolbert on 
their text, Argumentation. Winans, one of the earliest 
speech scholars to apply modern psychological findings to 
communication, had investigated attention as early as 
1911,^ six years before Yost's article, and by 1914, he 
had extended his theory to include "the modern theory of
OOvolition or will." Winans and Woolbert, moreover, 
advocated different brands of psychology. Woolbert was a 
confirmed behaviorist; Winans an empiricist. Woolbert 
redefined logic as a pervasive influence in the total 
process of persuasion. The Winans-Utterback text viewed 
argumentation as "the art of influencing thought and 
conduct by an appeal addressed primarily to the
sparingly, their theory does follow, or at least is con­
sistent with, much of Baird's early probings. See Henry 
Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate:
Tools of a Democracy (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941);
(rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951). For
other works indebted to Baird, see William A. Behl, Discus­
sion and Debate: An Introduction to Argument (New York:
Ronald Press Company, 19 53) ; Waldo W. Braden and Earnest 
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making: Principles of Discus­
sion and Debate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1§55).
•3TJames A. Winans, "The Attention of the Speaker," 
Public Speaking Review, I (October, 1911), 41-47.
3 8James A. Winans, "Persuasion," Public Speaking 
Review, III (March, 1914), 196-200. See Giles W. Gray, 
"Some Teachers and the Transition to Twentieth-Century 
Speech Education," in A History of Speech Education in 
America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1954), pp. 434-35.
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39understanding," and treated logic traditionally. Whereas 
Woolbert wished to reconcile logic and persuasion, Winans 
and Utterback saw no conflict between the two.
Though Yost's article did not seriously damage, 
nor Woolbert's "rewriting" supplant, traditional argumen­
tation and debate theory, most "middle period" writers 
did not discredit the validity of their criticisms.
Winans, for example, thought the charges long overdue.
Most "new" texts, however, finding Woolbert's alternative 
equally unacceptable, simply revised traditional philoso­
phies and methodologies to accommodate new drifts in 
theory.^0 These early probings resulted in the following 
modifications in "middle period" theory: an expanded
treatment of audience; an emphasis on argumentation as a
39Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 3.
40Edward Z. Rowell recognized the tendency toward 
"accommodation" in his review of James M. O'Neill and 
James H. McBurney, The Working Principles of Argument 
iNew York: Macmillan Company, 1932). flIn general, the
reader will find in this work a serious attempt to pay 
heed to the criticisms which have been levelled at our 
traditional course in argumentation in the last fifteen 
years. He will find here a clear recognition of all the 
newly-emphasized consideration due the audience, and he 
will meet here a frank attempt to mend and amend the prin­
ciples and techniques which we have been teaching."
Edward Z. Rowell, "New Books: Working Principles of
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (June, 1933), 
429. Rowell objected, however, that the mending and the 
amending are conspicuous," and concluded: "Thus our very
anxiety to give adequate recognition to the newer concep­
tions of our discipline robs our books of the directness 
and simplicity which we like to find in college textbooks," 
p. 430.
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balanced rhetorical effort; and a broadening of its scope 
to include discussion. Baird's analysis of argumentation 
as a humanistic subject presaged these new directions.
His "admittedly fragmentary" proposal stated:
Argument shall be taught as a systematic 
attempt to discover and present the truth, 
whereas debating, although also having this 
purpose, shall continue to aim first of all 
at gaining a decision on definite issues by 
means of e: act technique. Argument must con­
tinue to base its procedure on the sure 
foundation of logic and evidence. But a more 
just proportion is to be observed between 
Thought, Composition, and Delivery. Discus­
sion will be substituted for formal debating; 
figures and citation of authorities will not 
submerge vital thought; individual expression 
will have freer scope than is usually the 
case in debate. . . . This shifting of 
emphasis from the legal to the rhetorical and 
philosophical w.i 11 logically lead to an 
enlargement of the field of discussion. . . . 
Argument, . , . will include the whole field 
of philosophy, science, literature and 
ethics. ̂
The Audience
Though Aristotle had insisted on the audience- 
centered nature of persuasion in the fourth century B.C.,^ 
it was an interest in twentieth century developments in the 
social sciences that catapulted the audience into a central 
place in argumentation and debate theory.^ Whereas "early
^Baird, "Argumentation as a Humanistic Subject,"
p. 262.
42See W. E. Utterback, "Aristotle's Contribution to 
the Psychology of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech 
Education, XI (June, 1925), 218-25.
^See Woolbert's view of response; Yost's insist­
ence on a sociological context.
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period" writers had examined the audience in chapters on 
persuasion,44 many "middle period" texts included sepa­
rate chapters on the audience in which they emphasized 
"persuasion"; i.e., emotion appeals.4  ̂ Various footnotes 
and bibliographies indicate, moreover, that writers appro­
priated their ideas about the audience primarily from con­
temporary public speaking, psychology, and sociology texts.
In 1932, O'Neill and McBurney examined "five 
psychological states which must be experienced by the 
audience before effective communication takes place in
argument: attention; perception; reasoning; judgment;
46and overt action." In his 1937 revision of Public Dis­
cussion and Debate, Baird, relying on the analysis of the 
psychologist H. L. Hollingsworth,47 discussed five general 
aims in influencing the audience: catch the attention of
the potential hearer; hold his interest through the
44See, for example, George Baker and Henry B. 
Huntington, The Principles of Argumentation (rev. ed.; 
Boston: Ginn and Company, 1905); James M. O'Neill, Craven
Laycock, and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1917); Foster, Argumentation
and Debating, 1917 rev. ed.
45Audience-decision debating also gained a measure 
of popularity during the period. See forensic section of 
this chapter.
46O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, pp. 69-73.
47H. L. Hollingsworth, The Psychology of the 
Audience (New York: American Book Company, 1935),
pp. 12-13. Whether O'Neill and McBurney and Hollingsworth 
were drawing from a common source, or whether the 
similarity is incidental, is difficult to ascertain.
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selection and arrangement of ideas; convince him through
logical argument and evidence; persuade him through proper
motivating materials; and secure from him definite 
4 8action. Most "middle period" argumentation and debate 
writers perceived their discipline to be thus multi­
faceted, differences in textual treatments being primarily 
a matter of emphasis. Of particular interest, however, 
was the role of attention in argumentation.
James A. Winans, probably the first public speaking 
writer to discuss attention in light of modern psycho­
logical theory, relied primarily on William James's
4 9hypothesis that "what holds attention determines action."
Agreeing that "arguing well means holding the attention of 
50an audience," Baird also investigated the nature of
4 8Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev. 
ed., p. 240. Baird retained these distinctions in his 
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 214. Ewbank and 
Auer also cited the Hollingsworth analysis, pointing out 
that "in terms of these five tasks . . .  as well as in 
terms of the degree to which the audience is polarized or 
oriented toward the speaker, Hollingsworth has classified 
five chief types of audiences"; pedestrian; passive; 
selected audience; concerted audience; and organized 
audience. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 41 
ed., pp. 223-24; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 208-209.
49William James, Psychology, Briefer Course 
(New York; Henry Holt and Company, 1892), p. 448. See 
also H. A. Overstreet, Influencing Human Behavior 
(New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1925).
^^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
p. 273. O'Neill had included the concept in his 1917 revi­
sion. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 254. Babcock and Powell recognized the need for
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51attention, observing that it occurs m  varying degrees;
that it may be voluntary or involuntary; and that certain
"conditions of attention" may be isolated. These
"conditions" (intensity, movement, surprise, the familiar,
52the concrete, suspense, and struggle) appear m  certain
53other works as stylistic devices for amplification.
Winans and Utterback held that "if the argument 
itself is not sufficiently interesting to hold attention, 
no matter how it is arranged, the speaker must employ 
special methods to make it so."^ They suggested "two 
ways to make a dull argument interesting: relating it to
a topic or an activity in which the audience is already
holding attention, but they did not apply the James theory. 
Robert W. Babcock and John H. Powell, How to Debate 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923), pp. 50-51.
tr *1Baird cited psychologists Stevenson Smith and 
E. R. Guthrie who averred that degrees of attention result 
from "differences in relative intensity of the various 
stimuli, because of the particular orientation of our sense 
organs at any moment, because of the variation of con­
ductivity in neutral arcs, the result of habit and reen­
forcement, and because of fatigue." Stevenson Smith and 
E. R. Guthrie, General Psychology in Terms of Behavior 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1921), p. 204, cited
in Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 273.
■^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 273-75.
53 •See Angelo M. Pellegrini and Brents Stirling,
Argumentation and Public Discussion (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1936), pp. 112-21; Donald Hayworth and Robert
B. Capel, Oral Argument (New York: Harper and Sons, 19 34),
p. 302.
^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 231.
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c cinterested, and expressing it m  language that arouses
interest."^® Winans and Utterback perceived the "permanent 
interests" of audiences to be fundamental interests, human 
interest, interest in personages, and interest in conflict. 
They outlined, moreover, the following methods of arousing 
interest: illustration; description and narration; con­
crete expression; wit and humor; and the rhetorical 
question.
Ewbank and Auer treated attention in a section 
called "Basic Facts about Listening." They concluded:
1. Listeners cannot give continuous 
attention. . . .
2. To hold attention, the style of the speech 
must be varied. . . .
3. We attach meanings to concrete and spe­
cific symbols more easily than to general 
and abstract ones. . . .
Though including "effective rhetorical devices for gaining
attention," Ewbank and Auer dropped, as did subsequent
59texts, the rationale provided by the James theory.
55See James's principle of derived interest. 
William James, Talks to Teachers (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1899), p. 94.
^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 231.
^ Ibid. , pp. 232-41.
C pEwbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., 
pp. 452-57, passim.
59Ibid., pp. 457-58. They included questions, 
illustrations, examples, figurative language, loaded 
words, and humor.
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"Middle period" texts also offered specific 
prescriptions for analyzing audiences.*50 Though differing 
systems (i.e., lists of questions) appeared,*51 most writers 
sought to determine an audience's knowledge and beliefs 
about a speaker, his subject, and to a lesser extent, the 
occasion.**^ Collins and Morris wished simply to determine 
the probable acceptance-attitudes of an audience.**1 The
6 nuO'Neill summarized "the whole theory of handling 
an audience" as follows: "Know your audience and adapt
your speech to your audience." O'Neill, Laycock, and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 283. Baird labeled 
discussion and debate "a problem of influencing the 
audience." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
p. 272. The Winans-Utterback text agreed, asserting that 
"the hearer's knowledge of the subject, his interest in it, 
and his beliefs and bias on it so largely determine his 
reaction that an analysis of his attitude is essential to 
the construction of effective argument." Winans and 
Utterback, Argumentation, p. 189.
C. 1 See particularly Collins and Morris, Persuasion 
and Debate, pp. 58-65; Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, 
pp. 172-209; Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 
rev. ed., pp. 232-35; Behl, Discussion and Debate, 
pp. 165-79. O'Neill and McBurney's representative list of 
factors in audience analysis follows: "1. The existing
status or needs of the audience in relation to the proposi­
tion. 2. The environmental background of the audience.
3. The personality type of the audience. 4. The 
acceptance attitude toward the proposition. 5. Famili­
arity with the proposition. 6. Emotional attitude toward 
the proposition. 7. Attitude toward the arguer." O'Neill 
and McBurney, Working Principles of Argument, pp. 73-80.
fi OThese will be examined in detail in the section 
on emotional proof.
6 3See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate,
p. 62.
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development of discussion theory probably influenced 
treatments of the larger audience. Ewbank and Auer, for 
example, included chapters on "How Individuals in Groups 
Think" and "Characteristics of the Average Audience" 
which drew heavily from contemporary sociological and 
psychological research. Behl's later list of "charac­
teristics which are virtually universal to any audience 
64situation" (that is, the tendencies to believe what one 
wishes to believe, to rationalize, and to respond to per­
suasive appeals) emphasized a continued interest in pathos 
as a primary tool of audience adaptation. These and 
similar lists of principles governing motivation are con­
sidered in a subsequent section on emotional proof.
Balanced Rhetorical Approach
The rejection of the conviction-persuasion 
dichotomy by most "middle period" writers^5 along with an
6 4Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 165.
^Foster, one exception, was criticized for retain­
ing the conviction-persuasion dichotomy in his 1917 revi­
sion of Argumentation and Debating. See William Hawley
Davis, "New Books: Argumentation and Debating," Quarterly
Journal of Speech Education, XV (January, H IT S ), 128-31.
Disappointed, moreover, with his failure to emphasize
persuasion in the 1932 edition, Raymond F. Howes observed:
"Dr. Foster still thinks of argument and persuasion as
separate processes." Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and
Debating," p. 93. Howes editorialized: "The abandonment
o£ that concept in recent years is in one sense new, since
psychologists and rhetoricians have learned something about
the human mind since ancient times, and in another sense
fundamental, because it necessitates pervasive changes in
the discussion of argument itself. Thus the analysis of
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increased interest in the audience resulted in a search—
in the classical sense— for "all the available means of
persuasion," the practical effect of which elevated the
status of emotional and ethical appeals in argumentation
and debate theory and emphasized style and delivery as
integral to a "total" process.66 Though many "early
period" writers had embraced, at least philosophically,
6 7Baker's "woof" of argumentation, and though argumentative 
"composition" had called for chapters on style and arrange­
ment, early texts treated these elements as subsidiary to
the audience is not something that the speaker does after 
he has prepared his brief, merely for the purpose of dis­
covering the best way to present contentions already 
selected. The knowledge and beliefs of the audience form 
a standard of relevance for the contentions themselves.*1 
Donald Ecroyd leveled a similar criticism at the McBurney, 
O'Neill, and Mills revision. He said: "The chapters
dealing with the actual seeking of audience agreement, 
however, seem to have been written as re-definitions and 
defenses of such older notions as the conviction-persuasion 
dichotomy, and a classification of motive appeals." Donald 
Ecroyd, "New Books: Argumentation and Debate," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, XXXVII (December, 1951), 50 3.
66Considerations regarding arrangement appeared in 
sections on briefing or case construction.
^Baker had included sections on arrangement and 
style. George Pierce Baker, Principles and Argumentation 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1895), Ch. VII. Alden added
a section on delivery. Raymond Alden, The Art of Debate 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1900), pp. 203-215.
Laycock and Scales used invention, selection, arrangement, 
and presentation as the basic outline of their text.
Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 190 4). 0 1 Neill
followed their organizational pattern. O'Neill, Laycock, 
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate.
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logical proof. The sociological-psychological perspective, 
on the other hand, encouraged viewing style, delivery, and 
motivational and ethical proofs as integral to an organic 
theory of argumentation.
Emotional Proof
Emotional proof, reserved by certain writers for
gaining attention in an introduction and perhaps amplifying
6 8the appeal in a conclusion, assumed a more central role 
in "middle period" argumentation and debate theory. Not 
only did it achieve status equal to conviction, but modern 
psychology argued that there was no division between the 
t w o . ^  Most texts continued, nevertheless, to examine the 
processes separately,^  the main divergence from tradi­
tional theory being simply a greater emphasis on emotional
71 ■proof. That emphasis, derived primarily from a renewed
interest in the audience and from the reevaluation of the
^See Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 5-7.
69See Rowell's distinctions between the psycho­
logical duality and the rhetorical duality (Aristotelian). 
Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part IV, pp. 596-
60 4. Nichols and Baccus quoted Rowell's analysis and con­
tinued to treat conviction and persuasion separately.
Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus, Modern Debating 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936),
pp. 14-15.
70Baker and Huntington had earlier reasoned that 
"for purposes of instruction" it is convenient to treat the 
processes separately. Baker and Huntington, Principles, 
1905 ed., p. 11.
71Collins and Morris did not label separate 
processes. Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 1
place of persuasion in argumentation, centered on analyses 
of audience beliefs, classifications of emotions, and 
restatements of principles of motivation in terms of con­
temporary psychology.
Though Baird paraphrased Shaw's definition of
belief (the "certainty or assurance with respect to the
72alleged truth of an idea"), he recognized that "belief
. . . is (according to modern psychology) a form of 
73behavior." Later developments in the social sciences
gave even greater insights into the nature of belief. In
their revision of Discussion and Debate, Ewbank and Auer,
for example, cited the findings of social psychologists
David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield who contended that
"as soon as we experience any facts, they will be perceived
7 4as organized into some sort of meaningful whole." From 
this "universal characteristic of the cognitive process," 
Ewbank and Auer concluded:
72See Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 3. Shaw had dichoto­
mized belief: that based on reason, conviction; that based
on faith, persuasion. Baird cited O'Neill and Weaver's 
distinction. Baird said: "Belief is a form of behavior
in which tendencies to respond in any given way are touched 
off by a combination of words called a proposition." See 
J. M. O'Neill and A. T. Weaver, The Elements of Speech 
(2d ed.; New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1932),
p. 268. See also Smith and Guthrie, General Psychology, 
pp. 195-96.
73Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
— . Cy  • •
^David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory 
and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1948), p. 86.
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When analyzing an audience perhaps the 
most important observation to make about 
belief is that all men tend to formulate some 
kind of belief about situations they encounter.
That is, men perceive with meaning and inter­
pretation, even though they do not have all
the evidence.^5
A general agreement with Winans1 position that "to 
convince or to persuade a man is largely a matter of identi­
fying the opinion or cause of action which you wish him to
adopt with one or more of his fixed opinions or customary
7courses of action" prompted an interest in the existing
77beliefs of an audience. Winans and Utterback went so far 
as to suggest that the beliefs of an audience should become
75Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 
rev. ed., p. 227.
76James A. Winans, Public Speaking (rev. ed.;
New York: Century Company, 1917), p. 276.
77See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, 
pp. 4-6, 57. Defining persuasion as "that form of instru- 
mental composition which is used by a writer or speaker 
to influence a particular audience to shape its conduct 
(whether thought or action) in conformity with his desire," 
Collins and Morris believed that "persuading a single 
individual or a group is largely a matter of connecting, 
or identifying a desired belief or action to or with one 
or more established beliefs or customary courses of 
action." (Author's italics omitted.) J. Walter Reeves 
and Hoyt H. Hudson had considered "the principles for 
choosing persuasive material" to be: "Do not disturb any
more than necessary the fixed beliefs of your hearers, but 
rather show, if possible, that your views are in accord 
with their fixed beliefs.1 J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt H. 
Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1941), p. 116. Ewbank and Auer had 
defined persuasion as "the process of securing acceptance 
of an idea, or an action, by connecting it favorably with 
the listeners' (or readers') attitudes, beliefs, and 
desires." Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 
ed., p. 261; 1951 rev. ed., p. 241.
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the speaker's basic premises. Regarding the relative
strengths of beliefs, they said:
Certain conditions are conducive to the 
formation of strong beliefs. With these con­
ditions in mind, the speaker can infer from 
the background and experience of his hearers 
what many of their strongest beliefs are.
Those beliefs are likely to be strongest 
(1) which are based upon habitual modes of 
action, (2) which are closely bound up with 
the hearer's personal interests and feelings,
(3) which are an integral part of a system of 
beliefs felt to be mutually dependent, or
(4) which are held by all, or nearly all, of 
those in the hearer's social group. 8
Ewbank and Auer also emphasized the importance of isolating
the chief factors which determine the relative strength of
beliefs. They cited numerous experimental studies in both
editions of Discussion and Debate which demonstrated the
following factors to be determinants of belief strength:
length of time held; influence of group and expert opinion;
ability to influence beliefs of others; personal, social,
79or economic status (degree of involvement); and desira­
bility of belief.**®
Baird averred that "to the extent that the emotions
which stimulate approval are aroused will the speech be 
81successful." He cited contemporary treatments of emotion
7 8Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 142.
79This was added to the revised edition. Ewbank 
and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 228-30.
80Ibid., 1941 ed., pp. 247-48.
8^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
p. 280. See James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 373-90.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 4
which perceived it as "a consciousness, or awareness, of
bodily changes, these bodily changes resulting from some
stimulus which is communicated to the higher centers of
82the nervous system." Allport put it this way: "This
fused complex of sensory experience is what we call an 
emotion.
84The tradition of classifying emotions gave way
during the "middle period" to the classification of
85motives. Writers disputed, moreover, over the difference 
in the terms. Winans cited the positions of John Dewey,
orWilliam McDougall, and Edward Lee Thorndike. Dewey had
®2Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 281.
8 3Floyd H. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1924), p . 85, cited in Baird, 
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 281.
84See Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932),
pp. 93-131; W. C. Robinson, Forensic Oratory (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1893), pp. 14-lS; Winans, Public 
Speaking, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 261-63.
85See, however, Baird, Public Discussion and 
Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 253. Baird referred his readers, 
moreover, to Seashore's classification and discussion of 
emotions and feelings. Carl E. Seashore, Introduction to 
Psychology (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 23),
pp. 302-337. A. E. Phillips' listing of "seven impelling 
motives" was particularly influential, though subsequent 
writers amended his categories. A. E. Phillips, Effective 
Speaking (Chicago: Newton Company, 1908), p. 48. See also
Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 303-304; Baird, Public Discussion 
and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 281; James M. O'Neill and Rupert 
L. Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion (rev. ed.;
New York: Century Company, 1931), p. 167.
O £Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed., pp.
196-97.
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contended that the most evident way in which we arouse
emotion to fix attention is by awakening desire for the
end sought, an effective desire being called a motive.®^
Thorndike suggested that an emotion which moves to action
is a motive, though he did not consider all motives to be 
8 8emotions. Baird, on the other hand, insisted that "all
89emotions are motives."
Later writers paid little attention to individual 
emotions and motives, investigating, rather, bases or prin­
ciples which govern motivation. Winans had set out three 
such principles in Public Speaking: "in dealing with those
practical issues that directly affect human conduct, the 
very basis of argument is emotion; or . . . the major 
premise of such an argument is the expression of an 
emotion"; the "strong tendency of men to believe what they 
wish to believe"; and, "emotions not properly belonging to
8 7John Dewey, Psychology (3d rev. ed.; New York: 
American Book Company, 1886), p. 366. See also William 
McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (4th ed.; 
Boston: J. W. Luce and Company, l9ll), p. 241. Baker had 
advised a speaker to "choose the highest motive to which 
you think your audience will respond." Baker, Principles, 
p. 351. O'Neill and Cortright, on the other hand, advised 
appealing to the "lowest basic motive common to all 
present." O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis­
cussion, p. 16 8. These positions are not necessarily 
inconsistent, however, depending on one's definition of 
"highest" and "lowest."
8 8Edward Lee Thorndike, The Elements of Psychology 
(2d ed.; New York: A. G. Seiler^ 1907), p. 89.
89Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 
rev. ed., p. 253.
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9 0the argument itself, affect decisions." Ewbank and Auer
discussed six bases of persuasion in the first edition of
Discussion and Debate and called them "the main-springs of
91human motivations." They expanded their list in the 
revised edition to include the following:
1. We tend to believe what we want to believe.
2. We tend to believe, and to do, as we are told.
3. We tend to act in accordance with our dominant 
attitudes.
4. We tend to make stereotyped responses to 
stereotyped stimuli.
5. We tend to respond to the emotional connota­
tions of words.
6. We tend to yield to the repetition of stimuli.
7. We tend to accept ideas from those we like.
8. We tend to conform.
9. We tend, when persuaded, to act immediately.
10. We tend to regard our actions as l o g i c a l .
Baird attempted to isolate the same phenomena in his 
analysis of the audience as individuals and as a group.
He concluded:
1. The individual and the audience as a group are
90Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed., 
pp. 250-55.
91Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
pp. 261—66.
^2Ibid., 1951 rev. ed., pp. 240-45.
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affected by basic emotional responses and 
desires.
2. The individual and the audience as a group 
tend to believe what satisfies their primary 
and secondary needs and wants.
3. The individual and the audience as a group 
tend to respond to connotative language.
4. The individual and the crowd tend to be 
suggestible.
5. The individual and the crowd tend to 
rationalize.
6. The individual and the crowd tend to think and 
act from prejudice.
7. The individual and the audience tend to accept
9 3fallacious arguments.
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills included a compre­
hensive approach to motivation based on data provided by
9 4contemporary psychological and sociological studies.
Though Mills defined motivation "generally as the process
of stimulating inner urges and desires which prompt persons 
9 5to action," he suggested for practical purposes Robert H.
Q *0Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, 
pp. 215-21.
94Glen Mills was responsible for this particular 
chapter. James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. 
Mills, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Demo­
cratic Society (New York: Macmillan Company, 1951).
^Ibid., p. 143.
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Seashore's "operational definition": "Motivation is the
selective reinforcement or inhibition of stimuli or sets 
(preparatory responses) evoking any given type of response 
in competition with stimuli or sets leading to other
g cbehavior." Mills's discussion in the McBurney, O'Neill,
and Mills revision integrated traditional notions of
motivation into treatments of "persuasive values of
motivation" (utilizes reaction tendencies and commands
attention) and methods to "associate motive appeals with"
the proposition (suggestion, rationalization, and forthright 
97statement). He also included "some typical lists of 
appeals.
99Though most writers of the "middle period" had
Robert H. Seashore, "Introduction to Motivation" 
(lecture delivered at Northwestern University in 1949), 
cited in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 143.
q 7McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 146-48, 151-53. See Behl's discussion of 
suggestion.
9 8Behl added suggestion as a factor in persuasion. 
Relying on the definition of Emory S. Bogardus (Emory S. 
Bogardus, Fundamentals of Social Psychology [4th ed.;
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950], p. 275) 
that "suggestion is the process of sending out specific 
stimuli to which uncritical responses are made," Behl 
postulated that "persons react favorably to certain stimuli 
whether or not those stimuli present a logical pattern or 
configuration." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 167. He 
then identified three factors influencing suggestibility—  
knowledge, fatigue, and the existence of a crowd— a knowl­
edge of which would be helpful to a speaker, pp. 167-78.
99Hayworth and Capel offered a novel approach to 
persuasive appeals. Having distinguished the academics 
"those who live largely in a world of facts, who get their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149
included considerations of motivation in their texts, some 
believed emotional proof to be outside the scope of— if 
not argumentation— then at least their particular studies. 
Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, in a "note to 
instructors" said:
We have not dealt with the psychological 
implications of speech and argumentation. We 
have felt, in the first place, that a treat­
ment of this phase of the speech discipline 
would not fall within the scope of our work.
The problems of motivation, persuasion, etc., 
are properly considerations for advanced 
courses in speech and argumentation. We have 
designed this text primarily for a beginning 
course in argumentation. 00
Such pronouncements occurred, however, early in the period.
Ethical Appeals
Baker and Huntington had recognized that "the means 
by which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning 
sympathy for himself or his subject— usually both."101 
Foster had listed "the man" as one of the three sources of
knowledge of life chiefly from reading, and who are defi­
nitely introspective" from the "warm 'human' people who, 
without bothering to think things out for themselves, take 
their beliefs from their most immediate desires and from 
those who happen to be near them," the authors turned to 
"the fundamental appeals of academic debating." Hayworth 
and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 271, 284. They listed four: 
the social good; the rxghts of man; straight thinking; and 
good fellowship, p. 284.
100Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and 
Public Discussion, p. ix. See also Babcock and Powell,
How to Debate, p. 214.
101Baker and Huntington, Principles, 1905 rev. ed.,
p. 294.
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persuasion, and had isolated the following characteristics: 
sincerity; earnestness; simplicity; fairness; self-control;
humor; sympathy; and personal magnetism.^®^ O'Neill added
103that a speaker must "know human nature." Most "middle
period" texts simply reiterated various combinations of
these characteristics,^®** the primary development in theory
being an increased emphasis on the value of ethos for
argumentation and debate. Some authors discussed the
intelligence, character, and goodwill characteristics of
105classical invention. Ewbank and Auer equated ethical
proof with prestige.'*'®® Winans and Utterback presented 
one of the more comprehensive treatments of ethical proof. 
They averred that an audience's estimate of a speaker 
"determines to what extent the speaker may rely upon his 
own unsupported assertion for the acceptance of his 
premises," and "a speaker who enjoys their [the audience's]
102Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1932 rev. 
ed., p. 233. Foster included the ''good man' concept in 
discussing personal magnetism, p. 238.
103O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 265.
104O'Neill and Cortright, for example, included 
vigorous, sincere, earnest, fair, just, and reasonable. 
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 166. 
Reeves and Hudson mentioned modest, fair, and sincere.
Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, 
p. 114.
^®®See Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 174-75; 
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. 474.
10 6Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 
ed., pp. 266-67; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 246-47.
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confidence often exerts an influence all out of proportion
10 7to its logical value."
Style
Interested primarily in oral argumentation, "middle
period" writers distinguished the variables of oral and
written communication in more detail than had their 
10 8predecessors. Russell Wagner set out these differences
clearly:
Speech must be almost instantaneously 
apprehended. Connections must be plain. The 
structure, relationships, and emphases must 
be much more plain and effective. Most of 
all, speaking must be more concrete and vivid 
than writing.
10 7 .Wmans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 172. 
Gustave Le Bon, a psychologist, labeled the speaker's 
authority the "fundamental element of persuasion." Gustave 
Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 25) ,
p p . 1 5 7 - f s ":------------------
10 8Alden, Art of Debate. Certain "middle period" 
stylistic theorists did not, however, reflect this purely 
oral approach.
109Wagner, Handbook on Argumentation, pp. 88-89. 
Wagner suggested that: "Oral composition differs from
written also in that it is more direct and personal, more 
informal, more communicative. It is the discourse of one 
person speaking to another, face to face, and therefore 
resembles, in structure and .style, conversation at its 
best. The exigencies and conventions of the platform 
require it to be good English, the continuity of the dis­
course requires attention to unity and coherence, but at 
all points it must be direct, oral speech. The speaker 
uses the passive voice less often than the writer. . . .  He 
amplifies more, supplies more details; he uses more 
appositional and parenthetical expressions, since he must 
dwell on each idea until it is clear. Many sentences are 
therefore longer than they would be in written composition. 
But the alternation of long and very short sentences is 
more noticeable in oral than in written speech."
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Though considerations of style appeared in chapters on 
persuasion, composition, language, semantics, and con­
struction, most texts simply enumerated traditional 
characteristics of "good style"11® and/or stylistic 
devices for elaboration or amplification.111
Some writers turned to the popular field of 
semantics for insights into the nature and components of 
style. Alan Nichols, for example, believed instruction in 
semantics to be an essential part of "the principles and 
techniques which assist the investigation and presentation
O'Neill and Cortright, for example, added 
"originality" to O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's "brevity, 
simplicity, vividness and variety." O'Neill and Cortright, 
Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 150; O'Neill, Laycock, and 
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 273-82. Some other 
representative methods of classification follow: Ewbank
and Auer referred to "clear" language. Ewbank and Auer, 
Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 445; 1951 rev. ed., 
p. 423. Reeves and Hudson included interest, along with 
clarity, as the qualities of style "that debaters should 
mainly cultivate." Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argu­
ment and Debate, pp. 129-33. Wagner discussed clearness, 
coherence, interest, and emphasis or force, "the qualities 
desired in good argumentative style." Wagner, Handbook of 
Argumentation, pp. 89-102. Behl labeled "the three sig- 
nificant principles of style" as: clarity (adaptation to
listener, accuracy of words, simplicity of sentences); 
forcefulness (variety of words, repetition, connotative 
words, simple words, an economy of words, variety of 
sentence structure, variety of sentence types); and 
spontaneity. Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 192-96.
111Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, included 
restatement, repetition, general illustration, the 
probative example, the rhetorical question, negation, the 
illustrative analogy, contrast, and comparison. Pellegrini 
and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, 
pp. 134-42. See also Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, 
pp. 303-308.
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112of a subject of controversy." In the conclusion to a
chapter labeled "Semantics," he summarized as follows:
The chief office of semantics is to make 
the student eternally aware of the inherent 
ambiguity of words. The word is not the 
object described. The object may, therefore, 
be something entirely different from the words 
used to describe it, or there may be no object 
whatever. We never can express all there is 
to say about an object; therefore, our descrip­
tion must always be imperfect. Words may be 
spoken and written in a multitude of senses, 
and may be heard, read, and understood in a 
multitude of other senses. We must, therefore, 
be constantly on the alert to apprehend the 
correct meaning and to achieve the truth.
Baird's Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate also began
with "principles of language usage." Having cited twelve
semantic principles relevant to argumentation, discussion,
and debate,Baird offered the following suggestions for
concrete application.
1. Adapt your language to the audience.
2. Use accurate language.
3. Use objective language.
4. Be concrete.
5. Be concise.
6. Use unhackneyed language.
7. Use illustrative or figurative language.
112Alan Nichols, Discussion and Debate (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), p. 426.
113Ibid., pp. 425-26.
^■^See Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, 
pp. 203-204.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
8. Use oral language in speech composition.
9. Use variety in language.
Baird also discussed sentence structure and types of 
sentence forms and counselled that one might improve his 
oral style^"^ by reading, writing, and listening. He also 
advised that one acquire a knowledge of logic and semantics, 
and that he study language.
Delivery
"Middle period" writers followed their predecessors
117in examining methods of delivery, the most common list­
ing being manuscript, memorized, impromptu, and extempora-
118neous speaking. The tendency to "can" rebuttal speeches
probably prompted the vociferous defense of and insistence
upon extemporaneous delivery in debating evident in some 
119quarters. A general commitment to the extempore
115Ibid., pp. 204-210.
116Ibid., pp. 211-12.
117See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 187-98.
118See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 
rev. ed., p. 306.
119Not everyone, however, espoused pure extempo­
raneous delivery. O'Neill and Cortright, for example, 
examined both its advantages (flexibility, allows adapta­
tion to mood of audience, physical and nervous advantages, 
finer convincingness, inspiration of the audience) and 
its disadvantages (inaccurate, repetitious, monotonous, 
poor judgment), and preferred the "mixed method" of 
memorizing parts of the speech and extemporizing the rest. 
O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, 
pp. 217-23.
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method for debating continued, moreover, throughout the 
period.^20
Probably at least partially as a result of the
excesses of elocution, most "early period" texts did not
emphasize principles of delivery. In 1918, C. F. Lindsley
observed that
average debating is not good public speaking.
. . . There is nothing of the human quality, 
no conversational style, no sincere 
personality. . . . 2-*-
Aware of these and similar indictments, Baird included a
chapter in Public Discussion and Debate on delivery in
122which he stressed voice and bodily action. In reviewing
the text, Charles A. Marsh questioned "the wisdom of
including in a work on argumentation these technical sub-
123jects taction and voice]." By the end of the "middle
period," however, a comprehensive treatment of delivery
120See, for example, Wagner, Handbook of Argumen­
tation, pp. 114-16; Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and 
Debate, p. 246. Behl suggested, on the other hand, that 
"the type of delivery that the speaker elects to use in any 
one argumentative situation will vary according to the 
circumstances." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 207.
121C. F. Lindsley, "Delivery in Debate," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech Education, IV (January, 1918), ll7.
122Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 335-50. See Harry F. Covington, The Fundamentals of 
Debate (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918), p. 208.
123Charles A. Marsh, "New Books: Public Discussion
and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV (February, 
1929), 116.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 6
was the rule, rather than the exception. Baird's text
marks a shift toward including these elements as integral
to a total theory of argumentation and debate.
Relying heavily on Woolbert's treatment of delivery
124in Fundamentals of Speech, Baird suggested that:
Good speaking is emotional speaking; and 
emotion . . .  is a general bodily activity.
Good speaking requires activity of both the 
voice and the body. 25
Baird proffered practical advice to the debater, moreover,
regarding "the aspects of action, posture, movement, and 
1 26gesture." He summarized, "the elements of vocalization"
(quality, force or intensity, pitch, and duration or
127 .time) and discussed pronunciation, pointing out its
Charles H. Woolbert, Fundamentals of Speech 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 19 20). Cited m  Baird,
Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 336.
125Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 342.
126 Ibid., pp. 342-45. Baird's discussion included 
specific advice regarding platform manners. Crocker's 
listing was more pedantic: "See that your clothes are
pressed. Wear your best suit when you go on the platform.
. . . Keep your shoes shined and do not let your socks fall 
down around your ankles. . . . Wear suspenders. . . .  Go 
into the washroom before the debate to be sure your hair 
is all right, and then leave it alone." He also included 
lists of visual and auditory "don'ts." The following is 
a sampling: "Don't button and unbotton [sic] your coat.
. . . Don't pick your nose. Don't rub your beard. . . . 
Don't smoke your fountain pen. . . . Don't consume gallons 
of water. . . . Don't cough. . . . Don't tear paper."
Lionel Crocker, Argumentation and Debate (New York:
American Book Company, 1944), pp. 247, 256-57. See also 
Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 ed., pp. 492-96.
•̂2^Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 345-48.
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importance, offering suggestions for its improvement, and
128examining the concept of "standard pronunciation."
Writers of the "middle period" also incorporated
Winans' criterion of "conversational" delivery into their
texts. Winans had talked about "conversational speech" in
129Public Speaking, and in Argumentation, written with 
Utterback, he declared:
As regards delivery, public speaking is 
best thought of as a conversation between the 
speaker and his audience. It is not a one-man 
activity, but involves a process of give-and- 
take in which the audience plays an active and 
important part. . . .
Not only should the speaker conceive of 
his speaking as an enlarged conversation, but 
he should, while on the platform, have the 
feeling that it is conversation. He should 
not feel that he is talking at his audience or 
over their heads, but that he is talking with 
them. His delivery will not be effective 
unless he feels that he has entered into a 
direct, personal relation with his hearers. 30
Winans and Utterback held that "delivery is con­
versational when, and only when, two conditions exist:
. . . a full realization of the content of one's words as
131one utters them"; and "a lively sense of communication."
128Ibid., pp. 348-50.
129Winans, Public Speaking, 1917 rev. ed.,
pp. 25-32.
^^Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, 
pp. 300-301.
131Ibid., p. 302. See Ehninger's discussion of 
Campbell's "lively" idea. Douglas Ehninger, "Campbell, 
Blair, and Whately Revisited," Southern Speech Journal, 
XXVIII (Spring, 1963), 169-82. See also Lloyd F. Bitzer, 
"The Lively Idea: A Study of Hume's Influence on
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Though many writers appropriated the phrase, "lively
sense of communication," they tended to ignore, or
perhaps assume, the "first condition of conversational 
132delivery." Babcock, and Powell's treatment, an excep-
133tion, did insist on "an idea worth communicating."
Winans and Utterback admitted, nevertheless, that "con­
versational quality alone does not insure good delivery," 
for it "may also have all of the faults of the speaker's 
private conversation, perhaps in an exaggerated degree."1^4 
Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus argued that "public
speaking is not conversation despite the fact that it is
135based upon it to a certain extent." Though granting
George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric" (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1962).
1 '50Harrison B. Summers and Forest L. Whan concen­
trated simply on "a sense of communication" in their book, 
How to Debate, though they included the characteristics 
"animation',"1 which corresponded to the term "lively," and 
"sincerity." Harrison B. Summers and Forest L. Whan, How 
to Debate (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940),
pp. 282-83.
133They added "earnestness," "directness," and 
"spontaneity." Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, 
pp. 252-55.
134Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 30 3- 
304. See also Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 463; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 436-37.
^35Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 300.
"One does not speak to an audience or to a composite mind 
as he speaks to a companion in conversation. There is a 
psychological difference. In conversation speech and reply 
are a mutual affair. In public speaking speech is one­
sided except for the subtle, silent, psychological emana­
tions from individuals in an audience. Conversation often
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the concept of public speaking as "enlarged conversation"
to have "a measure of truth," they believed "improved con-
136versation" to be an equally appropriate criterion.
A cursory examination of texts co-authored by 
O'Neill demonstrates the "middle period" trend toward 
incorporating principles of delivery into argumentation 
and debate theory. In his revision of the Laycock and 
Scales text, O'Neill organized his treatment of delivery 
around the four methods of presentation. He included,
moreover, a few specific suggestions regarding use of
137notes, outlines, and charts. Suggesting that "it is
impossible in this book to discuss platform speaking at
any length," O'Neill advised students to take courses in
138speaking, and to practice before real audiences. In
Debate and Oral Discussion, O'Neill and Cortright added
138"desirable qualities" of delivery and recommended 
140"reality" in presentation. O'Neill and McBurney 
expanded the treatment of delivery in Working Principles
lacks the dignity that public speaking demands, but it does 
furnish the basis for directness, intimacy of communica­
tion, and earnest sincerity needed in public speaking."
136Ibid., pp. 300-301.
137O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 441-43.
138 . ...Ibid., p. 443.
l390'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discus­
sion, pp. 223-24.
14QIbid., pp. 224-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
of Argument to two chapters in which they included methods
of presentation, the conversational basis of delivery,
emotion, and personal and persuasive qualities in delivery.
They introduced, moreover, a detailed discussion of plat-
141form decorum, voice, and action. McBurney, O'Neill,
and Mills, on the other hand, compacted these notions of 
delivery into a section of a chapter called "The Advocate 
as Speaker."142
Discussion
The incorporation of discussion into argumentation 
and debate theory, a "middle period" development, also 
helped to answer some of the criticisms leveled at the 
discipline. Not only did the addition of discussion 
broaden argumentation's theoretical base by incorporating 
modern psychological and sociological thought, but it 
also provided a practical methodology for meeting social 
problems.
Public discussion, certainly not a new phenomenon,
143had assumed many different forms m  America — town
1410'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, pp. 266-307.
142McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate. Mills was primarily responsible for the above 
chapter, p. vi.
143Paul D. Bagwell, "The Development of Public Dis­
cussion in the United States" (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of Wisconsin, 1938). J. F. O'Brien, "A Defini­
tion and Classification of the Forms of Discussion," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV (April, 1939), 236-43.
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meetings,144 ]_yCeum145 an(j Chautauqua movements,
1 Aopen forums such as Cooper Union, to mention some of the 
14 8more popular. It functioned within these contexts
variously as a political vehicle, a method of socializa­
tion, and as an educational tool for the dissemination of
149ideas. Committee or group discussion also flourished 
and a relevant body of theory developed.
In a study of "The Inquiry," "a small group of 
conference experts who began in 1922 a comprehensive though 
not too systematic development of discussion principles, 
techniques, and instructions," Richard Douthit traced the 
philosophical origins of the discussion movement to "the 
major thought currents of the nineteenth and twentieth
■'■̂ Ĵohn F. Sly, Town Government in Massachusetts 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 30) .
14 8Waldo Braden, "The Lecture Movement: 1840-
1860," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIV (April, 1948), 
206-2121 Cecil B. Hayes, The American Lyceum, Bulletin
12 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1932).
146John H. Vincent, The Chautauqua Movement 
(Chautauqua, N. Y.: Chautauqua Press, 1886).
147Mary L. Ely, "Talking It Over: The Old Town
Meeting Reincarnated," Survey Graphic, XXVII (January, 
1938), 57-59.
148Later developments such as the symposium will 
be detailed in a later section of this chapter on the 
forensic.
149Baird suggested that "the applications of dis­
cussion, especially during and after the Second World War, 
have been more and more extensive— in communities, in labor 
and other economic areas, and in schools and colleges." 
Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. vi.
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150centuries." Of its more immediate roots/ he
concluded:
Along with Bagehot, Wallas, and Wilson, Dewey 
had seen the promise of public discussion as 
early as the turn of the century. Probably he 
more than any other American was responsible 
for establishing a new intellectual climate 
which demanded a rigorous examination of 
methodology. Historians seem agreed that John 
Dewey . . . became the symbol for those who 
would approach social problems scientifically. 5
Both the practical effects and the theoretical 
aspects of the discussion movement influenced the practice 
as well as theory of argumentation. Baird noted in 1928 
that:
In recent years the pendulum in student 
public speaking has swung from interest in 
formal argument and, perhaps, contest debate 
to the study and practice of discussion in its 
broader application, including public discus­
sion, committee conference, persuasive busi­
ness talk, and open-forum debating. 52
In 1920, O'Neill published A Manual of Debate and Oral
153Discussion for Schools, Societies and Clubs, largely 
a prescriptive text which reiterated in simple fashion 
traditional argumentation and debate principles. Baird,
Richard Pfaff Douthit, "A Historical Study of 
Group Discussion Principles and Techniques Developed by 
'The Inquiry,' 1922-1933" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Louisiana State University, 1961), p. 289.
151Ibid., p. 291.
152Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. iii.
153James M. O'Neill, A Manual of Debate and Oral 
Discussion for Schools, Societies and Clubs (New York:
Century Company, 19 20).
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meanwhile, wishing to strengthen and update traditional
argumentation theory and to bring it into line with current
154practices, treated discussion, debate, and persuasion as 
"types" of argumentation and contended that "the general 
principles of argumentation . . . may be applied effec­
tively" regardless of their ultimate use. Baird's specific 
"principles for the mastery of argumentation, public 
discussion, and debate" followed closely the standard 
tradition,his particular innovation being an updating 
of the underlying theory. Though some later writers (Behl, 
Braden and Brandenburg)̂ -55 followed Baird's tripartite
scheme, most texts omitted persuasion as a specialized form
157of argumentation, investigating rather the functions and 
processes of discussion and debate.
154Baird had essentially the same aim in his 1937 
revision of Public Discussion and Debate and in his later 
work, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.
^55Baird said: "The conquest of the art requires
long application and training. These include, first, frank 
self-analysis of your shortcomings and needs; secondly, 
ability to frame and analyze a subject for debate; thirdly, 
habits and methods of accumulating knowledge and thinking 
on that material; fourthly, ability to synthesize your 
ideas in the form of a brief; fifthly, power to analyze a 
special audience and to adapt your material effectively; 
sixthly, practice in stating the arguments persuasively; 
seventhly, ability to criticize your own work; and finally, 
a will to persist and master the art of persuasion."
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 14.
155Behl, Discussion and Debate; Braden and 
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making I
157See O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis­
cussion, p. 3; Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 4; Luther
A. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating (Chicago: 
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1949).
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Baird had characterized discussion and debate as 
"especially useful in working out . . . immediate problems
and m  training for citizenship." JO The political con-
1F9text as well as the rapid intellectual development of
the early twentieth century^® created a very real "felt
difficulty." Pellegrini and Stirling pointed up the
"social utility of public discussion" when they said:
Today more than ever before we are aware 
of an urgent need for clear thinking on 
social, political, and economic matters. We
158Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 10.
159William Utterback perceived a direct relation­
ship between the form which public discussion assumes and 
the political context within which it operates. Utterback 
concluded: "The modes of public discussion through which a
nation effects collective decision in any era are deter­
mined by the nature of the governmental process at the 
time, and this in turn depends upon the comparative sta­
bility of equilibrium between those conflicting interest 
groups whose activities underlie political phenomena. If 
the equilibrium has been stable long enough to generate a 
political tradition, debate will be the predominant form of 
public discussion. When a sudden and radical shift in the 
balance of power renders much of the tradition obsolete, 
propaganda and conference supplant debate until such time 
as the new equilibrium has found expression in a new 
political tradition." William E. Utterback, "Patterns of 
Public Discussion in School and in Life," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, XXIV (December, 1938), 588. That the experience 
of one war— and then two— upset any equilibrium which might 
have existed is obvious. Moreover, the need persisted for 
an alternative to violence for the solving of problems.
See J. T. Salter, The Pattern of Politics (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1940) .
^®New theories in sociology and educational phi­
losophy emphasized the need and provided new methodology 
for "skill in working through the complexities of a given 
social question." See Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumenta­
tion and Public Discussion, p. ix.
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are constantly warned by the more critical 
historians that the institutions by which we 
have lived for the past two centuries have 
run their span, and that the alternative to 
chaos is a formulation of new values. Whether 
the new generation is capable of meeting 
sanely an uncertain future will depend largely 
upon the clear-headedness with which it con­
fronts the problems which are its legacy. It 
is for the members of this generation to 
acquaint themselves with the problems which 
soon they will be called on to resolve. Let 
us teach them to approach these problems with 
a clear, analytical mind. 61
Auer agreed and emphasized "an exchange of information and
ideas, in a cooperative process for the resolving of these
162common problems." The title of the Ewbank-Auer text,
Ibid., p. vii. Braden and Brandenburg demon­
strated the persistence of the need almost twenty years 
later: "We live at a time when vigilance is demanded of
those who wish to govern themselves. In addition to the 
necessity for finding protection from physical destruction, 
citizens of today need a staunch intellectual and moral 
stature, a fortitude to resist and overcome subversive 
forces, and a constant watchful guard against complacency. 
How can these needs be met? . . . The authors of this book 
believe that . . . protection comes from equipping citizens 
with means and techniques which will enable and encourage 
them to recognize, to understand, to analyze, and to answer 
unwise counsel or dangerous programs. We believe that the 
need of today is a citizenry who can measure up to the 
responsibilities and obligations imposed by self-government, 
and who can work creatively and cooperatively in solving 
the problems of the group." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral 
Decision-Making, p. ix.
•^^J. Jeffery Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry: 
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, XXV (December, 1939), 533. Yost had also 
envisioned argumentation as a cooperative affair. So had 
John Dewey. In the foreword to Pellegrini and Stirling's 
Argumentation and Public Discussion, he said: "Argumenta­
tion is reasoning but it is reasoning together; it is a 
process of cooperative search." Pellegrini and Stirling, 
Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. iii. Traditional 
debating fit neither the Yost nor Dewey model.
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Discussion and Debate: Tools of a Democracy, represents
the importance those authors attached to "training for
citizenship."^^ Such subsequent works as Baird's
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, Braden and
Brandenburg's Oral Decision-Making, and McBurney, O'Neill,
and Mills's Argumentation and Debate; Techniques of a Free 
164Society reflect a similar philosophy.
"Middle period" writers further maintained 
discussion and debate to be instruments "for tempering 
the judgments of students"; for the promotion of open- 
mindedness";^^ for the "working out" of problems.
Toward the end of the period, Baird summarized various 
such rationales. Argumentation, discussion, and debate, 
he said, will:
1. Educate you for active responsible
participation in democratic government.
^Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., pp. 3-6.
164Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate; 
Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making; McBurney, 
O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate.
^^Lester Thonssen, "The Social Values of 
Discussion and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV 
(February, 1939), 117.
166Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 
rev. ed., p. iii.
167Ibid., 1928 ed., p. 10.
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2 . Assure you more efficiency in your occupation 
or profession.^-®®
3. Strengthen your self-confidence and enable you 
to make more satisfactory social adjustments.
4. Provide you with defenses against "bad" 
propaganda.
5. Widen your general influence in social 
movements.169
These justifications paralleled and/or complemented much
of the philosophy of the discussion m o v e m e n t . A s  
171Douthit suggested, members of "The Inquiry" believed
172they were developing the methodology for democracy.
The commitment of the discussion movement to a 
scientific methodology for the working out of problems in 
the real world influenced the development of argumentation
l®®Behl also included a section on the importance 
of argument in business and the professions. Behl, 
Discussion and Debate, pp. 3-4.
169Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 4-7.
170Wishing to determine a situational approach to 
discussion relevant to life, "The Inquiry" adopted a social 
creed grounded in the social gospel and practical politics. 
Their intellectual godfather, John Dewey, provided a 
scientific instrument for approaching social problems.
171 Douthit, "Study of Group Discussion,"
pp. 291-94.
172See Harrison Sacket Elliott, The Why and How 
of Group Discussion (New York: Association Press, 1923),
pp. 7-8.
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and debate theory. Though the pattern of reflective 
173thinking appeared in discussion texts at least as early 
as 1928,^^ Fritz^^ was probably the first argumentation 
writer to include Dewey's analysis. Baird's revision of
Public Discussion and Debate appended the concept as "a
176 177guide for group discussion," and Harold F. Graves,
17 8and James H. McBurney and Kenneth Hance ° followed suit. 
Nichols' text, published in the same year as Ewbank and 
Auer's Discussion and Debate, contained "a Manual of 
Discussion, a concise, up-to-the-minute survey of
17 8John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1910), p. 72. Reflective thinking involved 
the following steps: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its loca­
tion and definition; (3) suggestion of possible solution;
(4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the 
suggestion; and (5) further observation and experiment 
leading to its acceptance or rejection.
174See Harrison Sacket Elliott, The Process of 
Group Thinking (New York: Association Press, 1928), p. 35;
Edwin Leavitt Clarke, The Art of Straight Thinking 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1929), p. 368.
175Fritz, Method of Argument, p. 295.
176Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev. 
ed., p. 362. That Baird had been thinking in this direc­
tion is evidenced by his short section in the first edition 
of Public Discussion of Debate called "the technique of 
discussion." He said: "The chairman of the group calls
the meeting to order, states the problem, and calls for 
further interpretation and solution," 1928 ed., p. 34.
177Harold F. Graves, Argument (New York: Cordon
Company, 19 38), p. 21.
178James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance, The 
Principles and Methods of Discussion (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1939) , p. 1~62. The authors called their 
five steps "the logical pattern of discussion."
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179discussion methodology" which reduced Dewey's steps in
reflection to three.
Contrary to discussions which perceived reflective
thinking to be merely the "logical method of discussion,"
Ewbank and Auer applied Dewey's paradigm to the total
process of discussion and debate. Though Auer had espoused
181this idea first in a journal article, his text with
Ewbank refined, expanded, and popularized the concept.
Discussion and debate viewed as interrelated parts of one
process was not, however, a new idea. Baird implied such
a position when he characterized discussion as "a stage
182immediately preceding argument proper." Thonssen, 
moreover, saw discussion and debate as "correlative aspects
179Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. vn.
180Ibid., pp. 51-52. Nichols included the follow­
ing "problem-solving" outline:
I. The Presented Problem
II. Analyzing the Problem
A. Its definition and exact scope, including 
the historical background.
B. The causes of the problem, or the evils 
to be corrected.
C. The interests, or stake groups, which must 
be reconciled.
III. Determining the Solution
A. Presentation of each solution, with a brief 
description.
B. Evaluation of each solution.
C. The selection of the best.
1 ft 1Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry," pp. 533-39.
182Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 9.
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183of one process." But it was Auer who perceived that
process to be reflective thinking.
In his early probings, Auer had concluded that
cooperative problem-solving can occur only "when . . . the
citizen is able to use intelligently adequate tools of
social inquiry, tools which may be used in the continuum
of inquiry and judgment which is the process of reflective 
184thinking." Recognizing that "the scientific method
cannot be applied, ill to to, in the solution of public 
problems," Ewbank and Auer suggested: "Rather, it is the
discussion and debate technique based upon scientific
procedures which should be applied to the democratic
185processes of social inquiry and judgment." Adapting 
the inquiry-judgment continuum of the Auer article, the 
Ewbank-Auer text added the dimension of investigation and 
decision and suggested that "it is along this continuum 
. . . that discussion and debate is ranged." Their 
diagram -̂88 follows:
183Thonssen, "Social Values of Discussion and 
Debate," p. 114.
184Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry," p. 533. Auer 
labeled these tools argumentation, discussion, and debate. 
Ewbank and Auer dropped the term argumentation and treated 
discussion and debate. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and 
Debate, 1941 ed.; 1951 rev. ed.
185Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 20.
^86Ibid., p. 5.
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Treating discussion and debate as parts of a total
process persisted in certain later works. Baird, for
example, referred to "the correlative character of discus-
187sion and debate" in his 1950 text, while Braden and 
Brandenburg presented "discussion and debate as related
187Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
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counterparts of a larger process . . . called oral
188decision-making." Writers did not agree totally,
however, on the relation of those elements and the appro-
1 OQpriate logical method to be applied to them. Contro­
versy centered particularly on the role of reflective 
thinking in discussion and debate.
Baird held that argumentation "whether general
argument or specialized discussion or debate, is primarily 
190logical." His suggestion that the logical structure 
of problem-solution (examination of facts and making of 
inferences) parallels the reflective thought pattern
191implied that both discussion and debate are reflective.
18 8Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p. ix.
189 . . . .Many texts viewed discussion as preparatory to
debate. See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation 
and Debate, p. 68. See also William M. Sattler, "Some 
Values of Discussion in the Investigation and Analysis 
Phases of Debate," Gavel, XXV (March, 1943), 3-4;
(May, 1943), 54-55.
190Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
p. 38.
191In Public Discussion and Debate, Baird had 
included a section entitled "reflective thinking" in which 
he treated the tendency toward eclecticism; proper indica­
tion of quotations; need for assimilation of material; and 
methods of assimilation of material. Baird, Public Dis­
cussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 65-66; 1937 rev. ed., 
pp. 52-53. For a discussion of Baird's distinction of 
bilateral and multilateral processes and their relation 
to reflective thinking, see Baird, Public Discussion and 
Debate, 1937 rev. ed. , p. 358; Thompson, ‘Discussion and 
Debate," p. 295; Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 15.
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In fact, however, Baird specifically applied Dewey's
analysis only to the process of discussion, setting forth
19 2different steps for fact and policy questions.
Braden and Brandenburg presented three alternative
methods for arriving at decisions and actions. Their
continuum began with discussion, to which the authors
applied a version of reflective thinking similar to
19 3Baird's "pattern" for policy questions. Braden and
Brandenburg asked: "What is included in the process of
democratic decision-making?" Their answer implied that 
reflective thinking operates in all deliberation. "The 
group talks together, moving successively step by step 
from a felt need to the successful operation of a plan,"
they said. "It may be summarized in three words:
194 195deliberation, decision, and action." Their paradigm
follows:
19 2Baird included the following "pattern of a dis­
cussion of policy": define terms; expound goals or aims
to be considered in solution; analyze immediate and back­
ground causes and results; weigh representative solutions; 
weigh each solution evaluating evidence and argument; 
present diagnosis and verification of preferred solution; 
frame and justify a program to carry out conclusions. The 
following constituted his "pattern of a discussion of 
fact": explain terms; set up goals (criteria); examine
relevant data, arguments, evidence; classify, synthesize, 
interpret and evaluate, and make judgment. Baird, Argu­
mentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 265-66.




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174





Those argumentation and debate writers who first
included treatments of discussion in their texts empha-
19 6sized "public discussion." Gradually group discussion
replaced that emphasis. Such concepts as group leadership, 
agenda, interpersonal relations, even role-playing became 
a part of the theory of argumentation. These concepts, 
developed more comprehensively in discussion texts,
197reverted almost solely to those works after c. 19 55.
Analysis
Though "middle period" notions of analysis
1 9 f t See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate; O'Neill 
and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion.
197Braden and Brandenburg treated discussion 
probably more comprehensively than any other dual text. 
After their work, discussion moved almost exclusively to 
separate texts.
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corresponded to Baker's "investigation for a central idea
19 8or group of ideas," Edward Z. Rowell probably over­
stated the case when he asserted that "Baker's exposition
of argumentative analysis our tradition has continued
199without significant change." Even by 1932, the date of
Rowell's statement, several important modifications had 
begun: a general use of "stock" methods for determining
issues; more thorough explorations of the proposition; 
expanded chapters on research methods and sources; and 
well-developed and highly sophisticated treatments of case. 
Since these modifications continued throughout the period, 
it is probably more accurate to suggest that Baker's "steps 
in analysis" provided the framework for succeeding 
treatments.
The Proposition 
Though most "middle period" writers defined the 
proposition traditionally,^00 they failed to agree on a
19 8Russell Wagner viewed the nature and scope of 
analysis in a fashion representative of most writers of the 
"middle period." He said: "Analysis . . .  is that study
of the subject matter of the argument which sifts the ideas 
discovered, reduces them to lowest terms, determines the 
essential controversy and the chief differences of opinion, 
and ascertains what one must do to effect a sound demon­
stration of proof to others." Wagner, Handbook of 
Argumentation, p. 5.
199Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part 
III, p. 247.
^°°Pellegrini and Stirling viewed the proposition 
in the traditional sense as "that which is stated or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
single, consistent approach for its formulation. Those
authors who treated discussion and debate as a total
process saw the proposition as the result of reflective 
201thinking. Others, relying on traditional theory and
202methodology, began with subject matter. Still another
affirmed for the purpose of discussion. It is a provi­
sional statement, usually stated affirmatively, the truth 
or falsity of which must be demonstrated in the argument." 
Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discus­
sion, p. 7. Hayworth and Capel defined the proposition 
simply as "the concise statement of a difference in 
belief." Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 14. 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills treated propositions in terms 
of the fields of knowledge from which they emanate. 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, 
p. 18. They said: "Rhetorically ! It [a proposition]
is a judgment expressed in a declarative sentence . . . 
consisting of two terms and a copula. The subject of the 
sentence is one term, the verb is the copula or connecting 
link, and the object of the verb or some other predicative 
expression is the other term. A judgment so stated is a 
proposition." Collins and Morris, on the other hand, 
suggested a "purpose-proposition." "Such a sentence or 
epigram concisely and compactly constructed will tell the 
members of the audience just what the persuader wishes them 
to do and why he wants them to do it," they said.
"Repeated often, it will give unity and definite direction 
to the entire speech or article." Collins and Morris, 
Persuasion and Debate, p. 27. Collins and Morris made 
other pronouncements about the purpose-proposition: it
keeps the speaker on a "straight course"; repetition of the 
purpose-proposition impresses audiences; the purpose- 
proposition should express question of policy; and, time 
and occasion are limiting factors, pp. 28-32.
201Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 51 
rev. ed., p. 63.
202See, for example, Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 8-12; 
Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, pp. 43-51. See Braden 
and Brandenburg for ‘'criteria of good subjects for either 
discussion or debate." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral 
Decision-Making, pp. 39-52.
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group viewed the proposition primarily in terms of desired 
203response. Most, however, skipped such preliminary con­
siderations and proceeded directly to an examination of 
the characteristics and types of propositions.
Characteristics of "Good"
Propositions
"Middle period" texts stressed various criteria 
essential for the formulation of "good" propositions. Few, 
however, went beyond O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's 1917 
standards: propositions should be unambiguous; unpreju­
diced; concrete and specific; place the burden of proof 
on the affirmative; be brief and simple, debatable, and 
interesting.2®** Essentially the same criteria also
20 5appeared as "characteristics of a good proposition,"
20 6"rules for phrasing a proposition," "requirements of
207the proposition," "rules for constructing a
203This audience-centered approach, suggested by 
Woolbert, was most fully developed by Collins and Morris.
204O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 28-31; see also Foster, Argumentation and 
Debating, 1917 rev. ed., p. 11.
205O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Dis­
cussion, pp. 42-49.
20 6See Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, 
pp. 29-30. They required that propositions be free from 
ambiguity, be expressed in a simple sentence, contain no 
words or phrases that beg the question, and place the 
burden of proof on the affirmative.
207See Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 12; Pellegrini and
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20 8 20 Qproposition," and "tests of a proposition." Crocker
offered a slightly different twist. He framed his charac­
teristics as_ propositions, indicating that they should: 
fit the speakers; fit the audience; be debatable; be 
clear; be phrased affirmatively; be timely; not be too 
broad; state one central idea; and, be free from question- 
begging terms.
O'Neill and McBurney separated the functions of 
propositions from the rules for selecting and phrasing 
them. They listed four functions: to serve as the basis
of the argument; to name the affirmative and the negative; 
to state the action demanded of the audience; to place the
pi 1burden of proof. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills added
two "functions" and restated and expanded two. Their 
listing reads:
1. To express a conclusion from study and 
reflection.
Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, pp. 8-11.
The proposition must state a definite problem, be free of 
ambiguous terms, be controversial, and be worthy of 
argument.
20 8Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 10-19.
209See Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 20- 
25. They added the standard of "availability.1 Wagner, 
Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 13-15. Wagner added that 
a proposition should be "vital," p. 13.
210Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 21-26.
211O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, pp. 13-17.
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2. To express the meaning and intent of an 
advocate.
3. To serve as the basis of the argument.
4. To name the affirmative and the negative.
5. To state the desired audience reaction.
6. To place the presumption and the burden of
proof.2^2
Types of Propositions
Though classifying propositions is not technically
a development of the "middle period," the procedure became
widely accepted as an integral part of argumentation and
213debate theory during that time. Despite O'Neill's con­
viction that "it is hardly worthwhile we try to make much 
of this classification,the fact-policy divisions 
appeared, nevertheless, in his texts with Cortright and
212McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 19-22.
213Beginning with Baker, argumentation and debate 
writers had used the conviction-persuasion distinction as 
a basis for division. Though Walter F. Terris' treatment 
is incomplete, his conclusions have some validity. See 
Walter F. Terris, "The Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition,1 Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (October, 
1963), 266-73. Moreover, Gardiner had used the terms 
fact and policy and had anticipated a third category as 
early as 1912. See J. H. Gardiner, The Making of Arguments 
(New York: Ginn and Company, 1912), pp. 14-25.
2^40'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 19.
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pic . . . .McBurney, along with the value distinction m  the
216McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills revision. Even Foster,
who had ignored classification in his 190 8 and 1917 
217texts, included "propositions of fact and propositions
218of policy or principle" in his 1932 revision. These
and other "middle period" writers divided, defined, and
discussed "kinds" of propositions. W. C. Shaw's influen-
219tial distinctions follow:
A proposition of fact consists of any 
statement that affirms or denies: (1) the
existence of things; (2) the occurrence of 
acts; (3) the classification of objects; or 
(4) the connection of events.
A proposition of policy consists of any 
statement that affrirms or denies that a 
specified course of action, in preference to 
other possible courses of action, should be
a d o p t e d . 220
21 0̂ 'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discus­
sion, pp. 40-41; O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles 
of Argument, p. 17.
216McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 22-23. This chapter, however, was Mills's.
217Foster, Argumentation and Debating,
1917 rev. ed.
218Ibid., 1932 rev. ed., pp. 13-14.
219See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, p. 41; 
Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 17.
220 Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 20-21. Shaw believed 
further that propositions of policy are best suited for 
debate, p. 21. For similar positions, see Collins and 
Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 30, 33-34; Pellegrini 
and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. 11.
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Disagreements regarding the classification of 
propositions surfaced early, both fact and policy cate­
gories being dissected. Baird differentiated propositions 
of policy as: those dealing with proposals advocated as
theoretically sound and those dealing with matters of
221practical policy. Though subsequent texts did not
readily adopt this division, and though Baird himself 
dropped the classification in 1950,222 the distinction 
between theoretic and practical policy did not disappear. 
It reemerged rather over the issue of the meaning of the 
word should in propositions of policy. In 1942, F. W. 
Lambertson concluded:
Obviously we are dealing with a problem and 
a solution. Any debate question which presented 
an evil for which there was no remedy would be 
of little value in debate. We may rest assured 
that our planning committee will not make such a 
mistake. Therefore we may conclude that the 
word "should" includes the word "could." Whether 
or not Congress or the people "would" adopt a 
particular reform at the present time is beside 
the point. The merit of a measure is not neces­
sarily shown by popular disapproval. A plan 
"should" be adopted if it is wise, good, desir­
able, and practicable; if, of all the alternate 
courses of action, it will most adequately 
remedy the existing or threatened evils.22^
221Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
p. 41. See Gardiner's distinction of propositions of 
policy dealing with "matters of taste and aesthetic 
preference." Gardiner, Making of Arguments, p. 23.
222 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.
223F. W. Lambertson, "The Meaning of the Word 
'Should' in a Question of Policy," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, XXVIII (December, 1942), 424.
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Meanwhile, propositions of fact came under close
scrutiny. In 1934, Hayworth and Capel recognized four
classes of argument covered by the term proposition of
fact: whether or not an entity exists or has existed;
whether or not an action has taken place; whether or not
a relationship exists or has existed; whether or not stated
characteristics may be attributed to a given class or 
224individual. They further observed that:
Academic debates on questions described in 
the first two of these four classes are almost 
never held, and seldom on questions covered by 
the last two, although these are more possible. 
Propositions may be built on questions as to 
the existence of a relationship of comparative 
desirability. . . . This type of proposition 
is excellent for debate and doubtless merits 
further use.
More frequently debates are held on 
propositions concerned with whether or not 
stated characteristics may be attributed to 
a given class or individual. ̂ 25
2 2 6Nichols and Baccus, two years later, offered a tripartite
224Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 17.
225Ibid., pp. 17-18.
226Nichols and Baccus suggested the following tests 
for their propositions: "Fact— Is this true? Theory— Is 
this sound? Is it acceptable as a belief? Is it reason­
able postulation? Policy— Is this the thing to do? Is it 
expedient, wise, practicable?" Nichols and Baccus, Modern 
Debating, pp. 103-104. They preferred propositions of 
policy for debating. They said: "Debates on fact and
theory are often unsatisfactory because it is hard to 
establish what the burden of proof of the affirmative is 
and when the negative has performed its duty. It is 
almost impossible to set the limitations which circumscribe 
sufficient or insufficient proof in matters of fact and 
theory. In questions of policy, however, it is easier to
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scheme which included "judgment as to a theory or postula­
tion" along with fact and policy. The same year, Wagner 
introduced the term "proposition of value" into argumen­
tation and debate theory. This division provided the 
basis for most subsequent systems of classification.
Wagner differentiated the three kinds of propositions as 
follows:
Propositions of fact are those which are 
concerned only with the truth or falsity of 
assertions. They involve the existence of 
things, the occurrence or classification or 
causation of acts or events. They depend 
wholly upon the establishing of fact for 
proof.
Propositions of value are those which 
assess the worth of the subjects in dispute. 
They assert that something is or is not bene­
ficial; they call for approval or disapproval 
of a belief or an idea. . . . Propositions of 
value attempt to declare that to be true which 
can never be accepted as a fact, but which may 
be accepted as probable, if made to conform to 
certain approved applicable standards of judg­
ment, of taste, or of weight.
Propositions of policy are those which 
propose a change of policy, which call for 
action. They involve the proof of questions 
of fact, they require the assessing of value, 
but extend into the realm of practicality and 
expediency, and unlike the others, propose 
that something shall be done.
Those writers who attempted to subdivide fact or 
policy categories were seeking to isolate the evaluative
see the boundary line that establishes a case. The grounds 
of argument are drawn more satisfactorily and the goal is 
easier to discern," p. 104.
22 7Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 15-16.
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dimension in controversial questions. Baird, and Gardiner 
before him, had looked for it in policy questions.
Hayworth and Capel, Nichols and Baccus, and Wagner saw it 
as a factual problem. A consensus agreed, nevertheless, 
that propositions of theory or value, whether derived from 
past or present fact or from future policy, were less 
suited for debating than practical policy questions.22*
Investigating the Proposition 
"Middle period" prescriptions for investigating a
proposition did not differ appreciably from 1917 Foster or
229 230O'Neill. Treatments of preliminary analysis and
231briefing, though similar to their earlier counterparts,
228See Horace G. Rahskopf, "Questions of Fact vs. 
Questions of Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII 
(February, 1932), 60-70.
229Though Collins and Morris' text emphasized new 
terminology, its specific principles of analysis were, for 
the most part, traditional. Discussion centered around the 
"two-fold character of analysis": discovery and judgment,
the results of which appear on an analysis chart (sheet 
of paper, index cards), and in the brief. Collins and 
Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 34-35.
o on"Middle period" writers agreed on the necessity 
of a broad view of the subject; a knowledge of the origin 
and history of the question; a definition of terms. They 
concurred, moreover, that dictionary definitions are 
insufficient. They defined, as had their predecessors, by 
explication, example, authority, negation, derivation, 
function, and context. For a comprehensive approach to 
definition, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and 
Debate, pp. 56-59.
23-*-Though "middle period" texts adapted traditional 
methods and rules of constructing a brief almost without 
question (for rules and examples included by writers of the
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received less emphasis than in "early period" texts. 
Chapters on research, on the other hand, retained sugges­
tions for research procedure and recording materials and
232included detailed information on source materials.
Shaw constructed a well-ordered procedure for assembling 
proof which he claimed "has been called by hundreds of 
students and college debaters the most valuable contribu­
tion for one's life work that a training in debate can
o o ogive." Shaw set out this "Phase-System" of analysis
as follows:
1. A Definition of Terms Involved in the 
Proposition;
2. The Construction of a Bibliography;
3. The Establishment of Guides to Direct 
Research;
4. The Adoption of a Systematic Method of 
Note-taking;
5. A Study of Both Sides of the Question;
period, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, 
pp. 80-88; Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 235-44), 
some differences of opinion arose concerning the philosophy 
behind briefing. For Reeves and Hudson, "a brief is a com­
plete plan for an argument" which "shows where the dif­
ferent parts belong and their relative importance." Reeves 
and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, p. 41. 
Wagner, on the other hand, viewed the brief in terms of 
proof. Authors continued, moreover, to distinguish the 
brief from the rhetorical outline. See Baird, Public 
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 95-142; Wagner, 
Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 71, 84.
23 2See Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, 
pp. 30-34; Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 55-66; Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 
ed., pp. 93-103; Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision- 
Making, pp. 58-87.
23 3Shaw, Art of Debate, p. vi.
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6. The Arrangement of Proof in Chains of 
Reasoning;
7. A Trial of Proof in a Preliminary 
Discussion; and
8. A Repetition of the Foregoing Process for 
Every Subhead in the Various Chains of 
Reasoning. ̂ 34
Issues
Continuing to view issues as "the essential points
or subpoints of controversy that evolve in the considera-
23 5tion of a given proposition," "middle period" writers
also insisted that the essential work of analysis is to
"discover" these issues. Traditional argumentation and
debate theory had held that "clash of opinion" provided
the issues of a controversy. Certain "middle period"
2 36writers agreed. Though some attempts at alternative
234Ibid., p. 24.
235Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 57. Most 
writers also differentiated "kinds" of issues as had their 
predecessors. Toward the end of the period, Behl sum­
marized the various types: Potential issues, "all possible
issues that might arise in the investigation of a given 
topic," in terms of problems of fact, value, and policy; 
main issues, "those essential points of difference which 
must be considered in any given situation if we are to find 
a satisfactory solution to the problem"; ultimate issues, 
the issues around which the final argument centers; and 
sub issues, questions concerning the main issue, pp. 59-64. 
See also Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, p. 47; Wagner, 
Handbook of Argumentation, pp~ 17-19. Crocker added 
"issue-of-the debate1' to the list and characterized it as 
follows: "In an hour it is impossible to debate the entire
case. The Negative may single out the issue it wants to 
debate." Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 42.
3̂£>See, for example, Babcock and Powell, How to 
Debate, pp. 56-61. Wagner, moreover, agreed with the 
"clash of opinion" analysis, but insisted that "a survey of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 7
2 3 7systems of analysis appeared, most "middle period"
writers relied simply on "stock issues" to analyze debate 
238propositions.
the proof requirements" be included. Wagner, Handbook of 
Argumentation, pp. 17-23. Wagner also advised the writing 
of an argumentative precis "as an aid to the discovery of 
ideas and the accurate analysis of argumentative material," 
and also included in his discussion the epitome, "a very 
brief statement of the pith of an argument" which "usually 
consists of stating the proposition and main arguments, and 
the proof of the more important main heads," pp. 23-24.
237See particularly Shaw's complicated diagram 
which demonstrates his "phase" system of analysis. Shaw, 
Art of Debate, p. 181.
238Toward the end of the period, Baird compiled a 
comprehensive list of ways of discovering issues, and 
discussed them in some detail. An outline of these 
"methods" follows: (1) Read, think, discuss as means of
discovering issues. (2) Set up the general problem as an 
over-all impartial question. (3) Ask questions related to 
the explanation of terms involved in the question as 
framed. (4) Ask questions related to the goals assumed or 
set forth by the debaters or discussants. (5) Ask ques­
tions related to a problem of policy. For policy- 
determining issues you are to consider both the problem 
and its solution, the latter phase to be regarded as a 
program of action. (6) Ask questions related to a problem 
of fact. Such questions usually suggest a division by the 
classification of materials, according to economic, social, 
political and similar considerations. Where the question 
is primarily not one of social or political judgment but 
rather one where the facts can be rather accurately dis­
covered, the method of analysis and statement of issues 
is usually one of classifying the types of argument and 
evidence. Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, 
pp. 63-72. In a review of that work, Joseph F. O'Brien 
asserted that Baird's "comprehensive formula for breaking 
down of a proposition of policy is, in the reviewer's 
opinion, without equal as a stock analytical instrument." 
Joseph F. O'Brien, "New Books: Argumentation, Discussion,
and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVI (October, 
1950), 431.
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Certain "early period" writers had sought common 
questions or issues for propositions of fact and policy.2 9̂ 
From an analysis of the historical development of stock 
methods, Terris concluded:
The classification of propositions accord­
ing to the nature of the matter in dispute 
gave rise to stock patterns for analyzing 
virtually any argumentative proposition. The 
proposition of fact, because it was struc­
turally similar to the argumentative proposi­
tions used in legal pleadings, was ripe for 
the application of Quintilian's doctrine of 
status.
Probably by analogy with the proposition 
of fact, the proposition of policy was linked 
with a system of stock issues. There seemed 
no possibility of using Quintilian's pattern 
of three statuses (the conjectural, the 
definitive, and the qualitative) for the 
analysis of propositions of policy or prin­
ciple. However Foster developed an analogous 
system of five stock issues which attempted 
to do for policy what status did for fact.24®
Though Terris was incorrect in assuming Foster to be the
first to develop a system of stock issues for policy
questions,241 his analysis is, nevertheless, relevant. The
2 *30See, for example, journal articles published by 
J. R. Pelsma and H. B. Gough in 1913 which indicated the 
extent of interest in the question. J. R. Pelsma, "The 
Special Issues," and H. R. Gough, "Formulas for the Special 
Issue," in Public Speaking Review, III (November, 1913), 
1-8; Victor A. Ketcham, The Theory and Practice of Argu­
mentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1914),
pp. 35-36.
^40Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition," p. 268.
241In addition to Pelsma, Gough, and Ketcham, see 
George K. Pattee, Practical Argumentation (1915 rev. ed.; 
New York: Century Company), pp. 61-72; O'Neill, Laycock,
and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 56-57. Though
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increasing tendency to classify propositions did, in fact, 
influence methods of analysis. Most "middle period" 
writers^^ included standard questions for propositions 
of policy in their texts. Some added common questions 
for fact and value.
Whereas stock issues provided the primary method 
for analyzing debate propositions for "middle period" 
writers, Dewey's pattern of reflective thinking became the 
tool for dissecting questions for discussion. An earlier 
section of this chapter suggested the impact of Dewey's 
system on the discussion movement in general and on
later lists differed in number and phraseology of ques­
tions, they did not stray far from the Pelsma-Gough 
inquiries.
242Baird suggested that propositions of policy 
involved cause-effect questions which in turn give rise to 
need, advantages, practicability, and justness questions. 
Issues for questions of fact, on the other hand, are deter­
mined by "the specific types of evidence involved in the 
case." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 78-81. See also Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, 
pp. 36-59; O'Neill and McBurney retained the two issues 
of the O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales text: Is the present
system unsatisfactory? Is the proposed action the proper 
remedy? O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, pp. 57-58. The McBurney, 0TNeili, and Mills 
revision included the two, but agreed with O'Neill's early 
assessment that "it is unsafe" to accept these as the exact 
issues in all cases. McBurney, O'Neill/ and Mills, Argu­
mentation and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 37-38. See 
Wagner's "surveys" of proof for propositions of fact, 
value, and policy. Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, 
pp. 19-23. Ewbank and Auer restricted their discussion to 
policy questions. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 
1941 ed., pp. 209, 432; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 98-99. Braden 
and Brandenburg suggested stock issues for policy ques­
tions, but averred that no standard formula can be applied 
to fact and value propositions. Braden and Brandenburg, 
Oral Decision-Making, pp. 409-413.
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specific argumentation texts. It is sufficient at this 
point to recognize that only Ewbank and Auer unequivocally 
applied the specific steps of reflective thinking to the 
total process of problem-solving (discussion and debate). 
Baird represented the more general view when he observed:
The logical method of division is that of 
stating the cause and the results of a proposal.
The method is illustrated by (1) problem and
(2) solution patterns of the typical discussion 
and by the (1) need, (2) practicability, and
(3) desirability divisions of the conventional 
debate.24^
Case
Though case had been discussed cursorily as early
244as Baker's first edition of Principles, "middle period" 
texts gave the concept a central place in argumentation 
and debate theory. Whereas Baker had considered case to 
be one of four steps in analysis, most "middle period" 
writers treated it as a result of analysis. They redefined 
case, moreover, not in terms of the traditional brief, but 
rather,in terms of a rhetorical outline. They also deter­
mined separate case requirements for the affirmative and 
negative. O'Neill's 1917 revision of Argumentation and 
Debate presaged these new directions. O'Neill distinguished 
the rhetorical outline from the brief, perceiving separate
24 3Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
p. 65.
244Baker, Principles, p. 77.
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functions for the two.24"* He described the affirmative
case in terms of discharging the burden of proof and set
out four negative alternatives (pure refutation, defense
of the present, adjustment, and counter proposition) which
246became the standard for discussing the negative case.
The traditional procedure of treating the brief as 
the outline for a forensic or as the case met with objec­
tions both from the point of view of literary composition 
and from logic. Baird summarized the major literary 
criticisms as follows:
Elaborate briefing often makes for dull, 
uninspired, speech-making, filled with 
mechanical summaries, repetition of words 
and phrases that make up the brief, many 
terms of enumeration, and other earmarks 
of a mechanical rather than a literary 
foundation.247
Gladys Murphy Graham, one of the most vocal critics of the 
deductive framework of the brief, objected that such a 
system "does not fit all kinds of arguments."24** Her 
alternative, implicative wholes, assumed an expository or 
narrative rather than a traditional argumentative form.
2450'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 211-13.
246Ibid., pp. 376-78.
247Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
p. 134.
24 8Graham, "Logic and Argumentation," pp. 350-63. 
Graham believed that the implicative system persuades 
eventually since it points to an inevitable "this-or- 
nothing" conclusion. See Graham, "Natural Procedure in 
Argument," pp. 319-37.
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Yost also had commented on the deductive character of 
briefing but did not advise any major change in procedure. 
Why students made briefs, and what they did with them, 
concerned her more. Yost insisted that one should make 
briefs "in order to test his own thinking, and not use them 
as outline guides to his arguments, written or oral."^®
To the criticisms regarding the logical basis of the brief, 
Baird responded:
There is no reason why the rigid brief 
should not form the material out of which the 
inferential whole could be built up, to the 
practical satisfaction both of the debater 
and of the logician who sees all argument and 
thinking as unitary.
The mature student of briefing need not 
be a slave to his rigid document. It becomes 
a means to a practical end. Its construction 
has sharpened the mental processes, given the 
facts, and created a mental alertness which 
means a continuation of creative thinking. In 
the writing of the argument the elaborate out­
line may be put away. 0̂
On the other hand, "to meet the need for the inclusion of
the expository or other compositional elements that do
not find a place in the formal brief," Baird advised "the
251construction of the rhetorical outline." He set out
its nature and characteristics as follows:
249Yost, "Argument from the Point of View of 
Sociology," p. 122.
250Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed.,
pp. 135-36.
251Ibid., p. 136.
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This rhetorical outline . . . is in 
reality a combination of the analytical or 
expository outline, the argumentative brief, 
and the speaker's outline for delivery.
The rules for the construction of a brief 
will, in general, apply to this other method.
Complete sentences will be used; proper 
symbols and indentations will be observed, 
one symbol being used for each statement; in 
argumentative outlining each subordinate 
heading will explain the more general topic 
or be a division of it; the material will be 
arranged according to the order for delivery 
or printing; and the outline may or may not 
include the personal elements, including "we" 
and "you."2^
Subsequent texts tended also to follow the rhetorical 
outline.
In addition to differentiating an outline for the 
presentation of arguments from the brief, "middle period" 
writers also isolated certain variables relevant to con­
structing a case. Three characteristics appeared in most 
works: a case should be drafted for a particular audience;
it should develop the main issues determined by analysis; 
and it should be capable of proof.25  ̂ Some writers set
252Ibid., pp. 136-37.
253See Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation,
pp. 71-72.
254Winans and Utterback included one of the more 
comprehensive listings. They suggested proof requirements, 
types of arguments to be employed, selection and use of 
premises, citation of authority, audience attitude toward 
speaker, and proposition, interest, and refutation. Winans 
diiu ulLcijjdCK, dJLYuiuencacioii, pp. o—r4 . 'ine audience 
seemed to be particularly important. See O'Neill, Manual 
of Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 125; Collins and Morris, 
Persuasion and Debate, pp. 86-87; Hayworth and Capel, Oral 
Argument, pp. 77-92. Braden and Brandenburg included a
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out specific prescriptions for structuring a case. Ewbank 
and Auer included a comprehensive list: the statements
should be arranged to show a progression of ideas; the 
main points should be few in number; the relations between 
statements should be clearly indicated; the phrasing of
the statements should have "Headline Value"; and the case
255should not attempt to prove too much.
It has been suggested that O'Neill's description
of negative alternatives provided the basis for most sub-
256sequent discussions of negative case. The affirmative
case, on the other hand, much modified during the "middle
period," evolved, for the most part, into an explication
of stock issues, particularly in propositions of policy.
Summers and Whan, for example, argued that the affirmative
has little choice, being obliged to include two or three
elements: "arguments showing need for a change, arguments
showing benefits to be secured, and possibly defensive 
257arguments." Most writers were more subtle. McBurney,
speaker's social responsibility to an audience, along with 
a consistency with facts, and the best possible presenta­
tion of a given side of a case. Braden and Brandenburg,
Oral Decision-Making, pp. 433-34.
255Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 
rev. ed., pp. 407-409.
256See Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, 
p. 29; McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 166-68. For a different listing, see Summers 
and Whan, How to Debate, pp. 125-30.
257Summers and Whan, How to Debate, p. 124.
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O'Neill, and Mills, for example, noted that except in
"special situations . . . the affirmative case is required
to discharge the burden of proof by affirming the issues
in a logically adequate fashion."258 Their "steps in
developing a case," however, turned on issues of need and
desirability.
Along with discussions of case, many "middle
period" writers set out specific work for individual
260speakers in a debate. Though not differing appreciably
from "early period" treatments, most "middle period"
formats reduced team members from three to two and gave
261each speaker one constructive and one rebuttal speech.
"Middle period" discussions of refutation and
rebuttal, the terms often being used synonymously,
generally followed those of the "early period." Courtney
and Capp, however, made the following distinction:
Refutation consists of the destruction of 
opposing arguments; it is a tearing-down 
process. Rebuttal includes both constructive
258McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 165.
259Ibid., pp. 163-64.
260For a comprehensive discussion of the work of 
the first affirmative and first negative, see Braden and 
Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 435-46.
261Some formats, however, following legal pro­
cedures, gave the affirmative and the negative a single 
period of rebuttal.
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and destructive work; in it one attacks his 
opponents' arguments and rebuilds his own.262
Regardless of philosophical point of view, writers
generally agreed on methodology for refutation; i.e.,
testing of evidence and reasoning; locating fallacies; and
"special" methods (reductio ad absurdum, dilemma, residues,
263turning the tables). McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills,
moreover, isolated one "basic rule for all refutation":
"Always make perfectly clear to the audience or reader
just what is the point that is to be attacked, and the
264nature of the attack to be made." Most writers agreed,
moreover, that rebuttal speeches should contain no new
constructive arguments.
Constructing a case involved, for some writers, the
use of "strategy." Though Laycock and Scales had included
the term strategy in their text, Shaw was probably the
first to advocate openly its use in debating. And, his
"contribution" met with praise, at least in some quarters.
In reviewing The Art of Debate, G. R. Crecraft commented:
The chapter on Strategy is undoubtedly a 
helpful and welcome addition to the treatment 
of debate. It does indeed "make every reader 
wonder why this subject has been neglected 
so long by teachers and writers on debate;
zoZCourtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 183.
263McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 243-49. These "special methods varied from 
text to text.
264Ibid., p. 240.
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inasmuch as strategy is one of the most 
important means by which a debater demon­
strates his skill.
Shaw continued to defend the use of strategy in debating,
claiming:
There is no mystery, . . . connected with 
the real strategy of debate, and likewise I 
believe that there is no foundation for the 
criticism that debate strategy is altogether 
an art to be practiced by sophists and charla­
tans. The truth of the matter is that there 
never was a debate in which time limits for 
discussion were wholly absent, and the exist­
ence of these time limitations always makes 
necessary . . . the very best use of all his 
skill in debate. He must employ devices to 
get at truth quickly or to raise doubts 
quickly and postpone decisions. This means 
then simply one thing— the honest man, as 
well as the charlatan, must employ some arts
of strategy.̂ 66
Strategy quickly fell into disrepute, however,
developing numerous negative connotations. Wilbur E.
Gilman, for example, objected to Collins and Morris'
inclusion of the concept "because it presents ideas which
0 fi 7might better be left unsaid."^0/ John Pelsma went so far 
as to recommend the use of such slogans as "Rum, Romanism
265G. R. Crecraft, "New Books: Art of Debate,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IX (April, 19 23),
199 .
266Warren C. Shaw, "The Use of Strategy in Debate," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI (November, 1925), 
371.
267Wilbur E. Gilman, "New Books: Persuasion and
Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (June, 1928),
433; see also Emerson W. Miller, "Skill in Debate," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI (April, 1925), 
156.
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and Rebellion. "2^° a reviewer "commended" Courtney and
Capp "for omitting a treatment of strategy."2*̂  Some
writers believed in the value of strategy in debating but
"watered" it down. Raymond Howes commented that in
Harrison Summers' Contest Debating,
strategy has lost most of its fangs. Although 
debating is still a game, it is a polite game, 
played by gentlemen with at least one eye 
constantly on the audience.270
Strategy, for some, became synonymous with tech­
niques for winning. James H. Holms and Robert L. Kent
entitled their book The Strategy of Argument and included
271the claim "satisfaction guaranteed." ' And, in his 
codification of rules for competitive debate, Musgrave 
characterized the strategy of winning as follows:
Strategy . . .  is the art of placing one's 
opponents at a disadvantage through a case or 
an angle of approach that he does not expect.
. . . Intelligent debaters like strategy and 
use it more than their less brilliant col­
leagues. In strategic debating the emphasis 
is on out-witting one's opponents rather than
7 6 ftJohn Pelsma, Essentials of Debate (rev. ed.;
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1937).
269Thorrel B. Fest, "New Books: Practical
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXV (December,
1949), 543. Courtney and Capp had contended that "the most 
effective strategy is careful preparation." Courtney and 
Capp, Practical Debating, p. vi.
2 70Raymond Howes, "New Books: Contest Debating,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (April, 1935), 274.
27^James H. Holms and Robert L. Kent-. The Strategy 
of Argument: How to Debate Successfully (Portland:
J. Weston Walch, 1947).
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outplodding them in library work. The natural 
result, of course, is that teams employing 
good strategy win the tournaments and league 
championships, leaving their more conventional 
opponents behind.
The alternative to strategic debating is 
conventional debating. Teams using this 
approach often lose to strong opponents; the 
only way they ever win is by presenting 
expected cases supported by so much evidence, 
such logical reasoning, and with such organi­
zation of thought, that the opposing team is 
unable to tear down the line of argument.272
Though few authors admitted such emphasis on 
strategy, numerous "practical" or "how to" books on
argumentation and debating appeared during the "middle
273period." In his review of Hayworth and Capel's Oral
Argument, Arleigh Williamson voiced some widespread doubts 
about such texts. He said:
Oral Argument, as a presentation solely 
from the angle of debate, will be recognized 
as a departure from the usual treatment of 
argumentation. Baker and Huntington, and the 
greater number of authors who have followed, 
seem to have looked upon argumentation as a
272George S. Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules
and Strategy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945),
pp. 78-79.
273The following representative works concentrated 
on "what to do and how to do it." Carrol P. Lahman, Debate 
Coaching: A Handbook for Teachers and Coaches (New York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1930; rev. ed., 1936); Summers and 
Whan, How to Debate; Brooks Quimby, So You Want to Debate 
(Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1948); Brooks Quimby,
So You Are Directing Debate (Portland, Maine: J. Weston
Walch, 1948); Keith E. Case, Basic Debate (Minneapolis: 
Northwestern Press, 1936); Harold F. Graves and Carl B. 
Spotts, The Art of Argument (New York: Prentice-Hall,
1927); and Waldo Willhoft, Modern Debate Practice (2d rev. 
ed.; New York: Prentice-Hall, 1929).
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discipline in straight thinking, as a safeguard 
against error in the building of a case for an 
audience, and as a method of rendering an 
intellectually honest personal conviction con­
vincing to others. Considered in the light of 
these ideals of liberal arts education, a 
course based on such traditional instruction 
in argumentation is unassailable. However, it 
must be recognized that another widespread 
academic attitude towards argumentation exists—  
though most certainly not viewed sympathetically 
by all debate teams or teachers— that primarily 
of preparing debaters and debates to demonstrate 
the superiority of the team debating, rather 
than the superiority of the affirmative or the 
negative of the social question at issue.
Convinced that argumentation had social and educational
obligations, Williamson posed certain criteria and
challenges. He asked:
Will the text be influential in cultivating 
in students, in relation to their speaking, a 
sense of social responsibility? Is its disci­
pline conducive to intellectual integrity?
Will it stimulate in students such a high 
regard for truth, as essential in furthering 
the social good, that they will prefer to see 
truth triumph, even when advanced by an oppo­
nent, rather than win against it? Does it 
attempt to stimulate in speakers that sense 
of honor and fair play which scorns winning 
over an opponent by tricks of strategy or by 
appeals to commonly-held false premises? Are 
the social and intellectual standards it sets 
for students in keeping with the standards of 
liberal education?275
Proof
"Middle period" writers who insisted on a balanced
274Arleigh B. Williamson, "New Books: Oral
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (February, 
1935), 106.
275Ibid., p. 107.
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rhetorical approach viewed ethos and pathos as well as
logos as legitimate forms of proof. An earlier discussion
of the conviction-persuasion dichotomy demonstrated the
nature and extent of the controversies surrounding the
"proper" relation between emotional and logical proof.
Accordingly, this section will deal exclusively with
evidence and reasoning.
Though Baker, Alden, and Foster had viewed
reasoning as a form of evidence, most "middle period" texts
276followed Laycock and Scales's analysis which differ­
entiated evidence (the material) from argument (the 
machinery). Some differences arose, however, over the 
meaning of the terms reasoning and argument and the rela­
tionship between them. Crocker, for example, declared 
that
evidence and argument together provide the 
proof of the case. . . . The materials used in 
the proof of the case make up the evidence; 
the reasons we advance to prove the case con­
stitute the argument.^^
Ewbank and Auer, on the other hand, defined the terms
evidence, reasoning, and argument as follows:
Evidence is the body of facts and opinions 
bearing on the problem under consideration.
Reasoning is the process of drawing conclu- 
sions from evidence. When an individual uses
^^See Ch. II of this study.
277Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 60.
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reasoning to get others to accept his conclu­
sions we have argument.
Braden and Brandenburg indicated that the process of
drawing conclusions basically is referred to as argument,
279reasoning, or inference.
Regardless of terms or precise definitions, most 
"middle period" writers perceived proof to be a process 
of drawing conclusions from evidence (usually according 
to the rules of Formal Logic) to substantiate a position. 
Their texts, moreover, continued to rely on legal treatises




Though "middle period" writers failed to develop
281a consistent definition of evidence, an examination
278Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 19 51 
rev. ed., p. 10 4.
279Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p. 109.
280Best, Greenleaf, and Thayer had provided the 
essential distinctions for early period writers. See 
William M. Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed. (Boston: 
Boston Book Company, 1908); Simon Greenleaf, Law of 
Evidence, 3 Vols. (1st ed.; Boston: C. C. Little and
J. Brown, 1842-1853); James B. Thayer, A Preliminary 
Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1896-1898). New texts added John Henry 
Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1904-05).
28lFor a discussion of definitions in terms of
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of their works indicates that they viewed it similarly 
to their predecessors. Differing terminologies and con­
stituents simply represented attempts to clarify the 
concept.
Best had included components of evidence in his
2 82definition, along with its ultimate use or result. Most
argumentation texts took essentially the same approach, the
major difference in "middle period" definitions involving
the constituents of the "material of proof." Though those
texts written in the first fifteen years of the period
limited their definitions to "facts," they implied and/or
stated the inclusion of "opinions." O'Neill, for example,
had used Best's designation, "any matter of fact," in his
2 83revision of the Laycock and Scales text. His subsequent
discussion in that work suggests opinion, however, to be a
kind of fact. O'Neill retained the same distinction in
284Debate and Oral Discussion, but in Working Principles 
of Argument with McBurney, he defined as follows:
"what evidence is," and "what evidence consists of," see 
Annette N. Shelby, "Evidence, A Study of Evidence: The
Great Debates of 1960" (unpublished Master's thesis, 
University of Alabama, 1961).
2 8 2See Ch. II of this study.
283O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 82-83.
284O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral 
Discussion, p. 107.
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"Evidence consists of those matters of fact and opinion
which are used as a basis of argument."285
Many texts, after 1932, clearly labeled two
separate categories, evidence of fact and evidence of 
9 ft 6opinion. Several, however, retained the primacy of
facts. Baird's revision of Public Discussion and Debate,
for example, continued to cite Best's and Shaw's distinc- 
9R7tions. Wagner, moreover, suggested:
What are the means of proof? First, there 
is evidence— the establishing of facts by 
the testimony of witnesses, the citation of 
authorities, or the presentation of physical 
objects. Then there is reasoning about the 
facts.
Braden and Brandenburg treated "statements from authority"
p pQas a kind of fact. A few writers, moreover, subdivided
the "kinds” of evidence in their definitions. Nichols and 
Baccus, for example, averred that "evidence consists of
p o cO'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, p. 95.
286See Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate,
1941 ed., p. 117. Ewbank and Auer contended, nevertheless, 
that "all evidence is based upon matters of fact." See 
also Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 84.
287Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev. 
ed., p. 109. See also Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, 
and Debate.
288Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, p. 27.
Wagner, however, considered fact and opinion to be the 
two kinds of expert testimony.
2 On .Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p. 89.
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facts, data, statistics, happenings, and the personal
experiences and comments of persons qualified to testify
290and to make judgments."
Classification
Most "middle period" writers continued to include
legal classifications of evidence in their texts. In 1923,
291Ralph C. Ringwalt suggested three broad general cate­
gories: form; source; and the relation which facts bear
to the conclusion. Baird incorporated these same distinc-
292tions into his Public Discussion and Debate. This
analysis provides a comprehensive outline for labeling the
various methods used by "middle period" writers to divide 
293evidence.
I. Form
A. Spoken or written
B. Positive or real
C. Real or personal
D. General or specific
^^Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 111.
291Ralph Curtis Ringwalt, Brief Drawing (New York: 
Longman's Green and Company, 1923).
292Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., 
pp. 148-50; 1937 rev. ed., pp. 113-15. See also Baird, 
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 9 4-9 8.
29 3The subdivisions are not Baird's. This outline 
includes a comprehensive list of ways of classifying.
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II. Source
2 9 4A. Expert or ordinary (expert or lay)
B. Original or hearsay
C. Primary or secondary
D. Reluctant or voluntary
E. Deliberate or casual
III. Relation to Conclusion
A. Direct and indirect (testimonial and 
circumstantial)
The preceding list of ways of classifying propositions
demonstrates that "middle period" writers progressed, at
295least in this area, little beyond 1917 O'Neill, adding 
only two categories: general or specific; and reluctant
or voluntary. David C. Ralph probably introduced the 
general-specific category in the 19 54 Tau Kappa Alpha 
sponsored text. He explained by the following illustra­
tion its applicability to debating:
We may say that recent political conven­
tions tend to suggest that we need to discover 
a better way of determining our national party
294O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales had differentiated 
"ordinary ('fact') witness" from "expert ('opinion') 
witness." O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 96-101. In his 1937 revision, Baird said: "A
witness in court is one who gives testimony concerning a 
disputed fact, whereas an authority is one competent to 
give opinions about the fact." Baird, Public Discussion 
and Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 119.
29 5See O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales for legal and 
argumentative distinctions of these various classifica­
tions. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 88-99.
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candidates. This is a very general use of 
evidence. On the other hand, we may argue 
that the widely televised Democratic and 
Republican national conventions of 19 52 are 
examples to prove the need for an improved 
method of selecting candidates for the office 
of President of the United States. This is 
a more specific, direct use of evidence. 6
Ralph also included the categories reluctant and voluntary
to refer to the willingness with which testimony is 
29 7given. Most other texts included this distinction,
however, under tests of evidence.
Most writers of the "middle period" viewed evidence
from a more lim: ed perspective than these classifications
suggest. Some, for example, merely listed kinds of 
29 8evidence. Others outlined divisions of evidence, sub-
29 9ordinating certain classes. Ewbank and Auer distin­
guished evidence as proof from evidence as vehicle. They 
listed two kinds of evidence— fact and opinion— which could 
be presented through examples and statistics.3®® Crocker 
differentiated areas of classification from types of
296David C. Ralph, "Evidence," in Argumentation 
and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. by David Potter
(New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 93.
297Ibid., p. 96. See also Ewbank and Auer, 
Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 131.
298Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 105-108.
299Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 29-31.
^®®Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 
ed., pp. 133, 117-18.
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3 0 1evidence— examples, statistics, and testimony. And
Nichols and Baccus divided evidence into fact, data, sta-
. . 302tistics, and authoritative writings.
Tests
Texts of the "middle period" included divergent,
and at times contradictory, tests of evidence. Methods of
evaluation ranged from the reduction of testing to the
303determinant, consistency, by Nichols to Baird's twenty- 
five criteria. Regardless of which listing^*^ and/or
terminology was used, it is important to note that "middle 
period" writers treated similar evaluative concepts. 
Courtney and Capp advised: "The tests of evidence are
many. In general they may be summed up under three heads--
301
302
Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 65-71.
£Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 10 5.
303Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 309.
304"*Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, 
pp. 112-13.
305Some writers organized their tests of evidence 
in terms of the "kind" of evidence to be evaluated. 
Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, outlined tests of 
evidence pertinent to expert testimony and statistical 
evidence. Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and 
Public Discussion, pp. 14-24. Ewbank and Auer discussed 
evidence evaluation under the headings, testing facts and 
testing opinions. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 
1951 rev. ed., pp. 109-117. Braden and Brandenburg 
included specific tests for statements from authority, 
example, and statistics. Their evaluative criteria drew 
from contemporary writings in statistics as well as from 
traditional sources. Braden and 3randenburg, Oral 
Decision-Making, pp. 89-103.
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source, quality, and quantity. An examination of
various methods of testing evidence corroborates this 
conclusion. 7
"Middle period" writers retained traditional tests 
of source, of quality, and of quantity. In examining the 
validity of a source, they attended to prejudice, qualifi­
cations (physical, moral, mental, training), veracity, and 
opportunity to know the facts. The criterion "can evidence 
pass the hearsay test" kept surfacing, moreover. Posed
first by Laycock and Scales in 190 4, and retained in 1917 
30 8by O'Neill, the question appeared in the O'Neill- 
Cortright text phrased as follows:
First we must ask, is the evidence itself 
of such a nature that it is probable that it 
can be handed about from person to person 
without undergoing considerable change? . . .
The second part of the hearsay test 
requires that the hearsay evidence in order 
to be good evidence must come through satis­
factory channels.
Foster sharply criticized the use of hearsay evidence in
argumentation in his 1932 revision of Argumentation and
^Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 99.
30 7McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, however, insisted 
that "legal tests of evidence are not . . . tests of 
logical relevancy, but tests of legal admissibility." 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, 
pp. 74-75.
308O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 105.
309O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral 
Discussion, pp. 118-19.
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Debating/ setting out two objections: "(1) the variations
from truth liable to occur during its passage through such
fallible media as human minds and language; and (2) its
310irresponsibility." O'Neill and McBurney realized that
"in general argumentation, however, much reliance must be 
placed on the experiences and observations of others as
they are told to you, or as they are printed in books and
311magazines." And Nichols concluded that "if hearsay
evidence were rigidly excluded, discussion and debate
312would be practically impossible." Eventually, however,
most texts dropped the distinction.
"Middle period" writers also generally agreed on 
the constituents of "quality." For example, tests of the 
consistency of evidence (with itself, with other evidence, 
with human experience, with the laws of logical argument, 
with common sense, and with known fact) came largely from 
"early period" texts. The probability of evidence^^^
310Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 19 32 
rev. ed., p. 93.
311O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, p. 103.
312Nichols, Discussion and Debate, pp. 275-76.
313See Ch. II of this study; also, Baird, Public 
Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 152-53; O'Neill and 
McBurney, Working Principles of Argument, pp. 110-12.
314See Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, 
pp. 26 4-65; Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and 
Debate, pp. 68-72.
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(evaluated in terms of general knowledge or human experi­
ence, specific or unusual existing conditions, or sub­
sequent or prior known facts) emerged. And, the timeliness 
of evidence became an important method of verifying quality 
for some writers. Sufficiency, on the other hand, lent 
itself less easily to specific tests. Courtney and Capp 
pointed out:
There can be no "one and only" answer to 
how much evidence is necessary to prove an 
argument. Much depends upon the nature of the 
argument itself and upon the beliefs of the 
audience relative to each argument.
Quantity is determined by the nature of 
the argument, audience beliefs, and by the 
corroboration of evidence. x5
O  1 f.In addition to these tests for reliability, XD
appropriated largely from "early period" texts, certain
"middle period" writers examined audience acceptability
of evidence. Though Winans and Utterback, for example,
omitted a treatment of evidence as such, they, nevertheless,
averred that "to be convincing an argument must rest upon
317basic premises which are acceptable to the hearer."
•^^Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, pp. 105,
109.
316"Middle period" tests of reliability paralleled 
early period tests. See Ch. II of this study. In evalu­
ating competency of source, questions evolved concerning 
opportunity to know facts, capability of understanding 
facts, and ability to interpret them, along with physical, 
mental, moral, and experience qualifications.
317Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 140.
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O'Neill and McBurney agreed that both audience accepta­
bility and logical adequacy are appropriate tests of 
evidence. "In some cases, it is advisable to be guided 
by one test, and in other cases, primarily by the other 
test."3^3 They asked:
Is the evidence already a belief of the 
audience? . . . Has the evidence been attrib­
uted to an authority which the audience 
is willing to accept?31^
Though O'Neill retained audience acceptability as a test
of evidence in his text with McBurney and Mills, he gave
it less emphasis.
Reasoning
Traditional applications of logic to argumentation
321and debate faced attack from two divergent viewpoints.
Baker, relying heavily on Sidgwick, had questioned the 
value of a study of "Formal Logic" for practical argumen­
tation. Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, indicted 
"current" treatments of logic in argumentation texts as
*5 0  0insufficient and fragmentary. ^  Believing that the new
318O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, p. 99.
319Ibid., pp. 113-16.
3 20See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation 
and Debate, p. 95.
33^See Ch. II of this study.
3 ̂ Graham, "Logic and Argumentation," p. 350.
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logics could provide both new principles and a clarifica­
tion of certain currently used, muddled concepts, Graham 
wished to adapt Bosanquet's analysis of argument from 
implicative wholes to argumentation and debate theory.
Woolbert, meanwhile, having reassessed the place 
of logic (the process of inferring) in a system of per­
suasion, concluded that the making of inferences occurs 
at three general levels of consciousness (the sub­
conscious, partly conscious, and conscious). The nature 
of the process is the same for all three levels, being 
ultimately reducible to neuromuscular activity. Woolbert 
theorized that past experience operating as opinions, 
attitudes, et cetera, are influential at the subconscious 
level. Ethical appeals and testimony are operative at the 
partly conscious level; reason at the conscious level.
He categorized the three levels, therefore, in terms of 
logical formulae to be used. Rules of rhetoric are 
applicable at the first level. Few rules have been formu­
lated for the partly conscious level. Rules of logic are 
appropriate for the third or conscious level. Woolbert 
extended the levels of consciousness concept when he 
interpreted logical fallacies in terms of the Freudian
wish theory; i.e., faulty reasoning results from the clash
323of our subconscious and conscious wishes.
323Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion," 
pp. 19-39.
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John Dewey also examined thought as a logical form,
or product, and as a psychological process. He contended
that logical forms
apply not to reaching conclusions, not to 
arriving at beliefs and knowledge, but to the 
most effective way in which to set forth what 
has already been concluded, so as to convince 
others (or oneself if one wishes to recall 
to mind its grounds) of the soundness of the 
result.324
Dewey argued, nevertheless, that "actual thinking has its
3 2 6own logic; it is orderly, reasonable, reflective.'
What of the influence of these critics? Following 
Baker, "middle period" texts paid homage to a "practical" 
approach to argumentation. Practical, however, usually 
meant simplified prescriptive texts for contest debating 
with a smattering of traditional Formal Logic thrown in 
for good measure. Graham's insistence on applying reason­
ing from implicative wholes to argumentation, though
326largely rejected, helped to stimulate interest in new 
approaches to logic.
The Woolbertian disciples, Collins and Morris, 
presented a radical— though not particularly influential—  
treatment of argument. Attempting "to present helpful
324Dewey, How We Think, p. 74.
325Ibid., p. 75.
32^See, however, discussion of explanation as 
argument in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation 
and Debate, pp. 130-42; see also Nichols, Discussion and 
Debate, pp. 347-48.
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principles from logic and from psychology without drawing 
upon the systematic treatment of either," Collins and
3 9 7Morris ignored both the syllogism and formal induction.
Preferring the "more easily understandable and practical
synthetical methods," they examined "the three essential
argumentative materials of reasoning": propositions
expressing old beliefs of the audience; propositions
expressing new beliefs which the persuader hopes the
audience will accept; and propositions expressing mental
329connections between the old beliefs and the new. They
also included "the four essential implicit or impressive 
materials of objective reasoning": propositions expressing
illustrative imagery (presented by use of figure, analogy, 
exemplification); rhetorical questions which image and sug­
gest responses; bodily-action images (the action of the
330speaker); and vocal images (the voice of the speaker). 
Collins and Morris held that the acceptance-attitudes of 
the audience determined the use of these methods. 331
I X .




331McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills incorporated the 
analysi-^-synthesis terminology into their definition of 
explanation as argument: "Explanation is that form of
support in which belief and action are sought by explaining
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Most writers, perceiving John Dewey's paradigm to
be analysis, not proof, or even a process of proof,
examined the elements of reflective thought in chapters
on analysis or in sections on organizational patterns of
discussion. Nichols and Baccus1 "types of induction,"
however, an atypical approach, combined some of Dewey's
steps with certain of John Stuart Mills's experimental
methods. Nichols and Baccus labeled three "positive
processes of induction," inquiry or investigation,
generalizing, and analyzing, and one "negative process,"
332elimination.
Most "middle period" writers, rather than adapting
one of the preceding alternatives, retained edited versions
of "Formal Logic," similar to that found in O'Neill,
Laycock, and Scales's Argumentation and Debate. Their
texts simply updated traditional treatments in terms of
333certain contemporary logics. Of particular influence
the data connected with any proposition in such a way as 
to cause the audience to accept the proposition by 
implication. It is a process of argument in which the 
speaker analyzes and synthesizes the materials bearing on 
the proposition, thereby leading the audience to imply its 
truth." McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 130.
332Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, pp. 179-81.
333Nichols and Baccus presented a representative 
view of the relation of logic to argumentation and debate: 
"Debate depends so much upon logic that some people have 
considered it a game of logic. Debate, however, is not 
logic any more than biology is logic. It is not a game of
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*5 O Awere the writings of Max Black and Monroe Beardsley.
Black's Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and
O O CScientific Method combined "a cursory introduction to
symbolic logic with the traditional Aristotelian nomen- 
336clature" in examining deduction which, incidentally,
337Black determined to relativistic. Beardsley's Practical
338Logic and Thinking Straight included principles of
logic any more than military tactics are a game of logic.
Debate depends so closely upon logic for the rules of its
thinking, the tests of its reasoning, that it is impos­
sible to separate the two, but the same thing may be said 
of the dependence of all sciences upon logic. From the 
logical methods of thought the debater gets the construc­
tive argument needed to develop his case in proper arrange­
ment. From the methods of testing thought, he learns what 
to use and what not to use in constructing a case. From 
the maxim of logic he learns the formulas of refutation and 
rebuttal." Ibid., pp. 177-78.
^  j
The influence of Black and Beardsley is
evidenced both by journal reviews and by direct citations
of their works in numerous argumentation texts of the 
"middle period."
335Max Black, Critical Thinking: An Introduction
to Logic and Scientific Method (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1946).
336Solomon Simonson, "Chance, Law and Logic," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIV (April, 1948), 249.
337Black's innovative division of fallacies 
included general fallacies, "those whose persuasiveness is 
connected with some intrinsic defect of the argument" 
(formal, linguistic, and material types) and fallacies of 
circumstance, "those whose appeal arises from some features 
of the context in which the argument is used." Black, 
Critical Thinking, pp. 210-11.
33 8Monroe C. Beardsley, Practical Logic (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950): Monroe C. Beardsley, Thinking 
Straight (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950).
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application as well as theoretical distinctions between 
fact and opinion, exposition and argument, reasons and 
conclusions. Beardsley described syllogisms, emphasized 
statistical data, and discussed style. James I. Brown 
suggested that the "particular contribution" of 
Beardsley's two works "lies in bringing into closer rela­
tionship, logic and life— that portion of life centering
in communication, in writing and reading, in speaking and
- . . . ,,3 39listening.
It was suggested in Chapter II of this study 
that the 1917 revisions of O'Neill and Foster provided 
the essential framework for "middle period" approaches 
to proof. A summary chart of their positions is shown 
on page 219. An examination of the diagram indicates 
that though Foster and O'Neill essentially agreed on 
the components of proof, they perceived the relationships 
between these elements differently. The same was true 
for "middle period" writers. Some followed O'Neill‘S® 
in distinguishing rhetorical and logical classes of
339James I. Brown, "New Books in Review: Practical
Logic and Thinking Straight," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
XXXVII (October, 1951), 386.
340Shaw felt that "the basis of classifying all 
argument rests upon the nature of the inference between 
the premises and the conclusion." He included analogy, 
along with deduction and induction. Shaw, Art of Debate, 
p. 74. See also McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumenta- 
tion and Debate.
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*3 A 1argument. Others attempted, as had Foster, to
incorporate the rhetorical categories as "kinds" of
induction and deduction. Baird treated specific instances,
argument from authority, argument from causal relation,
and analogy as forms of induction. Winans and Utterback
labeled three types of reasoning: deductive (syllogistic,
but included a forteriori); generalization (included
343causal); and analogy. O'Neill and Cortright followed
the O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales distinctions, while
O'Neill and McBurney examined generalization and analogy
as forms of induction; antecedent probability and sign as
344kinds of deduction. O'Neill and McBurney suggested,
moreover, "two important thought relationships involved
in induction and deduction": cause-effect relationships
345and substance-attribute relationships. Nichols picked
Babcock and Powell listed as the major divisions 
of reasoning, deduction, induction, and estimates of 
probability in regard to particular questions, treating 
analogy and circumstantial evidence as parts of the third 
classification. Moreover, they evaluated effect to cause, 
cause to effect, and effect to effect reasoning as kinds 
of circumstantial evidence. Babcock and Powell, How to 
Debate, pp. 134-64.
342Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 
pp. 187-204.
343Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 64-136.
344O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, pp. 125-59. The McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills 
text returned to O'Neill's earlier pattern of organization.
345O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of 
Argument, p. 123.
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up these distinctions and included them along with non-
syllogistic types of argument, and implication or implica-
346tive wholes in his discussion of proof. Whereas Shaw
had treated analogy as comparable to induction and
deduction, Wagner suggested causal reasoning to be a third
347major division of argument. Wagner also included
certain other aspects of proof: accepted premises or
348topics; a forteriori reasoning; and the dilemma.
Some "middle period" writers simply listed types 
of arguments and did not specifically detail their rela­
tionships. Ewbank and Auer included deduction, induction, 
analogy, and causal argument. Baird (19 50) treated 
generalization (from specific instances, statistics, and 
circumstantial details), analogy, causal reasoning,
^^Nichols, Discussion and Debate, pp. 344-48.
Cf. Graham's distinctions.
347Summers and Whan discussed proof by classifying 
and eliminating. Summers and Whan, How to Debate, 
pp. 34-48.
348Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, p. 44.
Wagner suggested that in form, the a forteriori argument, 
a "mode of heightening the argument by analogy . . . 
resembles the hypothetical syllogism." O'Neill relied on 
Genung's description of a forteriori argument which said:
"A favorite use of the argument from example, especially 
in oratory, is the argument technically called a 
forteriori, which reasons that if a certain principle is 
true in a given case, much more will it be true in a 
supposed case, wherein the conditions are more favorable." 
John F. Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: 
Ginn and Company, 1886), pp. 421-22. O'Neill believed 
a forteriori argument to be applicable to either generali­
zation or analogy. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumen­
tation and Debate, p. 159.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
349authority, and deduction. Braden and Brandenburg listed
arguments from specific instances, circumstantial detail,
causal relations, analogy, and authority.350 Though
recognizing that one usually identifies these as inductive
arguments, they observed that:
Actually, however, the debater or public 
speaker almost always uses a deductive order 
with these forms. He presents his general 
belief or conclusion and then attempts to 
prove it by utilizing various kinds of argu­
ment in support of it.^51
Though most definitions and tests of the various 
forms of reasoning closely followed "early period" dis­
tinctions, argument from sign continued to generate 
controversy. Both Foster and O'Neill had included sign 
in their revisions. Foster believed that "we ought to
be able to explain all so-called arguments from sign by
352reference to generalization, or causation, or both."
O'Neill used the rhetorical classification and divided
sign into arguments from effect to cause, effect to effect,
353and association of phenomena in the past. Though Shaw,
349Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 115-60.
350Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
pp. 113-14.
^ ^ Ibid., p. 133.
352Foster, Argumentation and Debating, p. 181.
353O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 146.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 3
Ewbank and Auer, and Nichols included argument from sign
in their texts, it was in the O'Neill co-authored texts
that the concept received most attention. McBurney,
O'Neill, and Mills's Argumentation and Debate prescribed
the argument as
one which gives an indication that the 
proposition is true without attempting to 
explain why it is true. It is a ratio 
cognoscendi or reason for acknowledging or 
recognizing the truth of a proposition as 
distinguished from a ratio essendi or 
reason why the proposition is t r u e . 354
Ehninger disagreed. "As a ratio cognoscendi [method of
knowing], argument from sign is concerned with the what
of a thing," he said, "rather than with the why.”355
"Unfortunately," Ehninger continued, "the difference
354McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 96. "All arguments from sign are based on the 
assumption (stated or implied) that two or more variables 
are related in such a way that the presence or absence of 
one may be taken as an indication of the presence or 
absence of the other. Such relationships are reciprocal 
when either variable may be taken as the sign of the 
other. . . . Sign relationships are nonreciprocal when one 
variable serves as a sign of the second, but this second 
cannot be reliably deduced from the first. . . . These sign 
relations are sometimes referred to as substance-attribute 
relations. Since every substance (object, thing, person, 
event, item, etc.) has certain distinguishing attributes 
or characteristics (size, shape, color, speed, number, 
etc.) the attributes may be taken as signs of the substance 
or the substance as a sign of the attributes. All argu­
ments from sign are based on generalizations either stated 
or implied," p. 97.
35 5Douglas Ehninger, "The Logic of Argument," in 
Argumentation and Debate; Principles and Practices, ed. by 
David Potter (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 105.
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between sign and cause is not always easy to grasp," the
reasons being as follows:
The first is that at one point sign and 
cause coincide, since among the reasons for 
our knowing a thing is an awareness of its 
cause. Thus, triangular ripples in the water 
are both a sign that a boat has passed and 
are also the effect resulting from its having 
agitated the water. Second, in English we 
commonly employ "because," "hence," and 
similar words to express both relationships. 6
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills expanded traditional
tests of argument from sign. Believing that "the basic
test of any argument from sign lies in the reliability of
357the generalization upon which it is based," they 
included, nevertheless, specific tests for "constructing 
and appraising" these arguments.
1. Is the sign relationship accidental or 
coincidental?
2. Is the sign relationship reciprocal?
3. Have special factors intervened which 
alter normal relations?
4. Is the sign reliable without the 
collaboration or concurrence of other 
signs?358
Ehninger, on the other hand, suggested the following "three
basic considerations":
1. That which is alleged to be a sign of a 
particular state or condition must bear a 
necessary and essential relation to that 
state or condition.
357McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 98.
358Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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2. That which at one time and under one set 
of circumstances may be a valid sign of 
some state or condition is not necessarily 
a valid sign of that state or condition 
at another time or under altered 
circumstances.
3. While in some instances a single sign may 
be sufficient to establish the presence of 
a particular state or condition, generally 
the corroboration of several signs is 
necessary in order to establish its 
presence.
Though "middle period" writers retained traditional 
tests for formal validity (rules for categorical, hypo- 
thetical, and disjunctive syllogisms), they recognized 
that:
The essential rhetorical problem in the 
syllogism is in the fact that its rules and 
regulations contemplate a degree of certainty 
which can rarely be achieved in a rhetorical 
demonstration. The crucial test of the syllo­
gism is that the middle term be distributed in 
at least one of the premises. The point here 
is that the middle terms in rhetorical syllo­
gisms can rarely be distributed perfectly and 
completely. The things we talk about in most 
public and private debates are variable rather 
than discrete and categorical. . . .  A series 
of syllogisms whose middle terms are qualified 
. . . [as usually, frequently, et cetera] 
might very well establish an exceedingly high 
degree of probability; and yet, logically,
. . . they amount to exactly zero, because the 
middle terms are not distributed. . . .  In 
order . . .  to accommodate his syllogistic 
doctrine to the kinds of proofs which speakers 
and writers must ordinarily use, he [Aristotle]
*3 6 Q Ehninger, "Logic of Argument," pp. 106-107.
36oSee O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation 
and Debate, pp. 176-82.
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invented the "rhetorical syllogism" or the 
enthymeme. 361
Particularly instrumental in giving the concept a more
362central place in argumentation theory, McBurney said:
The syllogism and the enthymeme explain 
the structure of argument as it is exhibited 
in a properly drawn brief or logical outline 
and provide the structural basis, through such 
outlines, for the composition of the finished 
discourse. They also make it clear that all 
(deductive) reasoning proceeds by relating 
generalizations to particular cases through 
the mediation of middle terms which are common 
to both and provide tests which can be used to 
check the validity of deductive inferences.363
Consistent with an interest in empiricism and
pragmatism, "middle period" texts also investigated
material validity, primarily in terms of traditional
fallacies. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills pointed up the
importance of such a study when they said:
So far as it is possible, the speaker should 
attempt to make his arguments both formally 
valid and materially true. This amounts to 
saying that the deductions from his premises 
should be carefully drawn and his premises 
should be inductively sound. The rules of the 
syllogism are designed to give formal validity 
and the rules of inductive reasoning are 
designed to secure material truth. In dealing
361McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 118-19.
362See James H. McBurney, "The Place of the 
Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, III 
(September, 1936), 49-74.
3 6 3McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 122.
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with probabilities, we approximate these 
conditions as closely as possible.
Some writers included other "obstacles to clear thinking."
Baird listed eleven major problems.-*6 5 Behl reduced
Baird's categories to six general divisions (inaccurate
use of language, inaccurate use of definition, inaccurate
analysis, misuse of evidence, fallacies in logic, and
special fallacies) and added substitution of speaking
techniques for argument. OD
The Forensic
36 7Whereas Baker had perceived the forensic to be
either a written or oral presentation, ''middle period"
36 8writers restricted its meaning to the "spoken debate" 
and to certain forms of public discussion. In their essay 
on "Intercollegiate Debating," Cowperthwaite and Baird 
suggested that "by 19 23 college debating had seen most of 
its major developments. subsequent evolution,
they said:
364ibid., p. 126.
363Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
pp. 163-65.
366Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 135.
"^^Baker, Principles, p. vii.
^**See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 187.
^69Leroy Cowperthwaite and A. Craig Baird, "Inter­
collegiate Debating," in A History of Speech Education in 
America, ed. by Karl Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1954), p. 272.
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The forces which established intercol­
legiate debate have been vigorous enough to 
keep it in good health. International 
debating continued to expand. New adapta­
tions were introduced . . . and radio enabled 
the debater to reach larger audiences. The 
most important new direction was the debate 
tournament, which allowed debaters to meet sev­
eral colleges at one location with minimum 
expense. Colleges experimented also with 
legislative assemblies as a realistic setting 
for the student speaker.
Tournament Debating
The advent of tournament debating, for Baird
and Cowperthwaite the most significant development of the
period, resulted in textbook attention to, as well as
372journal literature on, organizing forensic programs,
370Ibid. Women also were allowed to enter the 
fray during the "middle period."
3 71Ibid., p. 274. The debate tournament 
"allegedly originated" in 19 23 at Southwestern College, 
Winfield, Kansas. See F. B. Ross, "A New Departure in 
Forensics," Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta (November, 1923). 
The first National Tournament was sponsored by Pi Kappa 
Delta at its national convention in 19 26. See Egbert 
Ray Nichols, "A Historical Sketch of Inter-Collegiate 
Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXII (April, 
1926), 213-22 and (December, 1936) , 59"l-602. Lahman, 
Debate Coaching, 1936 rev. ed., referred to tournament 
debating not as a type, but rather as an "epidemic" of 
debating, p. 62.
3 72See Gregg Phifer, "Organizing Forensic 
Programs," in Argumentation and Debate: Principles and
Practices, ed. by David Potter (New York: Dryden Press,
1954), pp. 345-74; Leonard F. Sommer, "Building the 
Debate Program," Central States Speech Journal, IX (Fall, 
1957), 24-26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
229
forensic l e a g u e s a n d  debate tournaments. It 
also influenced and in many ways dictated the structure 
of the forensic. Cowperthwaite and Baird observed further 
that:
In order to hold several "rounds" of 
debate in one or two days, the length of 
speeches was reduced to ten minutes for 
constructive and five minutes for rebuttal 
speeches. Although early tournaments made 
use of the traditional three-speaker team, 
tournament efficiency was in large measure 
responsible for the advent of the two- 
speaker system. With the national tourna­
ment came the necessity for selecting a 
national debate question. Finally, the 
tournament brought a renewed emphasis on 
contest debating, even though many non­
decision or "practice" tournaments were 
held. Tournament debating also meant 
speaking almost entirely without popular 
audiences; indeed, the real audience was 
often the critic judge.
070Paul Carmack, "State Forensic Leagues," in 
Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices,
ed. by David Potter (New York: Dryden Press, 1954),
pp. 423-53.
374Nichols and Baccus included one of the first 
textbook discussions of tournament debating. See 
Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating. See also F. E. 
Lambertson, "The Mechanics of Tournament Debating," 
Gavel, XXIII (March, 1941), 57-58; E. C. Buehler, ed., 
‘'A Symposium: Debate Tournaments Appraised," Gavel,
XXXII (May, 1950), 75, 82, 83.
375Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate 
Debating," p. 274. The national debate tournament 
prompted an interest in a common national question.
See James H. McBath and Joseph Aurback, "Origins of the 
National Debate Resolution," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association, IV (Fall, 1967), 96-102.
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Forms and Formats 
Debate coaches and tournament directors
experimented widely with format^** during the "middle
377 378period." Though recommending open forum, split
teams,heckling,^®® dialectic,and even "mail 
382order"° forms of debating, writers more often empha-
3 83sized the cross-examination, congressional, and direct
376For an excellent summary of the forms of 
debating, see Lahman, Debate Coaching, 19 36 rev. ed., 
pp. 33-40.
377Nichols attributed the new debate forms to 
criticisms being hurled at the discipline. E. R. Nichols, 
"Boil and Bubble, Toil and Trouble," Debaters' Magazine,
II (September, 1946), 189-90.
378See C. L. Menser, "On the Open Forum," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech Education, X (November, 1924), 346-49;
D. W. Morris, "The Intercollegiate Forum," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XXIV (April, 1938), 212-20.
379See B. I. Wiley, "Bridging the Gap," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XVI (February, 1930), 114-16. Wiley 
deals with the gap between Decision and Non-Decision 
debating.
380Edith M. Phelphs and Julia E. Johnson, eds., 
University Debaters' Annual (New York: H. W. Wilson
Company, 1937), pp. 471-530,
381E. L. Hunt, "Dialectic— A Neglected Method of 
Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII 
(June, 1921), 221-32.
382See Eric Julber and Warren Christopher, "'Mail 
Order' Debating," Rostrum, XVII (September, 1942), 5.
38 3This was also called the "Oregon Plan." See 
J. Stanley Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech Education, XII (April, 1926), 178-79.
See also D. R. Parker, "The Use of Cross-Examination in 
Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 
1932), 97-102. Gray outlined the advantages of the
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clash^®^ styles. In addition to modifications of the 
traditional forensic form, "middle period" writers devised 
numerous methods for presenting several sides of an issue,
O p Cconvention debating being particularly popular. 3 Inter-
386collegiate contests included parliamentary sessions,
387 388symposia, and, in some instances, discussion.
Oregon Plan. "We have no judge prejudice; no overemphasis 
of winning; no refusal of a debater to admit a fact because 
it may cause him to lose a judge's vote; no sacrificing of 
the welfare of the student for the sake of winning a 
debate; no dry academic and technical speeches; and 
finally, no shirking in preparation. The period of cross­
questioning is sufficient stimulus for thorough prepara­
tion. Aside from the first two speeches, memorized 
speaking is impossible. The debater must learn to adjust 
himself and his ideas to the new situations which every 
debate presents." Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," 
p. 179.
384Lahman called the congressional-style debate 
"a combination of the conventional procedure, cross­
questioning, and heckling." Lahman, Debate Coaching, 19 36 
rev. ed., p. 33. See Edwin H. Paget, "The Direct-Clash 
Debate Plan," Gavel, XV (March, 1933), 12-14.
385Arleigh B. Williamson, "A Proposed Change in 
Intercollegiate Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XIX (April, 1933), 192-206. For a discussion of 
Williamson's proposal, see William P. Sanford, "A Proposed 
Change in Intercollegiate Speaking," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, XIX (June, 1933), 416-18.
3^See Joseph F. O'Brien, "The Place of Extra- 
Curricular Speech in the College or University of Today," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (November, 1935), 579-87.
387Grace F. Shepard, "Symposium Rather than Debate," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, LII (December,
1931), 211-13.
^®®See Ray Cowell, "The Problem Solving Debate," 
Rostrum, XI (September, 1936), 6-7; Joseph F. O'Brien,
"Group Discussion as a Substitute for the Conventional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3 2
Pi Kappa Delta sponsored a student legislative assembly as
389a regular feature of its national conventions and Delta 
Sigma Rho inaugurated a continuing series of biennial 
National Student Congresses.
The advent of no-decision debate led to an investi­
gation of still other formats. There was agitation, for
3Q flexample, for debating on neutral floors. Radio debating
391gained popularity. Students participated in limited
392proposition or impromptu clashes, and some tried the 
39 3British system. Interest, moreover, generated by a few
High School Contest in Extemporaneous Speaking," Gavel 
XVIII (January, 1936), 19-20; Earl S. Kalp, "The Discussion 
Contest," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XX (November, 1934), 
545-47.
■^^Sherod J. Collins, "The Student Assembly," 
Forensic, XXVII (May, 1942), 126-27, 162.
390See Raymond F. Howes, "Finding Debate 
Audiences," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XI 
(November, 1925), 364-68.
391See William D. Millson, "Radio Debating: A New
Form," Speaker, XXIV (November, 1939), 9-10; Cowperthwaite 
and Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," p. 273.
392See J. R. Pelsma, "Advantages and Disadvantages 
of Impromptu Debating," Gavel, XIII (May, 1931), 6-7.
39 3See Douglas Ehninger, "Outline of Procedure for 
the English-Style of Debate," Gavel, XXX (March, 1948),
51. A. Craig Baird, "Shall American Universities Adopt the 
British System of Debating?" Quarterly Journal of Speech 
Education, IX (June, 1923) , 215-22; Waldo W. Braden, ‘'The 
British Style of Debating," Speaker, XLI (January, 1959), 
10-12; Cowperthwaite and Baird observed: "Characterized
by its conventional mode, wittiness, and its stress upon 
audience persuasion, the Oxford, or British, style of 
debating had a significant and profound effect in tempering
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isolated debates with British teams resulted in the 
establishment of an international debating program spon­
sored by the Institute of International Education.
Old Issues and New Directions 
Though the physical structure of the forensic 
changed during the "middle period," the underlying philo­
sophical controversies remained essentially the same as
those of the early period. Affirmative and negative
39 5journal articles appeared on debate coaching, debating
39 f\both sides of questions, and most particularly on the
the legalistic formalism of American debating." 
Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," 
p. 271. The implications of this issue were discussed 
earlier in this chapter.
394Such problems as constructing the forensic were 
discussed primarily in terms of case. Considerations such 
as arrangement, style, and delivery (including platform 
manners) assumed the central place in argumentation theory 
discussed earlier in this chapter. For a summary of some 
of the typical indictments lodged at debating, see Ruth E. 
Huston, "Debate Coaching in High School— Benefits and 
Methods," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, X (April, 
1924), 127-43.
39 5W. C. Shaw, "The Crime Against Public Speaking," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VIII (April, 1922), 
138-44; "The Coach versus the Professor," an Editorial, 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IX (June, 1923), 
284-85; Charles A. Marsh, ^'Coaching Debate Teams," Gavel, 
XIII (December, 1931), 3-6.
39 6See Williamson, "New Books," p. 19 8; Laverne 
Bane, "Discussion for Public Service vs. Debate," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XXVIII (December, 1941), 546-49; Fritz, 
Method of Argument, p. 27; Dayton McKean, "New Books: The
Method of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII 
(February, 1932), 136-37.
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appropriate end of debating, i.e., skill in argumentation
39 7versus discovery of truth. The O'Neill-Wells contro­
versy, though far from resolved, approached a stalemate in 
1918, with the publication of a joint article in the 
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education. Wells restated his 
earlier position that debate must emphasize reasoning with 
truth as the end. "Art is always dynamic, moving to defi­
nite purposes," he said.888 O'Neill, equally unyielding, 
countered: "I want precisely what we get in other kinds
of contests, an intelligent decision on the work done,
399the ability shown." Though directed initially towards
differing philosophical ends of debating, the continuing 
dispute had deteriorated into a hassel over judging. In 
1918, an article appeared in the Quarterly Journal 
entitled "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and 
a Decision."488 Sarett, the "judge," set out the issues 
as follows, his analysis being incisive.
"*87See Ross F. Lockridge, "A New Idea in High 
School Discussion Contests," English Journal, IV (January, 
1915), 19.
■̂88James M. O'Neill and Hugh N. Wells, "Judging 
Debates," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV 
(January, 1918) , 77.
399Ibid., p. 83.
488Hugh N. Wells, James M. O'Neill, and Lew R. 
Sarett, "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and 
a Decision," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV 
(October, 1918), 398-433.
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The gist of the whole argument is this.
Judge Wells wishes the debate to be judged 
primarily on the "weight of evidence" or "the 
case"— as I said I infer that by this he means 
the fullness and the logical coherence of the 
brief, and the preponderance of points; and 
secondarily (although nowhere does he make the 
definite statement) on skill in debate, and 
then only in so far as that skill serves to 
make the "weight of evidence" more clear, etc. 
Professor O'Neill wishes debate to be judged 
primarily on skill in debate as such, in and 
of itself, and secondarily on the evidence,—  
thus if one side is inherently weaker in 
evidence or "case" this misfortune will be no 
bar to the possibility of winning the debate 
if it is superior as a team of debaters, more 
skillful. The ultimate and conclusive answer 
to the question that is raised by these con­
flicting positions can be found only if we can 
agree on an answer to another question which 
is in turn created, and which lies at the root 
of the discussion, namely, What is the end of 
debate? What is its function? What is its pur­
pose? Neither Professor O'Neill nor Judge Wells 
makes a definite statement on this point; each 
bases his argument on a different assumption. I 
infer from Judge Wells' attitude— this is merely 
an inference— that he believes that the end of 
debate is the revelation of "truth." (I use 
quotation marks because I believe that "truth" 
as it lies in all big public questions is more 
or less relative, varying with the temperaments, 
prejudices, experiences, and observations of 
judges; moreover "truth" is not always truth.) 
Professor O'Neill on the other hand believes that 
debate is an intellectual combat, a contest in 
skill in forensics. Obviously the gentlemen dis­
agree in their basic conceptions concerning the 
end or purpose of debate. It is and always will 
be difficult to reconcile arguments concerning 
judges, standards, and so on, if we cannot agree 
on this conception of the function of debate; 
and our conclusions concerning all other ques­
tions of debate policy must vary with it. If the 
debate is a game, an intellectual combat, a con­
test in forensic skill, then the judge should be 
a critic who knows the game, who understands the 
art and the arts of debate; and the standard by 
which he should judge contests should be the
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standard of skill in the use of that art,—  
skill in debate, skill as such. ^
If nothing else, the Wells-0'Neill discussions 
pointed up the relativity of standards of judgment.
Writers drafted ballots with varying criteria. Some 
espoused voting by percentages. No-decision and audience- 
decision debates gained popularity and a single arbiter 
replaced the three-judge panel. Henry C. Klingbeil graphi­
cally demonstrated the problem when he said: "The greatest
need of the American brand of debating to-day is some defi­
nite, visible scoring scheme."402 Several such "schemes" 
appeared, one of the most interesting being the "shift of 
opinion" ballot by Woodward and Millson.402 Designed to 
replace the formal decision of a judge, this approach 
sought rather to assess the effect of debating in terms of 
a change in audience response. Recognizing that "audience 
opinion is an elusive thing,"404 Woodward attempted to
401Ibid., pp. 432-33.
402Henry C. Klingbeil, "Debate or Politics?" 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (April, 1928), 222.
4^Millson adapted Woodward's "shift-of-opinion"
evaluative procedure to the symposium. See William Millson,
"Audience-Reaction to Symposium," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XXI (February, 1935), 51-52. Monroe, m  turn,
investigated the statistical reliability and validity of
Millson's approach. See Alan H. Monroe, "The Statistical
Reliability and Validity of the Shift-of-Opinion Ballot,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIII (December, 1937), 577-85.
404Howard S. Woodward, "Measurement and Analysis
of Audience Opinion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV
(February, 1928), 94.
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construct a scientific, statistical approach to judging.40  ̂
His scheme4®** follows:
TO THE AUDIENCE
The debaters will 
appreciate your interest and 
help if you will, both before
Date
Place
This blank is filled by a 
I 1 man 1 1 woman, 
whose age is
and after the debate, indi­
cate on this sheet your 
PERSONAL OPINION on the IDEA 
PROPOSED FOR DEBATE.
Soon as the debate is 
finished, opportunity will 
be given you to question the 
debaters on any matters that 
pertain to the question
AFTER THE DEBATE
I have heard the entire 
discussion and now
| | I believe more strongly 
in the affirmative of 
the resolution than I 
did.
| | I believe in the 
affirmative of the 
resolution.
1 | I am undecided.
| | I believe in the nega­
tive of the resolution.
! |; I believe more strongly 
in the negative of the 
resolution than I did.
__ BEFORE THE DEBATE
|_| I believe in the
affirmative of the reso­
lution to be debated
1 |I am undecided
1 |I believe in the negative 
of the resolution to be 
debated.
THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION 
ARE:
THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION 
ARE:
40 5He designed his form, moreover, "to require a 
minimum of oral persuasion by the management and of activity 
by the audience." Ibid., pp. 95-96. The audience gets all 
its information about the debate from a distributed 
program.
406Ibid., p. 109.
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Summary
"Middle period" writers developed a fairly consist­
ent and generally acceptable approach to and theory of 
argumentation and debate. Philosophically, argumentation 
questioned the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and relied 
on a total rhetorical approach which emphasized the 
audience. It treated discussion, moreover, as a part of 
problem-solving and stressed the importance of discussion 
and debate to a democratic society.
The analysis of a proposition closely followed the 
system set forth by traditional theory. Stock issues, 
however, came to the forefront; chapters on research became 
more prominent; and case appeared as a construct clearly 
separated from the brief.
Though proof generally followed "early period" 
prescriptions, attention shifted to the relation of evi­
dence to reasoning, with detailed listings of kinds, 
characteristics, and tests of evidence. Reasoning in 
terms of logical validity continued to rely on the clas­
sical syllogism and Mills's system of induction.
The forensic itself also generated a degree of 
controversy during the "middle period." Though justifying 
debating in terms of educational values, writers failed to 
agree on its immediate goals; i.e., the discovery of truth 
versus the development of skills. That "epidemic" of 
debating, the debate tournament, with its emphasis on
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winning a decision (whether audience, juryman, or critic) 
intensified the problem. Numerous "plans" for academic 
debating appeared with format determined or at least 
influenced by one's predispositions about criteria for 
judgment. Underlying these issues lay broad, philosophical 
questions which harkened back to one's view of the nature 
and end of debate. The Wells-0'Neill discussions repre­
sented that controversy at its peak.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPORARY THEORY— c. 1955-1970
Building on traditional concepts, "middle period" 
writers had amassed a well-developed and widely accepted 
body of argumentation and debate theory.^- Their influence, 
moreover, did not terminate with the advent of more con­
temporary works. On the contrary, many texts written 
during the immediate period, though updating examples and
psychology, have simply extended "middle period" generali-
2zations. During the decade of the 1950's, however, some 
writers began to propose new directions for argumentation 
and debate theory. It is with these developments that this 
chapter is primarily concerned.
Though demanding a re-examination of philosophical 
bases and offering some new prescriptions, particularly in 
the area of proof, contemporary works have not rejected
■'"A cursory examination of basic public speaking 
texts indicates that many theoretical innovations appeared 
first in argumentation and debate texts and then were 
transferred to general rhetorical theory.
2See, for example, Glenn R. Capp and Thelma R.
Capp, Principles of Argumentation and Debate (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Robert B.
Huber, Influencing through Argument (New York: David McKay
Company, Inc., 1963).
240
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much traditional theory. Neither have they belaboured it. 
Assuming rather its value, many have shifted (or perhaps 
reverted) in emphasis to a redefinition of argumentation 
primarily in terms of proving a proposition, usually for
3a critic judge in a tournament situation. Arthur Kruger's 
Modern Debate represented the advance guard of such a 
position.^ Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede's innova­
tive text, Decision by Debate, took, however, an opposite 
tack.5 Much splintering of theory has occurred in critical 
essays published in books of readings in argumentation and 
debate,5 differences serving to reopen certain philosoph­
ical questions critical to "early period" writers.
The O'Neill tradition, true to form, has analyzed, 
synthesized, and attempted to bring a degree of order into 
contemporary theory. Much as O'Neill's 1917 revision of 
Argumentation and Debate had crystallized traditional con­
cepts and presaged new developments in theory, James H. 
McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills's
3Exceptions include Douglas Ehninger and Wayne 
Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead, and
Company, 1963).
4Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate: Its Logic and
Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960).
^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate.
£See, for example, Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. 
Nilsen, eds., Perspectives on Argumentation (Chicago:
Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966); Jerry M. Anderson and 
Paul F. Dovre, eds., Readings in Argumentation (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968).
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Argumentation and Debate linked the "middle" and "contempo­
rary" periods.  ̂ McBurney and Mills's 1964 revision marked
Othe end of that transition, Mills's subsequent works ven­
turing further from the relative security of traditional 
constructs. Mills set out clearly his predispositions
9toward argumentation m  Reason m  Controversy, published 
the same year as the revision of Argumentation and Debate 
with McBurney. Though Mills's second edition rejected cer­
tain of the assumptions of the earlier work, it included 
more tightly structured, well-reasoned defenses of the 
author's theoretical positions and brought under one cover 
what is probably the most comprehensive and precise analysis 
of contemporary argumentation and debate theory available.1®
7James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. 
Mills, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free
Society (New York: Macmillan Company, 1951).
gJames H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation 
and Debate; Techniques of a Free Society (2d ed.;
New York: Macmillan Company, 1964).
9Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy: An Intro­
duction to General Argumentation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
Inc., 1964).
10Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy: An Intro­
duction to General Argumentation (2d ed.; Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1968). Another widely used contemporary 
text is Austin J. Freeley's Argumentation and Debate.
Though well-written and comprehensive, the two editions 
applicable to this study add little to the development of 
theory, Freeley's major contributions being pedagogical 
rather than theoretical. Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation 
and Debate: Rational Decision-Making (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1961); (2d ed.; Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1966). The third
edition (19 71) is outside the scope of this particular 
study.
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In 1964, in a critical review of three new works 
in argumentation and debate, Forbes I. Hill summarized 
contemporary textbook approaches as follows:
Any argumentation book that is going to 
have a market is plagued with finding some 
relationship to the highly structured advocacy 
of intercollegiate debate. There are three 
possible approaches to this relationship: one
may write a book for the intercollegiate con­
testant which attempts to generalize its pre­
cepts of debating to significant real-life 
situations, or one may write a book about 
advocacy in real-life situations which works 
in just enough commentary about school debate 
to be usable to teach contestants, or one may 
write a book that is frankly a handbook for 
school debaters and leave it largely to trust 
that they will later transfer what they have 
learned to real-life situations. H
The Nature of Argumentation
Contemporary theorists have been no more successful
than their predecessors in determining a universally
12acceptable view of the nature of argumentation. James H. 
McBath's analysis pointed up, and Mills's discussion 
clarified, the diversity of modern approaches. Whereas 
McBath topically treated critical deliberation, persuasive 
argumentation, argumentation as a means of achieving 
assent, the social responsibility of the inquirer-advocate,
11Forbes I. Hill, "New Books in Review," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, L (October, 1964), 338.
■̂2See William S. Smith, "What Are the Principles 
of Argument," Speech Teacher, II (March, 1953), 134-38.
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13and argumentation as an instrument of inquiry, Mills 
examined argumentation as: a form of discourse (examining
its rhetorical roots, i.e., grammatical composition); a 
critical apparatus (involving concepts of probability, 
presumption, burden of proof, burden of rebuttal, analysis, 
evidence, et cetera); an academic discipline ("a branch 
of communication theory which deals with the analysis, 
synthesis, and criticism of primarily reasoned discourse 
about controversial ideas").^ Mills's second edition 
gave "more attention . . .  to definitions of basic concepts 
such as argumentation, debate, and proof.
Despite a lack of continuity in contemporary 
texts, a common interest has persisted in the methods 
and ends appropriate to argumentation and/or debate and, 
secondarily, in the relation of argumentation to other 
subjects, much less emphasis being attached to "defini­
tions." Many writers, moreover, have precisely set 
out their assumptions and premises. An examination
13James H. McBath, "Introduction to Argument," 
in Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices,
ed. by James H. McBath (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1963), pp. 4-6.
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., pp. 3-4. 
Mills suggested further that "the principles of this 
subject are applied in order to discover the proof 
requirements of an assertion or to make a case for or 
against an assertion," p. 6.
•^Ibid., 1968 rev. ed., p. v.
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of certain of these bases reveals much about contemporary 
perceptions of the nature of argument.
Assumptions and Premises
As the Baker, Collins and Morris, Baird, and Ewbank 
16and Auer texts attest, proponents of "new" approaches
often have taken great pains to develop and/or explicate
17justificatory rationale. The contemporary period repre­
sents an intensification of that trend, particularly in
18terms of the humanistic tradition. Its writers have 
built on "middle period" generalizations regarding the role 
of reasoned discourse in a democratic society. They have 
also emphasized the worth of argumentation in individual 
decision-making.
George Pierce Baker, Principles of Argumentation 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1895); George R. Collins and
John S. Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1927); A. Craig Baird,Public Discussion and 
Debate (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928); A. Craig Baird,
Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, inc., 1950); Henry L. Ewbank and 
J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate: Tools of a Democ­
racy (New York: S. Crofts and Company, Inc., 19 41) ;
(rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951).
^The preceding chapter pointed out that Collins 
and Morris followed closely Woolbert's hypotheses, while 
Baird and Auer worked out in journal articles basic 
philosophical distinctions.
18Mills suggested that: "Argumentation qualifies
as humanistic for four reasons: Man in general is an
arguing creature; as a means of social control, argumenta­
tion provides a freedom of choice which commands, threats, 
and brainwashing do not; nonargumentative procedures bypass 
the individual; a completely closed mind shuts one off from 
the human race." Mills, Reason in Controversy, 19 68 rev. 
ed., p. 7.
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McBurney suggested in the 1951 revision of 
Argumentation and Debate that "the study and practice of 
argumentation and debate involve four basic assumptions 
which merit careful consideration": propositions can be
proved; truth, justice, and wisdom are more powerful than 
their opposites; rational decisions are preferred; and 
emotional reactions are more easily enlisted in intel-
i glectually defensible causes. He reiterated these posi- 
20tions in 1964. Mills's Reason m  Controversy modified 
McBurney1s notions and called them assumptions relevant to 
the social context of argumentation. Mills's listing 
follows: a case can be made for either side of a contro­
versial judgment; "truth and justice are by nature more 
powerful than their opposites"; deliberative decisions are 
preferable to emotional reactions, impulsive snap judg­
ments, and trial-and-error procedures; and affective 
appeals work best when they supplement logical ones.
Mills went further to distinguish "some essential attitudes 
and beliefs" relevant to argumentation in general educa­
tion: free competition among ideas facilitating an honest
search for wise conclusions; tolerance and objectivity
19McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, pp. 10-11. McBurney was responsible for this 
chapter.
20McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,
pp. 14-15.
21Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,
pp. 12-13.
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toward opposing ideas; the constructive value of disagree­
ment; and a "reasonable confidence" in one's ability to 
22think. Mills retained these categories m  his 1968
. • 23revision.
McBath, editor of the 1963 revision of the Tau 
Kappa Alpha sponsored Argumentation and Debate, similarly 
had suggested that "underpinning argumentation and debate 
are four cardinal assumptions or premises that give direc­
tion to our study": that choices are inevitable in group
and individual life; that responsible group and personal 
decisions will be respected; that citizens must enjoy 
freedom to test and verify their ideas; and that belief 
has intellectual-emotional bases.2  ̂ Within the framework 
of these expressed assumptions as well as those implied 
elsewhere, contemporary writers have identified specific 
methods and goals for argumentation.
The Methods and Ends of Argument
Central to an understanding of contemporary notions 
about the ends and methods of argumentation is a recogni­
tion of two diverse, though not always mutually exclusive,
22Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 7-10. Mills added Ehninger's limitations of contro­
versy. See Douglas Ehninger, "Debate as Method: Limita­
tions and Values," Speech Teacher, XV (September, 19 66), 
180-85.
24McBath, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 4-6.
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viewpoints from which texts have approached the subject.
One branch of theory perceives debate to be a vehicle for 
the making of rational choices; the other holds that it is 
a process by which one defends or advocates a point of 
view. The first circumscribes a broad context for prac­
tical argumentation. The second attends to one species, 
academic debate. The terms inquiry and decision are keys 
to an understanding of the first approach; advocacy, logic, 
and strategy are keys to the second.
The roots of the inquiry-advocacy contradistinction 
go back at least as far as Whately's Elements of Rhetoric. 
The Archbishop had written:
Reasoning may be considered as applicable 
to two purposes . . . the ascertainment of the 
truth by investigation [inquiry] and the 
establishment of it to the satisfaction of 
another [proof]. . . .  The process of investi­
gation “must be supposed completed, and certain 
conclusions arrived at by that process, before 
he [the advocate] begins to . , . prove the
justness of those conclusions.^
The introduction of discussion theory into argumentation 
during the "middle period" reinforced that assessment.
Contemporary texts have retained Whately's correla­
tion of method with purpose. While the advocacy-proof
25Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. by 
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale! Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1963), p. 5. In quoting Whately's distinctions, 
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills included the terms inquiry and 
proof in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, 1951 rev. ed., p. 7.
^See particularly Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and
Debate.
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relationship has remained substantially the same, writers
have tended to define the end of inquiry in terms of
27"decision" rather than "truth." Though Mills, among 
28others, does not believe inquiry and advocacy to be
"strictly dichotomous," the tendency has persisted in some
29quarters to treat them as such. Maurice Natanson carried 
the differences probably as far as anyone when he suggested 
that philosophical argumentation is a form of inquiry,
onwhile rhetorical argumentation is a form of persuasion. u
Inquiry—»Decision-Making
Ewbank and Auer were probably the first to apply 
the term decision in terms of goal unquestionably and
27Bertrand Russell suggested that John Dewey's 
"most distinctive philosophical doctrine" was "the substi­
tution of 'inquiry' for 'truth' as the fundamental concept 
of logic and theory of knowledge." Bertrand Russell,
A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 19 45) , p. 819. See John Dewey, The School and 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899) .
28Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
p. 31. Mills recognized "four conceptions of the relation­
ships among debate, inquiry, and advocacy . . .  in the 
literature: (1) Debate is investigation (inquiry), not
propagation. (2) Debate is both inquiry and advocacy.
(3) Advocacy, including debate, is essentially unlike 
inquiry. (4) Debate and discussion (a form of inquiry) are 
complementary processes whose differences can be visualized 
on several continua," p. 29. Such positions indicate a 
vast "middle ground" between the polar positions.
29See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate; 
Kruger, Modern Debate.
^See Maurice Natanson, "Rhetoric and Philosophical 
Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVIII 
(February, 1962), 24-30.
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31emphatically to debate. The association gained currency, 
moreover, with the publication in 1955 of Oral Decision- 
Making by Braden and Brandenburg. Ehninger used the
33phrase, "decision by debate," in a 1959 journal article 
and carried it into the title of his text co-authored with 
Brockriede four years later.
Whereas Braden and Brandenburg had related inquiry 
to discussion and advocacy to debate,Ehninger and 
Brockriede viewed debate primarily as a critical instrument
O Cof inquiry applicable to everyday life. Both determined
31Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed.,
pp. 4-5.
32Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg, Oral 
Decision-Making: Principles of Discussion and Debate
(New York: Harper and Sons, 1955).
33Douglas Ehninger, "Decision by Debate: A
Re-examination," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (October, 
1959), 282-87.
34Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making,
p . 10.
35The first three of the "ten principles" reflected 
in Decision by Debate substantiate the pervasiveness of 
this view: "Tl Debate as a method of decision provides
for the rigorous examination and testing of pertinent data 
and inferences through the give-and-take of informed con­
troversy. Hence, properly employed, it is a means for 
arriving at judgments that are reflective and decisions 
that are critical. 2. A debater is not a propagator who 
seeks to win unqualified acceptance for a predetermined 
point of view while defeating an opposing view. Rather, 
when he places himself in the highest tradition of debate, 
he is an investigator who co-operates with fellow investi­
gators in searching out the truth or in selecting that 
course of common action which seems best for all concerned, 
debaters and public alike. 3. Debate is not limited to a
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inquiry to be a method of decision-making, Ehninger and 
Brockriede's assessment harkening back to earlier posi­
tions. In "Decision by Debate: A Re-Examination,"
Ehninger had contended:
If we will examine its [debate's] rationale 
afresh, and without predisposition or preju­
dice, we will see (1) that the end and method 
of debate are critical, (2) that debate is of 
the genre of investigation rather than per­
suasion, and (3) that debate is a cooperative 
rather than a competitive enterprise.̂ 6
Though certain other writers have recognized that 
argumentation does involve inquiry, none have determined 
for it as pervasive a role as Ehninger and Brockriede.
Mills, for example, differentiated academic debate from 
debate as an analytical-critical instrument but preferred 
to view the discipline within the former context. Freeley 
included the term, rational decision-making, in the title 
of his text, but his own approach leaned more toward
q n"educational" than "substantive" debate. That species of
*3 qargumentation, academic debate, employing the method of
particular mode of discourse. It is a generic species of 
deliberation, the principles and procedures of which are 
applicable to informed, responsible controversy however and 
wherever it may take place." Ehninger and Brockriede, 
Decision by Debate, p. vii.
36Ehninger, "Decision by Debate: A Re-Examination,"
p. 282.
37See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev. 
ed., Ch. II, for a discussion of the terms.
38In his first edition of Reason in Controversy, 
Mills suggested that "it is a mistake to treat argumenta­
tion and debate as synonyms, because the former is the
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advocacy with a view toward "proving" a "case," became for 
many authors the primary, if not sole,concern.
Advocacy— >-Proof of One' s Case
Kruger's publication of Modern Debate; Its Logic 
and Strategy in 1960, one of the first texts dedicated to
the primacy of advocacy in argumentation, raised an imme-
39diate furor. Rejecting as essential the total rhetorical
40construct demanded by "middle period" writers, Kruger 
emphasized analysis, case construction, proof, attack 
and defense.
Though many contemporary writers have agreed with
41Kruger's predisposition favoring academic debate, few—
theoretical field or the body of principles, while the 
latter is a specialized application of the former." Mills, 
Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 7. His attempt to 
distinguish the terms more clearly in his revised edition 
by treating them in separate sections as major headings 
resulted in much repetition, and failed to add significant 
clarity to the concepts. See also McBath, Argumentation 
and Debate, pp. 6-7.
39See, for example, the inherency argument dis­
cussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.
^Kruger contended: "Perhaps the most common mis­
conception of academic debate is that it is primarily 
training in mass persuasion by means of effective 
delivery." Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 4. He also rejected 
the notion that debate should be taught as "effective 
public speaking," pp. 3-4.
^Many "practical" texts offering realistic 
formulae for the winning of tournament decisions have 
appeared. This kind of "practical" book had also appeared 
during the "middle period." See, for example, George McCoy 
Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules and Strategy
(New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945). The point is
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Mills being representative— have been willing to discount 
traditional concepts. Though pointing to "the newer 
emphasis upon a less specialized treatment of the subject" 
in his second edition of Reason in Controversy/ Mills's 
own definitions and prescriptions suggested less diversity 
in the scope of argumentation. He recognized, for example, 
such topics as "explanation, ethos, motivation, composi­
tion, and delivery . . .  as secondary rather than main 
concepts" and preferred to view argumentation as "an 
academic discipline which deals with the analysis, 
synthesis, and criticism of predominantly reasoned dis­
course on controversial i d e a s . " H e  did not, however, 
reject the "secondary" concepts as irrelevant. Consistent 
with Mills's definition was his delineation of the "core 
concepts of argumentation: proof requirements of a thesis,
that contemporary books stressing such a view have found 
a greater degree of acceptability than certain of their 
predecessors'.
42Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
p. 26. This definition did not clarify the end of advocacy 
as had the McBurney-Mills statement: "A method of analysis
and reasoning designed to provide acceptable bases for 
belief and action." McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 82. They had suggested that "the basic princi- 
ples of argumentation have a wide application in both dis­
cussion and debate," pp. 79-83. Ehninger and Brockriede 
were forced to admit that "while the ultimate goal of the 
philosopher may be to exhibit relationships among ideas 
per se, the ultimate goal of the debater is to use ideas 
as proofs for influencing the beliefs of listeners or 
readers." A commitment to a total view of persuasion led 
them to insist that "a knowledge of how belief functions 
is . . .  an essential part of the debater's study."
Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. viii.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 5 4
propositions, analysis, investigation, evidence, reasoning, 
cases, attack and defense, cross-examination, and evalua-
A Otion." Such a departure from the persuasion dominated 
approach imposed by writers of the "middle period" marked 
almost a full circle return to the primacy of reason, if 
not logic, in argumentation theory.
Persuasion and Argumentation 
The renewed emphasis on "logic and strategy" as the 
appropriate methods for establishing a proposition had the 
practical effect of reviving, or perhaps extending, the 
conviction-persuasion controversy. Observing various con­
temporary views toward this "vexed" question, Mills 
suggested that "the answers span a continuum including
separateness, part-to-whole relationships, and over-
44 .lapping." Mills's distinctions constitute the basis
for the following discussion.
Mills contended that the conviction-persuasion
"dichotomizers have not been vanquished," citing the thesis
that:
To convince . . . implies no risk of the self; 
it is manipulation without commitment. To 
persuade, however, does risk the self and does 
imply commitment. 5
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 25-26.
^^Ibid., pp. 18-21.
4 cIbid., p. 20. See Maurice Natanson and Henry V. 
Johnstone, Jr., eds., Philosophy, Rhetoric, and
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Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings' position appeared to
be similar. "Argumentation," they said, "does not seek to
46persuade anybody of anything." Though suggesting that it
"functions to discover and formulate the requirements of
proof for a proposition or a conclusion,1 the authors
recognized, nonetheless, that the advocate uses the results
of his investigation, along with psychological proofs, to
persuade.'*7 In light of the latter distinction, Mills
contended that "viewed in a broader context than a single
page, it [the Windes-Hastings position] comes close to
saying that argumentation is the logos . . .  of 
4 8persuasion." Mills placed the Huber and the Freeley
49texts near Windes and Hastings on his continuum.
Mills further observed a trend toward treating 
argumentation and persuasion as "coordinate terms," citing 
particularly Walter R. Fisher and Edward M. Sayles who 
concluded:
Argumentation (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univer­
sity Press, 1965).
46Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumenta­
tion and Advocacy (New York: Random House, Inc.'J 1965) ,
p. 24.
^7Ibid. See also pp. 207, 235.
4 RMills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 18.
49Ibid.; see Huber, Influencing Through Argument, 
pp. 4-6; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev. ed., 
pp. 2, 7.
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Taken in its whole scope, the study of 
argumentation aids one in the discovery of 
the most reasonable position to take in 
regard to controversial problems, and it 
enables one reasonably to attack, to defend, 
or to extend his beliefs among men. ®
Mills summarized Gary Cronkhite's explanation, moreover,
which initially set out a coordinate relationship but
ultimately resorted to a part-to-whole approach as
follows:
According to this theory, persuasion 
involves relating a proposition ("object 
concept") to a stable attitude ("motiva­
tional concept") by means of a logical 
argument ("concept association"), and this 
linkage "must be evaluated from the point 
of view of the audience rather than from 
that of the critic."51
In Mills's view, "it is but a short step, so to speak, to
the implication that argumentation is mainly concerned
with persuasion."52 As a subsequent section suggests,
s n Walter R. Fisher and Edward M. Sayles, "The 
Nature and Functions of Argument," in Perspectives on 
Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. Nilsen 
(Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966), p. 20; see
also pp. 3-4.
^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
p. 19. See Gary L. Cronkhite, “Logic, Emotion, and the 
Paradigm of Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, L 
(February, 1964), 13-18.
52Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
p. 19. Here Mills cited Ehninger and Brockriede's con­
tention that "the concept of proof is meaningless when 
divorced from the person to whom the proof is offered," 
proof being "the process of securing belief in one 
statement by relating it to another statement already 
believed." Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
pp. 99, 201-203.
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Gerald R. Miller approached this position with his
53behavioral perspective of evidence.
Mills preferred a third, "overlapping," approach
54and applied that label to his own system. He cited
McBath's analysis in the revised edition of Tau Kappa
Alpha's Argumentation and Debate^  and pointed to the
drift between the 1951 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills'^
57and the 1964 McBurney and Mills editions of Argumenta­
tion and Debate. In his first edition of Reason in
Controversy, Mills had made this distinction:
Debate, which is an applied form of 
argumentation, differs from persuasion in at 
least one important respect; it requires com­
petition between rival ideas, while persuasion 
may mean one-sided advocacy which typically 
avoids deliberative thinking by the listeners 
or readers. Thus persuasion can become 
propaganda, but debate cannot. 8
In the 1968 revision, he said:
Gerald R. Miller, "Evidence and Argument," in 
Perspectives on Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and 
Thomas R. Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company,
1966), pp. 24-47.
54Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 21.
55McBath, "Introduction to Argument," p. 8.
5^McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 1.
57McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and Debate,
p. 1.
^8Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 8.
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Our professional usage has for academic pur­
poses narrowed the concept of argumentation 
to that part of persuasive communication in 
which reasoned discourse is the principal 
form of support. This definition in no way 
denies or deplores the occurrence of emotional 
and personal proofs in advocacy/ but it does 
imply the existence of a method for placing 
such proofs in a logical framework to give 
them some semblance of rigor. Thus we explain 
that argumentation is the form of discourse 
used in solving problems with a deliberative 
method.59
Reason in Controversy "treats popular persuasion as a 
peripheral matter . . . but it reinstates to a central 
position some principles of dialectic, the long-neglected 
method of argument.
Mills summarized the theoretical implications "of
the most familiar definitions" as follows:
Since argumentation serves analytical and 
critical functions which are not used to 
effect persuasion, and since . . . argumenta­
tion has derived its principles from dialectic 
and logic as well as rhetoric, it seems proper 
to conclude that the process called argumenta­
tion is more than a logical part of persuasion.
In fact, if argumentation were defined as per­
suasion, its so-called logic would have to be 
judged in terms of its persuasive effect instead 
of some external standard of reasonableness.
But when argumentation is taken to be a kind of 
science of proof, it can be used to test the 
reasoning in a persuasive communication, 
because . . .  it embodies more or less objec­
tive standards of critical analysis. 1
Mills's analysis pointed up, moreover, widely disputed
9̂Ibid., 1968 rev. ed., p. 15.
60Ibid., p. 22.
61Ibid., p. 21.
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issues of the contemporary period, answers to which 
determined one's view of the nature of argumentation.
Analysis
In their introduction to a section on analysis in 
Readings in Argumentation, Jerry Anderson and Paul Dovre 
editorialized:
The quality of a controversy is contingent 
upon how well the disputants understand, or 
analyze, the propositions in question. Analy­
sis of a proposition requires knowledge about 
the causes of the controversy, the history of 
the dispute, the specific meaning of the 
proposition, and the areas of agreement and 
difference between the disputants. The process 
of analysis involves all of these matters, but 
it culminates in discovery of the issues which 
are crucial in resolving the dispute.62
Though Ehninger and Brockriede and Mills have detailed the
traditional elements outlined by Anderson and Dovre, for
most writers, the critical questions of analysis have been
defining terms and isolating issues. Ronald F. Reid put
it this way:
Even if a debate proposition is well 
phrased and contains only one central idea,
6 2Anderson and Dovre, Readings in Argumentation,
p. 123.
6 3Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
p. 211; Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 91-9 5. Many writers, moreover, have not neglected 
sources, functions, wording, selection, and nature of 
propositions, the main areas of interest being kinds of 
propositions. With the exception of the latter category-- 
which is examined elsewhere— most treatments of the propo­
sition follow "early" and "middle period" texts. For an 
interesting exception, see D. W. Shepard, "Logical Proposi­
tions and Debate Resolutions," Central States Speech 
Journal, XI (Spring, 1960), 186-90.
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the inherently ambiguous nature of language 
and the general nature of debate propositions 
require that analysis of debate resolutions 
consist of (1) analysis of the language of 
the proposition and (2) analysis of the 
relevant subordinate propositions. ^
Definition
"Analysis of the language of a proposition," for 
Reid, involved "finding definitions for the words and 
phrases within the proposition."^ Reid considered a 
"reasonable definition," moreover, to be "not only spe­
cific and clear-cut but also . . . commonly accepted in 
light of the present social context of a debate proposi­
tion."^ Kruger added the "complete context— social,
g
political, economic, and historical as well as verbal," 
along with the criterion, equivalence, meaning "that a
64Ronald F. Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," 
in Argumentation and Debate, ed. by James H. McBath 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1963),
p. 67.
6 5Ibid. Recognizing the problems raised by faulty 
definitions, several writers examined the handling of an 
opponent's definition. According to Freeley, "Two methods 
are available to the advocates confronted with an unusual 
definition: (1) They may demonstrate, by using the methods
of defining terms already discussed, that their definition 
of terms is a more reasonable one than that of their 
opponents. (2) They may accept the definition of terms 
offered by their opposition and proceed to attack the case 
presented by their opposition." Freeley, Argumentation and 
Debate, 1961 ed., p. 29. Freeley noted, moreover, several 
problems of the stipulated definition.
^Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 55.
6 7Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 24.
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logical definition must be neither too broad nor too 
narrow."68
Most contemporary texts include specific methods 
and sources of definition similar to lists compiled by 
"early" and "middle period" writers.88 Ehninger and 
Brockriede introduced probably the most distinctive method 
which they set out as follows:
To select the best method of definition 
for any given term, the debater will do well 
to consider how that term may be most clearly, 
authoritatively, and objectively defined 
within the context of the proposition.
Although no formula exists, definition by 
classification may best set the scope of the 
proposition, definition by necessary condi­
tions may best establish criteria, and defini­
tion by operational description may best define 
the proposal embodied in the proposition. ®
C OIbid., p. 25. Kruger presented the following 
outline for obtaining logical definitions: "1. What is 
the new policy? 2. What type of policy is it? How does 
it relate to the status quo? 3. What is the key term, or 
essential feature, of the new policy? What is lacking at 
present? 4. What does the key term mean? a. What are 
the common objectives of the new and present policies? 
b. How does the essential feature of the status quo com­
pare with that of the new policy? c. How has the key term 
been interpreted by professors, textbooks, debate hand­
books, publicists, public officials, special dictionaries, 
and other assorted experts? What is the underlying context 
of the question? 5. Do any other terms require clarifica­
tion? 6. How should the definitions be expressed?" p. 28.
See, for example, Freeley, Argumentation and 
Debate, 1961 ed., pp. 27-29; Reid, "Analysis of the Propo­
sition," p. 56. An interest also continued in the use of 
the word should in propositions of policy. See Kruger, 
Modern Debate, p. 27; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 
1961 ed., p. 32.
^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
p. 217 (italics mine).
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Issues
The second major step in analyzing a debate 
proposition involved, for most writers, the "analysis of 
the subordinate propositions which must be demonstrated 
in order to demonstrate the truth of the general proposi­
tion."^ Whereas "early period" analyses had depended on
72the clash in opinion provided by the brief, most con­
temporary writers have mimed "middle period" stock issues 
approaches. Walter F. Terris pointed out that early 
writers had divided propositions according to the motive 
of the speaker, whereas later writers classified according
to the nature of the dispute, a procedure which gave rise
73to stock issues analyses. Terris suggested a further 
relationship between issues and the classification of 
propositions when he said: "After we have classified a
proposition we ought to be able to predict what sort of
71Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 54.
7 2 •Though most contemporary texts include material
on research and several include the brief, most do not 
emphasize the critical relationship of these elements to 
analysis as did most "middle period" texts. For a discus­
sion of differing philosophies of briefing, see William A. 
Behl, "A New Look at the Debate Brief," Speech Teacher, X 
(September, 1961), 189-93.
"̂ ■̂ Walter F. Terris, "The Classification of the 
Argumentative Proposition," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
XLIX (October, 1963) , 266-731 See Hal Howard, "Forum, *' and 
Walter F. Terris, "Author's Rejoinder," in Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, L (February, 1964), 75-77. Howard, 
"Forum," pp. 75-76; Terris, "Author's Rejoinder," 
pp. 76-77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 3
treatment will best develop its argumentative potential."^4 
A general, though not total, acceptance of this view 
suggests a need for attention to contemporary modes of 
classifying propositions.
Classification of Propositions
Writing in 1963, Terris observed that "the tri­
partite scheme of classification of fact, value and policy
has held stable though not unchallenged for the last
7 Rtwenty-five years." This is not to say that writers have
not modified these traditional categories. Ehninger and
Brockriede, for example, added a fourth classification, the
proposition of definition.̂  Kruger included propositions
of explanation, value, and policy and distinguished between
77propositions of past, present, and future fact.
In addition to expanding existing categories, a 
trend toward combining fact and value distinctions 
developed. Citing Freeley's handling of propositions of
74Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition," p. 267. See, however, Gary L. Cronkhite, 
"Propositions of Past and Future Fact and Value: A Pro­
posed Classification," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, III (January, 1966), 11-16.
^Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition," p. 269.
7 6Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
p. 219. Ehninger and Brockriede applied the following 
terms both to issues and to claims: definitive (defini­
tion) ; designative (fact); evaluative (value); and 
actuative (policy), pp. 218-28.
77Kruger, Modern Debate, pp. 15-16.
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value and fact "similarly," Terris questioned the
"justification for calling them by different names or dis-
7 8tinguishing each of them from a proposition of policy."'0
Concluding that "the fact-value distinction depends . . .
not on the wording or form of the proposition but rather on
79the type of evidence that must be used to prove it,"
Terris proposed that propositions of fact and value be
80classified as "propositions of judgment. ° He retained
"propositions of policy" as a separate class.
In the first edition of Reason in Controversy,
Mills, like Terris, kept the policy classification and
puc the remaining "kinds" into a single category which he
81called "propositions of definition and classification."
The latter division included as subtypes legal fact, past 
fact, present fact, prediction, and value. Mills justified 
"grouping factual claims and evaluative claims under one 
heading because of their similarity in relation to 
analysis" and because "we can sometimes, but not always,
78Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition," p. 270. Bruce Gronbeck treated the 
"valuative premise" as "intermediate between 'fact' and 
'advice.'" Bruce Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought': 
Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal,
XIX (Spring, 1968), 38.
^ Ibid. , p. 273.
80For a refutation of Terris' analysis, see 
Cronkhite, "Proposition of Past and Future Fact and Value," 
p. 12.
81Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,
pp. 43-45.
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distinguish between statements of fact and statements of 
evaluation."82
Though Windes and Hastings also subsumed under one 
heading fact and value propositions, their rationale for 
and labeling of classes suggests a position reminiscent of 
"early period" concerns with speaker motives. Though 
recognizing a relationship between classification and the 
determination of issues inherent in a proposition, Windes 
and Hastings categorized propositions for advocacy accord­
ing to "the behavioral response desired by an affirma- 
8 3tive." Accordingly, they isolated propositions of belief
(description, establishing existence, and value judgments)
84and propositions of action, describing the "close rela­
tionship" between the classes as follows:
As a rule, belief represents readiness for 
action, and almost always, except in irrational 
situations, action is based on belief. The 
advocate must pass through propositions of 
belief so that he may reach propositions of 
action.
In addition to the preceding positions— an expand­
ing of the tripartite system of classification on the one 
hand and a merging of the fact-value classes on the other—  
one other contemporary approach toward classification may
82Ibid., p. 44.
8 3Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, 
p. 53. See, however, pp. 24-25.
84Ibid., pp. 53-55, 218-26.
85Ibid., p. 55.
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be identified; that is, an interest in fact and value
propositions to the exclusion of policy questions. As
86early as 1962, Gerald R. Miller, starting with the
8 7premises of Horace G. Rahskopf, set out a definitive
rationale for debating propositions of fact and value.
By 1966, he dismissed the proposition of policy as having
no distinguishing characteristics which set it 
apart from fact and value propositions; that 
is, I believe that if any meaningful argument 
is to occur, a policy proposition must be dis­
puted as either a proposition of fact or a 
proposition of value.
For Miller, "the key to the choice of a factual or
value orientation lies in the definition of the term
should."^
If should is defined in terms of means-ends 
interests . . . then the issue becomes one of 
fact, revolving around considerations of whether 
or not the stipulated ends would occur. If 
should is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical 
considerations . . . then the issue becomes one 
of value, revolving around the goodness or bad­
ness of these moral precepts.
Miller relied primarily on Gustav Bergman's 
philosophical distinctions between the kinds of
86Gerald R. Miller, "Questions of Fact and Value: 
Another Look," Southern Speech Journal, XXVIII (Winter, 
1962), 116-23.
87Horace G. Rahskopf, "Questions of Fact vs. Ques 
tions of Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII 
(February, 1932), 60-70.
®^Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 36.
90Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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propositions. Bergmann defined a statement of fact as 
one which "says something about the object or objects it
mentions; and depending only on the properties of these
91objects, . . .  is either true or false." Bergmann 
suggested further that:
A value judgment is misunderstood if it 
is taken to ascribe a property to the object, 
act, or situation it mentions in the same 
sense in which a statement of fact is such 
an ascription; it is, therefore, literally 
neither true nor false. What it involves and 
misleadingly states as the property of an 
object, act, or situation alone is the fact 
that this object, act, or situation causes in 
the one who makes the judgment a certain 
state of mind, say, for instance, of positive 
aesthetic appreciation or of moral a p p r o v a l . ^ 2
As Terris, Miller perceived a direct relation
9 3between kinds of propositions and evidential data. Gary
Cronkhite, on the other hand, rejected the notion that
proofs for different kinds of propositions "necessarily
9 4demand different types of evidence." Neither did he agree 
that one distinguishes propositions of fact and value for 
purposes of analysis, arguing rather that "the choice of 
a given type of proposition is a rhetorical device
91Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI (April, 
1951), 206.
92t, . ,Ibid.
93Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 30-37.
94Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact 
and Value," p. 13.
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designed to prepare the audience for a particular type of 
9 5argument."
Cronkhite's system of classification, called by 
one writer "the most noticeable deviation from the
Q Cnorm," divided propositions into past and future fact
and value. Cronkhite believed that his scheme "seems to
allow more freedom in moving from one type of proposition
to another and seems to yield at least two dimensions on
9 7which propositions may be narrowed." Though the first 
claim is open to question, within the second lies the 
distinctiveness of his approach. Cronkhite began with 
the judgmental dimension of classification. Interested 
primarily in listener agreement or disagreement, he 
differentiated objective (based on present sensory 
stimuli) and subjective (based on previous experience) 
judgments, dividing the latter category into beliefs (fact
Q Ojudgments) and attitudes (value judgments). ° Rephrasing 
Wagner's definitions in terms of this analysis, "a 
'belief' is a feeling about 'existence' or relationships 
of objects or events, while an 'attitude' is a feeling
9 6Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 77.
9 7Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact 
and Value," p. 11.
^®Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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99regarding the value of an object or an event," Cronkhite 
suggested that:
Propositions of fact and value are related 
. . .  in that the proposition of value may be 
validly (and effectively) supported by proof 
of the propositions of fact upon which it 
rests. A proposition of fact, however, may 
not be given valid support by proof of propo­
sitions of value, although a speaker may be 
forced to deal with audience values which 
prevent its acceptance. 00
The second dimension, temporal, allowed Cronkhite 
to integrate within the fact-value categories other 
approaches to classification. Traditional fact-value dis­
tinctions became past or present fact or value; policy 
propositions, future value; Mills's "prediction," future 
fact. Cronkhite believed that Ehninger and Brockriede's 
"propositions of definition" "can be resolved into either 
a proposition of fact or a proposition of policy."-^1
Stock Issues
102Though some contemporary writers have labeled 
"stock issues" for propositions of fact and value, most 
have limited them to policy questions. And, though the 
number of stock issues for propositions of policy varies 
from text to text, most writers have preferred a three-part
" ibid. , p. 13.
^•"ibid. , p. 14.
^°^Ibid., p. 11.
■^^See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed. 
and 1966 ed.
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approach, including need-plan-advantages, need-
1 0 3practicability-advantages, or a similar approach.
One of the most original systems in contemporary theory, 
that set out by Lee S. Hultz^n, isolates four "stock 
issues" (ill, blame, cure, and cost) and three "sub­
issues" (conjecture, definition, and quality).̂ -04 
Hultzen's much quoted analysis influenced argumentation 
and debate theory through such writers as Ehninger and 
Brockriede.
Though differences in systems of stock issues 
have not caused particular problems, the rationale for 
using standardized questions for various propositions has 
raised questions. One of the more severe critics, Robert 
P. Newman, attacked this "artificial and unwholesome 
burden" on three grounds: stock issues are based on a
scientific model inappropriate to the historical data of 
rhetoric; they confuse issues with procedure; and they 
de-emphasize the integrity of the subject-matter which one
•̂ •̂ See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
pp. 223-28; Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 105-107.
104Lee S. Hultzen, "Status in Deliberative 
Analysis," in The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. by Donald C.
Bryant (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958),
pp. 97-123. For a more traditional system, see Ray 
Nadeau, "Hermogenes on 'Stock Issues' in Deliberative 
Speaking," Speech Monographs, XXXV (March, 1958), 62.
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10 5uses, encouraging the charge of "sophistry." Newman
concluded:
This is indeed analysis purchased cheaply, 
a "quickie" procedure for dissecting thorny 
and intractable problems. But the real issues, 
the building blocks of argument, are discovered 
only by digging, hard . . . and the more skilled 
the rhetorician, the less willing he will be to 
rest content with issues provided by a formula. 6
Inherency
Though the notion of an integral relationship
between the issues and a proposition underlay "early
period" systems of analysis, and though the term inherent
has appeared in argumentation and debate literature since
107Baker's first edition of Principles of Argumentation, 
the consideration of inherency as an important theoretical
105Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues— A Study 
of Doctrine," Central States Speech Journal, XIII (Autumn,
1961), 43. For a reply, see Ray Nadeau, ^ n  Defense of 
Deliberative Stock Issues," Central States Speech Journal, 
XIII (Winter, 1962), 142.
10 fiNewman, "Analysis and Issues," p. 51.
•^^Having examined the central issue and the rela­
tion of the other issues to the main one, Baker contended: 
"This analysis . . . gives us the primary inherent struc­
ture in our material." Baker, Principles of Argumentation, 
p. 79. Subsequent authors related inherency to the need 
issue. Ewbank and Auer, for example, asked: "Are these 
weaknesses [those in the present system] inherent in the 
system?" Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., 
p. 430. See also Lionel Crocker, Argumentation and Debate 
(New York: American Book Company, 1944), pp. 4 8-49;
Luther W. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating 
(New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1949), p. 30; Baird, Argu­
mentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 314; William A. Behl, 
Discussion and Debate (New York: Ronald Press, 19 53),
p. 60.
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construct is a fairly recent phenomenon. Its most 
vociferous advocate, Kruger, held in Modern Debate that 
"proving that the status quo is inherently defective or 
defective beyond practical repair constitutes the affirma­
tive need."^9® Though recognizing that "an affirmative 
need not contend that it is the entire cause but rather 
an important part of the cause or an insurmountable 
obstacle to solving the problem," Kruger, nevertheless, 
believed that "equating the essential characteristic of 
the status quo with the cause of existing or potential 
evils . . .  is probably the most important phase of the 
affirmative case."^99 In a journal article three years 
later, Kruger restated his position:
Thus, it seems clear that the affirmative 
must first of all show that a serious problem 
exists. . . . Second, to avoid the fallacy of 
post hoc reasoning, it must demonstrate that 
the problem inheres in, or is caused by the 
existing policy. In other words, to demon­
strate inherency is simply to demonstrate a 
causal relationship.HO
From Kruger's definitions, one might conclude that
inherency involves the need issue in propositions of
policy, that it demonstrates causality, and that it implies
a restrictive view of the prima facie case, excluding, for
example, the comparative advantage alternative.
10 8Kruger, Modern Debate/ p. 41.
109Ibid., pp. 46-47.
•̂■'■̂ Arthur Kruger, "The Meaning of Inherency,"
Gavel, XLV (March, 1963), 46-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 7 3
Inherency and Need Issue
Contemporary writers have discussed inherency
primarily in terms of the need issue in propositions of
policy. Many, moreover, have linked inherency with the
"essential" characteristic of the status quo. Kruger, for
example, insisted that "in most debates the key point of
the need should be that of equating the cause of existing
evils with the essential characteristic of the status
quo."^^ Despite this predisposition toward the need
issue, Kruger, nevertheless, admitted that inherency "may
112also be considered in the area of impracticability."
Freeley suggested that "the need portion of the
case consists of arguments to establish the need for
changing the status quo because of its inherent disadvan-
113tages or weaknesses." Baird had implied a similar
position when he advised an affirmative to "show that . . .
111Ibid., p. 47.
112"When a debater argues . . . that there are 
insurmountable obstacles which would block the affirmative 
plan, the affirmative should endeavor to show that such 
obstacles are not inherently insurmountable and can thus be 
overcome." Ibid., p. 51. Kruger labeled the following 
"misconceptions1 of the need issue: the "comparative
advantage" need and the equating of need with unrelated 
existing evils. He found confusions, moreover, of the need 
with "need for affirmative plan," common objectives or 
goals, and the "not necessary" argument. Kruger, Modern 
Debate, pp. 41-44.
^"^Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed. ,
p. 167.
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1 1 4the defects are inherent in the system." Ehninger and
Brockriede defined inherency similarly to Kruger. "An 
affirmative debater must show that serious problems,
inherent in the present policy require a fundamental change
115of policy," they said. Reid's less stringent approach 
suggested that "inherency involves the question of whether 
the failure of a policy is related to the particular phase 
of the status quo which the debate resolution proposes to 
change."1'*'6 Reid described the analytical process to be 
"(1) determining precisely which phase(s) of the status quo 
the debate proposition proposes to change and (2) deter­
mining whether the existing problems are caused by, or at 
least related to, those specific phases of the 
status quo."
Such writers as Patrick 0. Marsh, on the other
hand, believed that "no mention need be made of the evils
118in the status quo." Marsh held that:
114Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate,
p. 314.
115 . .Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 241. They believed that the task of the debater "is to 
’locate1 rather than 'invent1 them [issues], because they 
inhere in the proposition itself and are there to be 
found," p. 218.
116Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 61.
117Ibid.
11 sPatrick 0. Marsh, "Is Debate Merely a Game for 
Conservative Players," Speaker and Gavel, I (January,
1964), 50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 7 5
All that can logically be demanded in demon­
strating a proposition of policy . . . are the 
following contentions:
1. We should adopt the best available policy 
(judicial notice).
2. These are the proper criteria for deter­
mining which policy is best.
3. The affirmative policy best meets these 
criteria.
Inherency and Causality
Warren C. Shaw tied inherency inextricably to
causality in 1922 when he suggested "that, if existing or
threatened evils . . . are to be removed, they must be
120traced to their root causes in the present policy."
Kruger emphasized this relationship when he concluded that
"inherency in a policy debate is synonymous with 
121causality." Ehninger and Brockriede implied a causal
relationship when they contended: "If the present policy
is not to blame for the problem, that problem is not
inherent in the present policy, and accordingly there is
122no need to change that policy." Such a position did
123not, however, meet with unqualified approbation.
120Warren C. Shaw, The Art of Debate (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1922), p. 161.
121Kruger, "Meaning of Inherency," p. 51.
122 .Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 225.
^•^See Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition,"
p. 61.
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The first major challenge came from Patrick 0. Marsh who 
argued:
To demand that the debater show causal 
relationships in every affirmative debate . . . 
cannot help but lead to superficial treatment 
of causality. This seems unwise especially 
since isolation of the cause is usually 
unnecessary. If a cause be defined as an 
event which either completes or breaks the 
chain of "necessary conditions" to bring about 
an affect (and this appears to me to be the 
most defensible definition), then it is unneces­
sary for the debater to isolate the one condi­
tion which completes or breaks the chain.124
Marsh relied, moreover, on Barzun and Graff's distinctions
between "causation that occurs in a chain of events of
125various kinds and causation within a closed system."
Marsh was not alone in his rejection of causal inherency. 
However, it was he who initially assumed the presumption 
or burden of proof (depending on one's point of view) in 
the controversy.
Marsh, "Is Debating a Game," p. 50. "In 
'comparative advantage' debating the criteria set forth 
by the affirmative should include the necessary conditions 
for achieving the desired end. The available policies 
will either meet the conditions or they will not, and some 
will meet them more advantageously than others. If this 
is what Kruger means by showing causal relationships, then 
he can have no quarrel with the comparative advantage case, 
for it is so contained. But if he demands showing the 
reason for the absence of certain necessary conditions, 
then he is asking debaters to concern themselves with non- 
essentials which may easily lead to irrelevancies if not 
absurdities," p. 51.
125Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, The Modern 
Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc.,
1962), pp. 151-52.
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Inherency and the Prima*i o  r _ _Facie Case-1-̂ 0
The most vocal antagonists of causal inherency,
12 7proponents of the comparative advantage case, ' saw
128"essential causality" as an unwarranted restriction of
1 7Qthe affirmative's alternatives. After the publication
126For contemporary discussions of the prima facie 
case, see Robert L. Scott, "On the Meaning of the Term 
Prima Facie in Argumentation," Central States Speech 
Journal, XII (Autumn, 1960), 3 3-34; Kim Giffin and Kenneth 
Megill, "A Study of Case Construction in Tournament 
Debates," Western Speech, XXVI (Winter, 1962), 52-53;
Donald Terry, "Workability, Topicality, Inherency, and 
Prima Facie as Debate Problems," in Modern Debate Case 
Techniques (Skokie, 111.: National Textbook Company,
1970), p. 14; Donald R. Terry, "The Traditional Case," in 
Modern Debate Case Techniques (Skokie, 111.: National
Textbook Company, 1970), p. 1; Bruce Markgraf, "The Prima 
Facie Case: A Modest Proposal," Speaker and Gavel, I
(November, 1963), 27-28, For a discussion of negative 
alternatives, see Roger E. Nebergall, "The Negative 
Counterplan," Speech Teacher, VI (September, 1957), 217-20; 
J. W. Patterson) "The Obligations of the Negative in a 
Policy Debate," Speech Teacher, XI (September, 1962), 
208-213.
127Musgrave had introduced an advantages analysis 
as early as 1945. See Musgrave, Competitive Debate, 
pp. 55-60. For a discussion of the modern comparative 
advantage case, see Vernon Craven, "Comparative Advantage:
A Classification," Central States Speech Journal, XIX 
(Winter, 1969), 243-49; L. Dean Fadely, "The Validity of 
the Comparative Advantage Case," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association, IV (Winter, 1967), 28-35; Arthur 
Kruger, "The Comparative Advantage Case— A Disadvantage," 
Journal of the American Forensic Association, III 
(September, 1966), 104-111.
128Donald R. Terry went so far as to label 
inherency one of the three requirements for a prima facie 
case! Terry, "Workability, Topicality, Inherency, and 
Prima Facie," p. 14.
l^James W. Cheseboro distinguished the two 
approaches as follows: "The inherency affirmative must
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of Kruger's Modern Debate, Marsh had asked, "If the
proposed plan has significant advantages, even where
'serious weaknesses1 are not 'inherent' in the system
could not one logically demonstrate that the system should 
130be adopted?" Kruger denied such a prerogative, reply­
ing: "To suggest that no problem exists, as in the
'comparative advantages' approach, is even worse than con-
131tending that a minor problem exists." Marsh's response, 
a Speaker and Gavel article entitled "Is Debate Merely a 
Game for Conservative Players?" questioned the validity of 
four assumptions basic to the "inherency argument":
(1) that a presumption favors the status quo; (2) that 
"evils" in the status quo must be demonstrated; (3) that 
these evils must be shown to be "causally" related to the 
status quo; and (4) that the removal of these evils must 
contribute a "major change" from the status quo.-1-22 The 
two preceding sections outlined Marsh's position regarding
demonstrate the existence of an evil, indicate the cause 
of this evil, propose a plan to correct the evil by 
removing the cause, and finally demonstrate how the plan 
corrects the problem. . . .  On the other hand, the advan­
tages case does not devote its attention to either an evil 
or the causes of that evil." James W. Cheseboro, "The 
Comparative Advantage Case," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association, V (Spring, 1968), 60-61. See James 
L. Robinson, "Are We 'Overlegalizing' School Debate?"
Speech Teacher, IX (March, 1960) , 109-115.
130patrick 0. Marsh, "Prima Facie Case: The
Perennial Debate Topic," Gavel, XLV (November, 1962), 15.
^2^Kruger, "Meaning of Inherency," p. 47.
^22Marsh, "Is Debate a Game?" pp. 46-53.
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the second and third assumptions. The fourth will be 
treated in relation to the comparative advantage case. 
Marsh rejected the first assumption, moreover, that a 
presumption favors the status quo on the following 
grounds:
Since the traditional presumptions are 
inferential, societal, and arbitrary, they 
remain debatable and should be incorporated 
into the debate— not merely assumed. Thus, 
the judge-critic may base his decision upon 
the relative strength of the opposing argu­
ments rather than to allow the legitimate 
issues to be prejudged. 33
134In a series of rebuttal articles, Kruger 
defended the four assumptions outlined by Marsh, though he
T O Cadmitted a "minority view of presumption." Though
133Ibid., p. 49. See Gary Cronkhite, "The Locus of 
Presumption," Central States Speech Journal, XVII 
(November, 1966), 270-76.
134Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assumptions of Policy 
Questions: I. Presumption and Burden of Proof," Speaker
and Gavel, II (November, 19 64), 2-17; Arthur Kruger, 
"Underlying Assumptions of Policy Questions: II. Indict­
ment of the Status Quo," Speaker and Gavel, II (January, 
1965), 60-62; Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assumptions of 
Policy Questions: III. Inherent Evil," Speaker and Gavel,
II (March, 1965), 79-82; Arthur Kruger, "Underlying Assump- 
tions of Policy Questions: IV. Major Change of the
Status Quo," Speaker and Gavel, II (May, 1965), 134-36.
135Kruger, "Presumption and Burden of Proof," 
p. 14. Kruger pointed out that Reeves and Hudson had 
assumed a similar position. J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt 
Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1941), pp. 11-12. Kruger said, "In a 
word this interpretation entails not just a description 
but a favorable evaluation of the status quo in relation 
to any proposed extreme change."
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responding at the midpoint of the series,*36 it, neverthe­
less, was in his final reply to Kruger that Marsh clarified 
his philosophical position.
This controversy began with my effort to 
resolve some of the contradictions in the 
lists of stock issues found in various text­
books on argumentation. Now, I take an 
"issue" to be an essential question in a con­
troversy which must be answered "yes" by the 
affirmative if the affirmative is to demon­
strate a prima facie case. The "stock 
issues," accordingly, would be the minimum 
essential requirements for demonstrating a 
proposition. The stock issues will, therefore, 
be the same for all propositions of a given 
kind. For example, the minimum essentials for 
demonstrating a proposition of fact . . . are:
(1) an issue of definition and (2) an issue of 
compliance. Likewise, in proposition [sic] of 
value the stock issues appear to be: (1) an
issue of criteria and (2) an issue of compliance. 
Certainly we can build prima facie cases for 
these two kinds of propositions. In each 
instance there is burden of proof on the 
affirmative to support these minimum essentials.
But notice that the prima facie cases are 
developed without reference to a presumption, 
and also without reference to how the proposi­
tion must be worded. The question then arises 
as to why is it essential in a proposition of 
policy to introduce elements that were not 
essential in the other two kinds of proposi­
tions. . . . These questions become more 
pressing when we consider that a proposition 
of policy is essentially a proposition of 
value.137
Marsh recognized some justification in according 
the four assumptive premises discussed if one chose to view
136Patrick O. Marsh, "Terminological Tangle: A
Reply to Professor Kruger," Speaker and Gavel, II (January, 
1965), 54-59.
137Patrick O. Marsh, "The Terminal Tangle: A Final
Reply to Professor Kruger," Speaker and Gavel, II (May,
1965), 137.
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debate operationally (i.e., as a "mental game" concerned 
with "abstract certainty"). If one chose, however, to 
define argumentation conceptually, with a concern for 
"training students to use their critical capacities to the 
greatest advantage in problems resulting from the world 
of human affairs," then Marsh was "unwilling to restrict 
their freedom by imposing unnecessary limitations upon
I optheir practices of case construction." Accordingly,
Marsh opposed "setting down a hard and fast rule which 
requires every affirmative policy debate to begin by show-
1 oqm g  the inherent inadequacy of the status quo." Though
not denying that "some very effective debating results from
such a line of argument, and often encourages its use," he
did, nevertheless, "deny that an inherency argument is an
140essential part of every affirmative case." Robert
Newman called the requirement that an advocate show "an 
inherent and compelling need for a change" "artificial and 
unreasonable, while Bernard L. Brock argued that "the
affirmative should not be judged according to the standards 
designed for traditional . . . cases, but according to how 
well it fulfills the obligations which are appropriate to
138Ibid., p. 138.
139Ibid.
141Robert Newman, "The Inherent and Compelling 
Need," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II 
(May, 1965), 66.
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the unique characteristics of the advantages analysis. 
Interestingly, toward the end of the journal debate, Kruger 
explained:
So when I advocate that an affirmative 
team "must," or should, carefully analyze the 
cause of the problem which it is presenting, 
and that it should present only those evils 
which are caused by, or are inherent in, the 
present policy, I say this not because this 
is the only way of presenting a prima facie 
case but because I am thinking of the negative 
attack which will come and which will puncture 
the affirmative case if this analysis has not 
been undertaken and heeded. 43
This is not to suggest that Kruger ultimately embraced the
comparative advantage case. Conversely, he referred in
the same article to the abandonment of "the principles of
logical analysis," and in a subsequent discussion he
treated "The 'Comparative Advantage1 Case: A Disadvantage,"
conceding merely that:
The comparative advantage approach is suitable 
for a proposition not worth debating, or not 
debatable in the sense that a significant 
change is at issue. . . . When an affirmative 
has to support what is basically a negative 
position (minor change of the status quo), of
142Bernard L. Brock, "The Comparative Advantage 
Case," Speech Teacher, XVI (March, 1967), 121. For other 
defenses of the comparative advantage alternative, see 
Cheseboro, "Comparative Advantage Case," pp. 104-111; 
Craven, "Comparative Advantage"; Fadely, "Validity of Com­
parative Advantage Case"; David Zarefsky, "The Traditional 
Case— Comparative Advantage Case Dichotomy: Another Look,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, VI (Winter, 
1969), 12-20.
■'■43Arthur Kruger, "The Inherent Need: Further
Classification," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, II (September, 1965), 113.
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course it has no cause to demonstrate a 
compelling need for a change.
Meanwhile, on the debate circuit, as well as in 
the professional literature, various alternatives to causal 
inherency appeared. Newman, for example, agreed with Marsh 
that:
The true burden of proof carried by every 
affirmative . . .  is this: he who asserts must
prove. His proof may be causal reasoning or 
it may not. He may show a substantial evil in 
the status quo, or he may merely show that the 
status quo fails to meet its designated goal.
. . . His prima facie case can consist of any 
good reason why his proposition should be 
adopted, and then he must defend that case. 5
Accordingly, Newman favored a "functional" approach to 
inherency in which affirmative teams could present more 
realistic solutions. David Zarefsky defined this alterna­
tive as follows: "To argue functional inherency," he said,
"is not to claim that certain structures are organically 
deficient, but rather that, in their functioning, they 
prevent the achievement of the desired objective.
Debaters, moreover, argued "structural" and "attitudinal"
147inherency. Thomas Mader, proceeding in another
144Kruger, "'Comparative Advantage' Case," p. 106.
145Newman, "Inherent and Compelling Need," p. 71.
146David Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case 
(Evanston, 111.: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1970),
p. 2.
^Conversation with Annabel Dunham Hagood, 
Director of Forensics, The University of Alabama, July, 
1972. Attitudinal inherency referred to predispositions
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direction, advocated stasis as a point of departure.148 
Recognizing that status in time (i.e., that dealing with 
conditions that exist) is but one of many possible posi­
tions, Mader pointed out that propositions also call for 
extending or continuing. He concluded, therefore, that 
the affirmative must demonstrate an inherent need only
when the status quo is the "fixed point"; otherwise, the
149affirmative must show need only m  principle.
Whether viewed as causal, functional, structural, 
or attitudinal, whether a necessary requisite or simply 
one affirmative alternative, inherency has become a 
critical concept in contemporary argumentation and debate 
theory. As a tool of analysis, it has influenced case 
construction and criteria for judgment. As a theoretical 
construct, it has prompted a reassessment of such under­
lying assumptions of argumentation as burden of proof and
presumption. It has inquired into the defining of proposi- 
l sotions and into the mam issues essential to the proof 
of a case. The suggestion that "those theorists who
to view or act in certain ways. See Zarefsky, Comparative 
Advantage Case, p. 2.
148Thomas Mader, "The Inherent Need to Analyze 
Stasis," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV
(Winter, 1967), 13-20.
149Ibid., p. 13.
^^Most of the controversy over presumption centered 
on defining the term should in propositions of policy.
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propose that inherency be present in all debates are, in
effect, proposing that inherency be made another 'stock
151issue' in analysis," is probably a valid assessment.
Reassessments of prima facie case and presumption, 
accompanying contemporary concerns with inherency and com­
parative advantages analyses, directly relate to— if they 
do not grow out of— a renewed interest in strategy in 
debating. Though "special methods of refutation" appeared 
in "early period" texts, and though Shaw popularized the 
constructive as well as destructive value of strategy in 
the "middle period," "strategy" and "attack and defense" 
have become battlecries for those contemporary writers 
committed to advocacy in debating. Kruger investigated
logic and strategy in the development of a debate case as
152early as 1954. In 1960, he carried those concepts into
153the subtitle of his text, Modern Debate: Its Logic and
Strategy. By no means alone in his commitment to "the 
most logical way to construct or answer arguments, and to 
organize many arguments into a unified whole, called the 
'case,'" he represents the vanguard of such a position.
^^Kenny Barfield, "A Study of the Nature of 
Inherency," unpublished paper, The University of Alabama, 
1971, p. 33.
152Arthur Kruger, "Logic and Strategy in the 
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Proof
By far, the greatest number of contemporary
argumentation and debate theorists, viewing proof tradi-
155tionally as evidence plus reasoning, have continued to
rely on the canons of legal evidence and on syllogistic
and/or rhetorical inferential constructs.^"5® Nevertheless,
during the immediate period, at least three identifiable
developments in the theory of proof have emerged: a
behavioral approach to evidence; the introduction of
Toulmin's structural model into argumentation and debate
theory; and a renewed interest by certain authors in
157motivation and in ethos as "proof." That the long- 
range effects of these "minority interpretations" cannot 
now be determined does not deny that they are extensions, 
perhaps even "significant" contributions, to argumentation 
and debate theory.
See, for example, Capp and Capp, Argumentation 
and Debate, p. 135; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 
rev. ed., pp. 52-118; Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 132. See 
Mills's analysis of approaches to proof as need- 
fulfillment; as consonant with a climate of opinion; as 
empirical verifiability; as logical demonstration; and as a 
combination of substantive and structural factors to 
satisfy disinterested, intelligently critical listeners or 
readers. Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 38-45.
^^Contemporary works, however, have begun to 
inquire into historiography and social psychology for new 
alternatives. See particularly Robert P. Newman and Dale 
R. Newman, Evidence (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 
1969); Miller and Nilsen, Perspectives on Argumentation.
157Writers discussed this concept primarily in 
terms of evidence— i.e., "authority-based assertion."
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Evidence
In both editions of Principles of Argumentation,
Baker had treated evidence as the focal point or unifying
factor of proof. Transmitted to the "middle period"
largely by Foster, this notion has survived in contemporary
argumentation and debate theory. Paul D. Brandes, for
example, held that:
Evidence is useful in building ethical per­
suasion with hostile audiences, skeptical 
audiences, and critical audiences, that it 
is useful in enforcing legitimate emotions, 
and that it can furnish both inductive and 
deductive elements in reasoning.158
Mills agreed. "In rhetorical theory," he said, "there are 
three main reasons given for the use of evidence in argu­
mentative discourse: it adds probative force; it tends to
increase the credibility of the communicator; it may add
159emotional impact." Various definitions of evidence 
suggest, however, that it has been the "probative" dimen­
sion which has commanded most attention.
158Paul D. Brandes, "Ev'dence," in Argumentation 
and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. by James H.
McBath (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.,
1963) , p. 166.
159Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 98. 
The "probative force" of the evidence was most frequently 
investigated. Freeley, for example, suggesting that 
"evidence may only partially substantiate a matter at 
issue, or it may be strong to prove the matter conclu­
sively," examined partial proof, indispensible proof, and 
conclusive proof. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate,
1961 ed., pp. 65-67.
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Pefinition^Q
Some contemporary writers have continued to define
evidence as "any factual material or opinion used to prove
a contention. "161 Both Mills and Freeley included "objects"
162in their definitions. Brandes was moving toward a
behavioral perspective when he insisted that "evidence is
not any fact or opinion, but those facts and opinions which
163the audience divorces from speaker bias." Ehninger and
In an analysis of six contemporary texts,
William R. Dresser suggested that "there seems to be fairly 
general agreement, however, on two characteristics of evi­
dence: (a) evidence is something used to generate proof,
functioning as a basic premise in an argument; and (b) evi­
dence is something that is external to and independent of 
the speaker using it." William R. Dresser, "The Use of 
Evidence in Ten Championship Debates," Journal of the 
American Forensic Association, I (September, 1964), Toi.
^^Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate, p. 103. 
Some preferred new or different labels. Kruger, For 
example, used the terms "empirical" and "authoritative" to 
differentiate types of evidence. Kruger, Modern Debate, 
p. 132. Kruger believed that "whenever possible, a debater 
should give not only the authority's conclusion but also 
the proof used in arriving at it," p. 133.
162See James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and Robert 
L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan
Company, 19l7), p. 867 Mills's statement read: "For the
purposes of general argumentation, let us define evidence 
as factual statements, objects not created by the advocate, 
and opinions of persons other than the advocate which are 
offered in support of his claims." Mills, Reason in 
Controversy, 1964 ed., p. 97; 19 6 8 rev. ed.,
Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev.
Brandes, "Evidence," p. 159.
16 3Brandes, "Evidence," pp. 145-46. 
believed, moreover, that "evidence should be 
the issue, relevant to the argument at hand, 
probative value without introducing unwanted
p. 166.
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Brockriede made the break with a purely "logical" perspec- 
164tive more complete by examining the dimension of audience 
belief. Rejecting the fact-opinion dichotomy, Ehninger and 
Brockriede observed that "if evidence is considered from 
the point of view of the listeners or readers to whom it 
is addressed, the 'factual1 character of any information 
ultimately depends on the 'opinion' of the audience.
They defined evidence accordingly as "an informative state­
ment believed by the listener or reader and employed by an
166arguer to secure belief in another statement."
Miller objected that in the Ehninger-Brockriede 
text "the primary focus still appears to be on the value 
aspects of its [evidence's] use."^^^ Assuming that the
Miller distinguished between psychological and 
logical aspects of evidence. See Miller, "Evidence and 
Argument," p. 26.
^■^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 100.
^ ^ Ibid. Ehninger and Brockriede believed that in 
order to function in a "unit of proof," evidence must be 
both germane and believable. They contended, moreover, 
that "authoritative proofs made good only certain kinds of 
claims. . . . The critical listener or reader does not 
accept an authoritative proof designed to establish the 
ultimate claim of a controversy. The decision in a debate 
is not critically determined merely by acquiescing to the 
opinion of an expert, no matter how qualified he may be. 
Authoritative proofs are best in establishing intermediate 
claims in a chain of argument," pp. 161-63. "Proof by 
authority," moreover, "is also limited to establishing 
critically designative and definitive claims," p. 162.
•̂ •̂ M̂iller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 26.
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168"primary objective" of using evidence is the "development
. . . of a sense of belief," Miller "offered as a useful,
tentative definition" the following:
Evidence consists of those data that are 
Intended to induce a sense of belief in the 
proposition which the data purportedly support.
Thus, the term evidence embraces a large body 
of diverse and varied materials; the common 
defining characteristic of these materials is 
to be found in the function they perform. 69
The three major implications of that definition follow:
Questions regarding the nature and uses of 
evidence are essentially psychological and 
involve considerations of the bases for people's 
beliefs and of the kinds of material most 
likely to induce . . .  a sense of belief.
The function of evidence in argument is to 
induce belief ["a certain kind of state of body 
or mind or both"],171 not necessarily to aid in 
communicating truth or establishing fact 
[empirically ascertainable phenomena that exist 
as part of the physical world].
What conclusions may be validly drawn from 
certain items of evidence is a question associated
168_, ,. .Itallics mine.
169Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 25. Miller 
believed that "direct experience is seldom involved in 
instances that we would consider argumentation.1 He 
limited his discussion of types of evidence therefore to 
testimony, designating two varieties: testimony composed
of statistical data and testimony composed of authority- 
based assertion, p. 37.
^^Miller believed, however, that "the logical and 
the psychological aspects of evidence cannot be separated 
into discrete categories." Ibid., p. 29. He wished "to 
combine the salient elements of both approaches," p. 26.
171Miller relied on the definition of Bertrand 
Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 145, cited in Miller, 
"Evidence and Argument," p. 27.
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with the logical rules of inference and with 
the empirical status of certain related 
propositions.
Though Robert Huber, Ernest Bormann, Ehninger and 
173Brockriede, and, indirectly, Dale Newman and Robert
Newman174 agreed that belief is an appropriate end of
evidence, none minimized— as did Miller— the communicating
175of truth or the establishing of fact. Conversely, most
contemporary writers appear committed to conclusions 
logically or empirically warranted by evidence. Or, to 
put it differently, whereas Miller defined the function of 
evidence as belief, most other writers perceived it to be 
proof.
Classification
Those contemporary writers who defined evidence
traditionally tended also to rely on legal classifica- 
176tions. Though a few new categories appeared
172Ibid., pp. 25-29.
173Huber, Influencing through Argument, p. 9 4;
Ernest G. Bormann, "An Empirical Approach to Certain Con­
cepts of Logical Proof," Central States Speech Journal,
XII (Winter, 1961), 90-91; Ehninger and Brockriede,
Decision by Debate, p. 100.
174They said: "We also share with historians a
commonsense and non-philosophical definition of truth: 
truth is what the evidence, correctly interpreted, obliges 
us to believe." Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.
175Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 27.
176Ehninger and Brockriede presented a representa­
tive listing. They described evidence as real or personal,
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(i.e., Freeley's distinction of judicial and extra- 
177judicial), most lists paralleled those of the "early"
178or "middle" periods. More original were the compila-
179tions of "sources" of evidence. Freeley, for example,
included judicial notice, public records, public writings,
180testimony of witnesses, and personal inspection.
Brandes labeled "functional forms," i.e., that evidence
furnished by witnesses, documents, recordings, pictoriali-
181zations and relics. Mills essentially concurred, though
182his terminology differed slightly. Newman and Newman
talked about sources of evidence in terms of government, 
the press, pressure groups, and professional scholars.
original or hearsay, direct or circumstantial, pre­
appointed or casual, written or unwritten, positive or 
negative, eager or reluctant. Ehninger and Brockriede, 
Decision by Debate, p. 110.
177Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 57-65.
17 8The preceding discussion on definition hints at 
the fire to which the traditional fact-opinion categories 
were subjected.
179In some instances these lists of "sources" 
superceded lengthy discussions of research. See particu­
larly Newman and Newman, Evidence.
180Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 54-57.
181 Brandes, "Evidence," pp. 153-59.
182Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed.,
pp. 91-101.
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They also included a separate section on statistical 
183evidence.
Perhaps the most important contemporary development
in classification has been an interest in categorizing
evidence in terms of its relation to different kinds of
propositions, issues, or claims. Terris perceived that
"the fact-value distinction depends . . . not on the
wording or form of the proposition but rather on the type
184of evidence that must be used to prove it." This notion
185has surfaced in at least four other contemporary works.
Ehninger and Brockriede, for example, limited "proof by
186authority" to designative and definitive claims. Erwin
Bettinghaus contended that "the type of evidence available
depends on the nature of the question to be asked and the
187relation of the communicator to the necessary evidence." 
Newman and Newman related evidential forms to directional, 
positional, and predicative statements. A summary of their 
analysis follows:
183Newman and Newman, Evidence, pp. 91-181,
205-225.
184Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative 
Proposition," pp. 266-73.
185Cronkhite, however, rejected this position. See 
Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact and 
Value," p. 12.
186Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 162.
^^Erwin p. Bettinghaus, Message Preparation: The
Nature of Proof (New York: Bobbs-Mernll Company, Inc.,
1966), p. 56.
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The first step in policy deliberation is 
analysis and criticism of goals. This is not 
an entirely subjective matter; facts impinge 
on policy goals in many ways. (1) Most goals 
incorporate a number of factual assumptions 
which must be inspected carefully. . . .
(2) Some goals can be challenged because we 
cannot uphold them consistently. . . .
(3) Most goals cannot be achieved without 
extracting a "cost" of some sort. . . .
Positional statements are judgments about 
the present; they locate us in relation to a 
certain goal. The reasoning necessary to 
establish them is inductive or evidential.
Such positional statements can never be 
certain, and they frequently involve con­
siderable inferential risk.
There are three important ways of 
supporting positional statements. The first 
is descriptive generalization, where specific 
historical instances of a phenomenon are 
assembled without any claim to know why the 
phenomena function as they do. . . .A second 
way of supporting a positional statement is 
with a causal explanation, where one claims to 
know why things happen as they do. . . . The 
third way is by historical analogy, where two 
phenomena are alleged to be comparable in one 
unknown variable since they are comparable in 
several known variables. 89
Predictions represent the payoff stage of 
deliberation; we approve or disapprove a spe­
cific policy because of its anticipated con­
sequences. . . . Descriptive generalizations, 
causal explanations, and historical analogies 
are vehicles by which evidence can be brought 
to bear on the future. . . . According to the 
epistemological doctrine of Helmer and Rescher, 
policy predictions usually involve inarticu- 
latable evidence and imprecise generalization 
which call for intuitive evaluation, and this 
only an expert can do. How one evaluates
loo“Newman and Newman, Evidence, pp. 14-15. 
^89Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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expertise therefore becomes a major concern of 
the student of evidence.-*-9®
Miller also related goals to propositions, but from a 
belief rather than probative perspective. Concluding 
that both testimony composed of statistical data and 
testimony composed of authority-based assertion are 
applicable to fact and value questions, Miller determined 
statistical data to have "greater limitations when uti­
lized to induce belief in propositions of fact," while 
"testimony composed of authority-based assertion . . .
often has its greatest psychological impact in the realm
191of value disputes."
A final approach which fails to fit into the
preceding categories suggests that the three modes of
proof (personal, emotional, and logical) may be brought
19 2within a common critical framework. Accordingly,
Ehninger and Brockriede examined authoritative proof
19 3within a modified Toulmin pattern. Those authors
speak best for themselves:
190Ibid., pp. 49-50.
19 1Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 43, 46.
19 2See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
Ch. 11.
19 3The Toulmin Model is explained in a subsequent 
section on reasoning.
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The evidence of an authoritative proof is 
a factual report or a statement of an opinion, 
together with an identification of the source 
of the data. . . . The warrant states that the 
source of the evidence is credible. The claim 
then reiterates the statement appearing in the 
evidence as now certified by the warrant. . . . 
The support for the warrant evaluates the 
source of the evidence by applying three well- 
established criteria and by investigating the 
past reliability of the witness's statements 
on the same subject covered in the evidence.
1. Is the witness an expert in the 
field? . . .
2. Did the witness have an opportunity to get 
at the facts? . . .
3. Is the witness reasonably unbiased?
Reservations may be needed in an authorita­
tive proof for two reasons. In the first 
place, even if the general reliability of a 
source is accepted, the idea may be rejected 
if a more respected authority presents a 
counterclaim. . . . Second, a reservation is
required if a substantive proof of greater 
probative force yields a counterclaim. . . . 
Claims derived from authoritative proofs almost 
always require some sort of qualifier. As with 
substantive proofs, claims may need qualifiers 
for any or all of three reasons: (a) If the
evidence is in any way qualified, the claim 
must also be qualified. . . . (b) If the
warrant is qualified, the claim must also be 
qualified. . . . (c) If reservations are
present, the claim may have to be set aside or 
qualified.
Tests
Contemporary argumentation and debate texts have 
included essentially the same criteria for testing evidence 
found in earlier works. Some new terminology has appeared, 
as have new organizational patterns for discussing specific
19 4Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
pp. 159-61.
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standards. These tendencies# however# only reinforce 
earlier predispositions. Historically# one might find 
as many ways of structuring tests of proof and systems 
of labeling these tests as he would find argumentation 
texts. Of particular interest is the inclination of 
some contemporary writers to include a behavioral dimen­
sion for the testing of evidence, the standard of audience 
acceptability being applied to source and substance alike.
Not a contemporary construct, the test of audience 
acceptability has appeared in argumentation and debate
texts at least since the publication, in 1932, of O'Neill
19 5and McBurney's Working Principles of Argument. Subse­
quent texts in that line of authors have included the
iqrconcept, though Mills called it a "lesser" class
"except in popular persuasion, where it is the major
test."'*'^ Yet, Newman and Newman's criticism that
"rhetoric and journalism tend to use credibility and
19 8acceptability synonymously" does not seem to apply.
19 5James M. O'Neill and James H. McBurney, The 
Working Principles of Argument (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1932)# p. 99.
196McBurney, O'Neill# and Mills# Argumentation 
and Debate# p. 9 5; McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, p. 110.
19 7Mills, Reason in Controversy# p. 107; 1968
rev. ed., p. 152.
19 pNewman and Newman, Evidence, p. vin.
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199Rather, those writers who have favored evaluating an 
audience's acceptance of a proposition have also insisted 
on the tests of logical adequacy, or, as Newman and Newman 
put it, that evidence be "'worthy of belief,' hence 
probably true."200 Such standards as reliability,20 -̂ 
accuracy, verifiability, recency, and representativeness 
of evidence, along with questions to determine the com­
petency of sources, have continued to dominate lists of 
tests.202 Even Miller recognized certain of these dimen­
sions, concluding that assertions not routinely expected 
and unanimity of authorities are tests for testimony com­
posed of authority-based assertion, while testimony com­
posed of statistical data should describe accurately the
existing empirical state of affairs and should supply
20 3operational definitions of key concepts.
Though audience acceptability is a common criterion
in contemporary argumentation and debate texts, it is not 
a universal one. Conversely, many writers, seeming to
199See particularly Freeley, Argumentation and 
Debate, 1961 ed., pp. 83-84; 1966 ed., pp. 93-106. See
Bettinghaus, Message Preparation, p. 56.
^°°Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.
201See Harold A. Larrabee, Reliable Knowledge 
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964).
202See Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate, 
pp. 114-20. Brandes had suggested that "evidence's only 
inherent property is its initial set of freedom from the 
bias of the speaker." Brandes, "Evidence," p. 146.
Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 37-47.
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agree with an historiographical perspective, express "no
concern as to whether any specific audience or reader will
in fact believe it [evidence] . "204 Strong adherents of
such an approach, Newman and Newman have investigated
credibility primarily in terms of affect of perceptual
capacities, perceptual distortion, willful distortion,
9fl Rand authenticity. They have, moreover, restructured
traditional tests of evidence into the following indices 
of credibility:
SITUATIONAL TESTS
1. Tension. The lower the tension asso- 
ciated with an event, the higher the 
credibility of reports about it.
2. Accessibility. The more accessible the 
situation being reported on, both to 
the reporters and their audience, the 
more credible the reports.
3. Freedom to report— absence of gag rule.
The more freedoma witness has to 
report things as he sees them, the 
greater his credibility.
DOCUMENTARY TESTS
4. Authenticity. The greater the presump- 
tion of authenticity, the higher the 
credibility of a document.
5. Internal consistency. The higher the 
internal consistency of an author, the 
more credible his testimony.
6. Carefulness of generalization. The 
more careful the generalizations of a 
writer, the higher the credibility of 
his testimony.
7. Reluctance. The greater the damage of 
his own testimony to a witness, the 
more credible it is.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WRITER
8. Expertise. The greater the relevant
204Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii. 
^®^See ibid., Ch. IV.
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expertise of an author, the higher his 
credibility.
9. Objectivity. The greater the objec­
tivity of an author, the more credible 
his testimony.
10. Accuracy record. The more accurate the
description and prediction record of a 
source, the higher the credibility of 
his testimony in general.
TESTS OF PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
11. Eyewitness principle. The greater a
witness1 observation of a matter to 
which he testifies, the higher his 
credibility.
12. Contemporaneity. The more contemporaneous
the report of a witness the more credible 
his testimony.
TESTS OF SECONDARY SOURCES
13. Selection of primary sources. The more
discerning a writer's selection of pri­
mary sources, the more credible his 
testimony.
14. Accuracy of citation. The more accurate
the citations of a writer, the more 
credible his testimony. 06
Though Newman and Newman contended that "there are no
specific tests of credible statistics," they isolated
three questions helpful in an evaluation of statistical
evidence: (1) Who wants to prove what? (2) What do the
figures really represent? (3) What conclusions do the
207figures support?
One final position deserves mention at this point. 
Though Ehninger and Brockriede advocated evaluating 
authoritative proof in terms of a modified Toulmin struc­
tural model, their specific tests did not differ appreciably
206Ibid., pp. 87-88.
2^Ibid. , p . 224 .
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20 8from those included in other works. More noteworthy was
the authors' conviction that evidence must "also be fairly
and effectively presented to those persons with whom the
209decision rests." Though other writers had included
standards aimed at an "ethic of evidence," none juxtaposed 
more forcibly than did Ehninger and Brockriede a "rhetoric 
of evidence„" "Underlying all rules for the presentation 
of evidence in critical deliberation," they argued, "is 
this basic test: Is the evidence set forth in such a way
that the reader or listener is able to assign it exactly
210the weight it deserves— no more and no less?" "An
ethic of rhetoric," they contended, "aims to insure that
the evidence entered into argument will be given no more
211weight than it deserves." "A rhetoric of evidence seeks
212to guarantee that it will not be undervalued."
208Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
p. 160.
209T, ..Ibid., p. 116.
211Ibid., p. 118. They explained the "ethic of 
evidence" as follows: "Deliberate attempts to manipulate
data, so as to give them greater weight than they deserve, 
violate what may be termed an ethic of evidence. Such 
violations fall into two major classes: selective report­
ing and altered or colored reporting," p. 116.
212The underlying principle of a "rhetoric of 
evidence" follows: "1. An effective argument is more than
a string of quotations and statistics. 2. The evidence 
used in debate often requires explanation. Readers or 
listeners must be told how it applies and, sometimes, what 
it means. 3. Facts and figures must undergird each unit
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Believing that these dimensions of evidence "coincide," 
Ehninger and Brockriede said:
If one seeks to write and speak per­
suasively, he should write and speak truth­
fully and give to each fact or value exactly 
the weight it deserves. Only when one is more 
concerned with truth than with victory are 
his chances for victory at their best. To be 
persuasive be truthful; be truthful to be 
persuasive.213
Reasoning
In his 1968 revision of Reason in Controversy,
Mills recognized great diversity in recent discussions of
inference. Having surveyed treatments of reasoning in
approximately a dozen contemporary texts, he concluded:
Many writers have felt obligated to cite the 
categorical syllogism on the mortality of 
Socrates, to say a little about J. S. Mill's 
canons of induction, and to urge students to 
avoid an assortment of fallacies. Some have 
been more discerning in explaining how logic 
may serve in the analysis and criticism of 
argument. The most extreme position in this 
direction holds that debating is mainly an 
exercise in logic. . . .  At the opposite 
extreme is the view that formal logic and 
probability have little to do with logical 
proof as we think of it, and that we are left 
with style and plausibility as our legitimate 
concerns. 214
of proof presented. 4. Special care must be taken to 
present statistics clearly. 5. Evidence must be entered 
into argument in specific and concrete terms." Ibid.,
pp. 118-21.
213Ibid., p. 121.
^■^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
p. 175.
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Logic and Argumentation
Mills's analysis took into account the continuing 
controversy surrounding the "proper" role of logic in 
argumentation and debate. William S. Smith's 1962 "pre­
liminary investigation into the place of formal logic in
the theory of debate" pointed up the "unequal treatment
215of formal logic by various debate textbook authors," a
phenomenon which Smith contended "suggests that formal
logic continues as a part of debate theory out of tradition 
21 fionly." However, the notion that "debate . . . tends to
be judged in keeping with the philosophy of inductive
logic" rather than the "formal," deductive variety did not
negate for Smith the value of reason and thought in argu- 
217mentation. Rather, his plea for "less concentration on
the formal validity of our logic, and . . . more stress on
the testing of the conclusions that we reach through logic
and reasoning" anticipated resulting extensions of logic
218useful for argumentation.
215William S. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate," 
Southern Speech Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 334.
Smith's investigations showed a lack of completeness of 
tenets of formal logic in representative texts, a lack of 
consistency in degree of completeness, and a lack of agree­




218Ibid., pp. 337-38. Smith believed that such
extensions might take place in at least two ways: "First,
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Contending that philosopher and logician alike 
deem neither formal logic nor probability to be applicable
2  I Qto rhetorical argument, 3 David W. Shepard concluded that 
the role of formal logic in argument is one of style and 
plausibility. Shepard said:
Formal argument makes sense as an element 
of style. . . . Well-composed deductive argu­
ments, like polished sentences, are an ornament 
to the debater and a blessing to the audience, 
for both enable the audience to tell where the 
speaker is going. Correct logic and correct 
grammar are alike in that both are independent 
of the facts; neither will guarantee the fac­
tual truth or falsity of what the speaker 
asserts. As elements of style, grammar and 
logic either clarify or obscure what the 
speaker is asserting to be true.
Another non-logical function of formal 
argument emerges which also holds for proba­
bility. By virtue of style, formal argument 
creates plausibility. No proof, no genuine 
probability, but credible argument, one that 
seems worthy of acceptance.220
teachers of reasoning, argument, and debate, might study 
the development of scientific thought to discover methods 
of thought which might be helpful to our field. . . .  A 
second way might be to do as the scientist did: begin
with the problem of explaining what actually happens in 
debate and other speaking situations and develop our own 
methods of thought necessary to explain the phenomena that 
we observe," p. 338.
219Shepard put it this way: "When the philosophers
and logicians dismiss formal argument from having any 
bearing on the facts, when they discuss probability and 
kick rhetoric out the door, and when they compound the 
insult by not applying their probability systems to the 
subject-matter of rhetorical argument, where are we?"
David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western 
Speech (Fall, 1966), 247.
220Ibid.
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Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen, writing 
for "the critic wishing to apply logic to argumentative 
discourse," observed an almost exclusive attention to 
"legitimate inferential principles and argumentative forms" 
in many argumentation texts with "only scant attention, if 
any, to the infinite ways in which intricate syntactical 
relations may undermine or even rule out any possibility
p  p  Iof a public logic for reasoned claims. Suggesting that
"the significant problem becomes one of analyzing the kinds
of connectives and hence the type(s) of logic which can
best explicate the relationships among propositional state-
222ments of rhetorical argument" and pointing up problems
with both "context-invariant" (as in Formal Logic) and
"context-variant" (as in the Hastings descriptive clas-
223sification and the Toulmin structural model) connec- 
9 9 4tives, Anderson and Mortensen concluded that "the critic 
assessing evaluative arguments should expand his conception 
of context."225
221Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen, "Logic 
and Marketplace Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, LIII (April, 1967), 143.
222Ibid., p. 144.
223Both the Hastings classification and the Toulmin 
model are discussed in a subsequent section.
224Anderson and Mortensen, "Logic and Marketplace 
Argumentation," p. 144.
225Ibid., p. 151.
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Hence to understand the contextual meanings of 
connective terms within rhetorical argument, 
the critic, for example, sometimes will find 
it useful to study matters of style or, say, 
overall structure of discourse. On other 
occasions the critic may even explore the 
value system of the speaker as a framework for 
an analysis of meaning consistency of value­
laden propositions.
In a rejoinder to the Shepard, and Anderson and
Mortensen articles, Glen Mills and Hugh Petrie sought "to
restate the relevance of logic to verbal communication and
thereby to prevent the debasement of rhetoric into 
227sophistry." Granting that "logic may stimulate belief 
through external or 'accidental' features of formal argu­
ment such as style or emotional involvement, irrespective 
of its formal correctness," Mills and Petrie, nevertheless, 
maintained that "logic may effect persuasion through its 
own 'proper' nature of providing logically compelling
reasons for belief and the concomitant recognition of the
228rationality of such belief by the audience." It was
in support of that position that their refutative effort 
was addressed.
Patterns of Inference
A cursory survey of contemporary approaches to
226Ibid.
227Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of 
Logic in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV 
(October, 1968), 267.
228Ibid., p. 260.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 0 7
reasoning reveals a continuing interest both in traditional 
logical forms (induction and deduction) and in rhetorical 
patterns of inference (generalizations, analogy, causal 
reasoning), though particular systems differ from text to
text.22  ̂ Some writers have sought to integrate old con-
230structs; others have wished to devise new methods of 
structuring and labeling arguments.23 -̂ These efforts have 
resulted in an investigation of the bases of classifica­
tion, reformulations of inferential processes, and in




In an early attempt to "reformulate" the modes of
reasoning in argumentation, Arthur C. Hastings identified
three differentiating criteria. Observing argument in
more than 250 contexts, Hastings derived nine "major
processes" or "modes" of reasoning, the first three of
229For a summary of a cross-section of these 
approaches, see Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. 
ed., pp. 187-89 .
230See, for example, McBurney and Mills who label 
sign and cause as deductive arguments; example and analogy 
as inductive. McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and 
Debate, Ch. VIII.
231See, for example, the following discussion of 
Hastings' "reformulation."
232For a discussion of "special logics, set out to 
rationalize and systematize advice-giving," see Gronbeck, 
"Alternative Strategies," p. 38.
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2 3 3which he claimed to have a semantic base; the second 
three being based on causal generalization; and the last 
three supporting either semantic or causal conclusions. 
Hastings' "reformulation" follows:
1. Argument from example to a descriptive 
generalization, in which factual informa­
tion or one or more examples leads to the 
conclusion of a general characteristic or 
pattern. The typicality of the examples 
is important, rather than their number.
2. Argument from criteria to a verbal classi­
fication, in which characteristics of an 
event are presented to prove that it fits 
into a verbal category or that it should 
be labeled in a certain way. The semantic 
criteria for the meaning of the conclusion 
are included in the premises. This process 
of reasoning has not been previously 
described.
3. Argument from definition to characteris­
tics, in which an event or principle is 
defined and the logical consequences of 
the definition are applied.
4. Argument from sign to an unobserved event,
in which the existence of one event is
taken as an indication that another event
or condition exists. A high correlation 
exists between the two events.
5. Argument from cause to effect. This is a 
prediction of the consequences of an 
event: if A occurs, B will result. The 
cause may be hypothetical or real.
6. Argument from circumstantial evidence to
hypothesis, in which a fact or facts are 
explained or accounted for by a pattern, 
event, or other fact. A low correlation 
exists between the individual facts in the 
premises and the conclusion.
7. Argument from comparison, in which conclu­
sions drawn about one event are asserted 
to apply to a similar event. This has
2^^Hastings determined that in these cases the 
warrants were semantic or linguistic rules of meaning or 
usage. Arthur C. Hastings, "A Reformulation of the Modes 
of Reasoning in Argumentation" (unpublished dissertation, 
Northwestern University, 1962).
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been called literary analogy, but the two 
types of analogy are so discrete that it 
is unwise to classify them together under 
the same term.
8. Argument from analogy, in which abstract 
relationships of one event are compared to 
another event, and conclusions about the 
first event are asserted to apply to the 
second.
9. Argument from authority or testimony, in 
which the conclusion is justified because 
a person or institution other than the 
speaker asserts its truth. 34
In his chapter on argument in Mills's first edition
of Reason in Controversy, Hastings dropped the "semantic-
causal" rationale, classifying rather according to the
235frequency of usage and the usefulness of arguments.
Windes and Hastings offered a similar explanation for their 
division of arguments which modified Hastings' original 
"reformulation." Windes and Hastings' inclusion of "other
234Ibid.
235Arthur C. Hastings, "Reasoning Processes," in 
Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy; An Introduction to 
General Argumentation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 
1964), pp. 128-47. Hastings' earlier "reformulation" 
remained essentially intact though he allowed for the 
"demands of persuasion." Concerned with the "proof in 
advocacy," Hastings had dealt "exclusively" with 
"rhetorical reasoning." He described its characteristics 
in the Mills text as follows: "The first characteristic
is that rhetorical proof is less demanding than scientific 
proof or the proof of formal logic. . . . Secondly, most 
rhetorical reasoning leads to probable rather than certain 
conclusions as in logic. . . .  A third aspect of rhetorical 
reasoning is that, if persuasion is intended, the premises 
or assumptions in the proof must be drawn from the beliefs 
of the audience, pp. 125-26.
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processes" indicated a less pedantic assessment of forms 
236of reasoning.
Beginning with a differentiation between symbolic
237logic and place or topical logic. Jack Ray and Harry 
Zavos also attempted to sort the "bases" for classifying 
patterns of inference. Interested primarily in place 
logic, the authors concluded:
Arguments can be classified in many ways.
. . . One way is to classify them as deductive
or inductive. Arguments can also be classi­
fied according to the form or the substance of 
the argument, according to the type of propo­
sition involved, according to the kind of 
relationship involved (such as class inclusion, 
correlation, cause, more and less, similarity, 
etc.).238
Ray and Zavos1 own classification which they determined to 
be "more complex" and "more useful" than traditional list­
ings included at least two dimensions of differentiation:
a logical-rhetorical distinction and a marshalling of
236Windes and Hastings modified the original 
"modes" as follows: they retained categories 1, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8; redefined categories 2 and 3 to read "reasoning from 
characteristics to a description (by criteria of defini­
tion)" and "reasoning from characteristics to a value judg­
ment replaced category 9; and added a category called 
"other processes." Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and 
Advocacy, pp. 159-85.
237Jack Ray and Harry Zavos, "Reasoning and Argu­
ment: Some Special Problems and Types," in Perspectives
on Argumentation, ed. by Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. 
Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1966),
pp. 93-94.
238Ibid., p. 94. The authors noted that these 
"distinctions for classifying arguments are not always 
clear and distinct."
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b. Arguments from definition
c. Other arguments with analytic 
reasons
d. Arguments about consistency 






4. Reduction to absurdity, sense 3





a. Argument from circumstance
b. Argument from example
c. Argument from authority
d. Analogy (used as argument)
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Mills's six "bases" of classification, similar to
those proposed by Ray and Zavos, included: traditional
(symbolic) and topical; deductive and non-deductive;
acceptance or rejection of conclusion; cause and sign;
main and justificatory arguments; and classifying according
240to the intent of the communicator. His three-level
outline, "an eclectic system of classifying arguments," 
included "the deductive and non-deductive distinction and 
the truth-value distinction, together with some lesser 
bases which serve to identify the specific subtypes of 




2. Category to traits
3. Apply hypothesis to cases
4. Apply causal principle to cases
B. Value conclusions
1. Characteristics to evaluation
2. Principle to application
II. Nondeductive arguments
A. Truth conclusions
1. Circumstances to hypothesis
2. Analogy
3. Induction to generalization
4. To causal explanation
240Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed.,
pp. 187-91.
241Ibid., p. 191.
242Ibid., pp. 191-92. Bettinghaus discussed 
"functional" and "genetic" patterns of inference along with 
the more traditional "deductive" and "probabilistic" ones. 
However, his discussion is probably outside the scope of 
argumentation and debate theory. See Bettinghaus, Message 
Preparation, Ch. V.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
313
B. Value conclusions
1. Evaluative prediction for one case
2. Evaluative analogy
3. Evaluative generalization
4. Agreement and difference
Mills also distinguished argument from nonargument. He 
said:
Conditional statements, which typically 
include "if" or "if-then" clauses, often 
appear as the first part of hypothetical 
syllogisms. The complete syllogism is an 
argument, but anything less than a conclusion 
and a reason is not. . . .
Simple causal explanation . . .  is not an 
argument. . . . Giving a reason for an occur­
rence is not the same as presenting a reason 
for the acceptance of a belief or a causal 
principle. . . .
Constructive reasoning . . .  is a mental 
activity which is used to reach a conclusion 
on the basis of reasons. It is quite unlike 
argument, which starts with a conclusion or 
claim and supports it with reasons for its 
acceptance.
Structural Alternatives
It has been suggested that the rhetorical 
syllogism, practically taught in most cases as the logical 
syllogism with the qualifier "probably" added to the major 
premise and conclusion, or as an elided syllogism only 
"probably" true, raised critical questions— as did dis-
O A Atinctions between material and logical validity.
^^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 174-75.
^^See Henry W. Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument 
(University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 19 59), Chs. V and VI. See analysis by Smith, 
"Formal Logic in Debate," pp. 330-38.
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Many contemporary writers have tried to answer, or at
least avoid, certain of the problems by advocating various
alternative strategies. Some have turned to modern rhe-
245torical interpretations of the enthymeme. Others have
looked for other structural approaches. Mills named four:
the line diagram; the logical outline; the Venn diagram;
246and the Toulmin layout, the Toulmin model being the most 
influential contemporary construct.
See Miller and Fausti who argued that the 
enthymeme is often neglected. Relying on Bitzer's notion 
that the enthymeme is a cooperative affair between speaker 
and audience, Miller and Fausti said: "In his deductions,
the skillful debater will advance his arguments so as to 
elicit the participation of the listener in constructing 
the chain of deduction. This cooperative deduction, 
regardless of whether to a probable or a necessary conclu­
sion, is called an enthymeme." Arthur B. Miller and Remo 
P. Fausti, Elements of Deliberative Debating (Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969) , p. 28; see
Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (December, 1959), 399-408.
^^Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 182-85.
247In their journal article, Brockriede and 
Ehninger labeled "seven claims" for the superiority of the 
Toulmin model over the traditional syllogism. Wayne 
Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An
Interpretation and Application," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech (February, 1960), 46-47. In Decision by Debate, 
they reduced the claims to four: "(IT In the Toulmin
model, proofs are displayed in a spatial pattern to help 
debaters see a dynamic relationship between evidence and 
claim as certified by principles of reasoning actually used 
by debaters; in the syllogism, proof consists of a series 
of statements that reflect the relatively static relation­
ship of compartmentalization. (2) The Toulmin model pro­
vides explicitly for the material support of warrants; the 
major premises of syllogisms are supportable only by a sort 
of extralogical operation. (3) The Toulmin model empha­
sizes the factual analysis of a unit of proof and material
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In 1958, the British logician Stephen Toulmin
248published The Uses of Argument, a collection of essays
designed to investigate that "everyday'1 argumentation which
had concerned George Pierce Baker one-half century earlier.
Perceiving a relationship between meaning and function in
argument, Toulmin sought to devise a standard of judgment
by evaluating argumentation in "everyday use." He based
his spatial model, therefore, on the jurisprudential
analogy rather than on the mathematical logic of the 
249syllogism.
Toulmin isolated six components of an argument and 
assigned the following labels: data (the facts appealed to
as a foundation for the claim); claim (the assertion);
validity by investigating a proof within the context of all 
related information; the syllogism, more concerned with 
class relationships, emphasizes formal validity and 
achieves a sort of factual analysis only through a complex 
series of syllogisms. (4) The Toulmin model provides 
explicitly for ways of qualifying and limiting the force of 
a claim; the conclusion of a syllogism can often be 
properly qualified or limited only through tortuous and 
involved propositions. Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision 
by Debate, p. 98.
248Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1958).
249Ibid., p. 16. Toulmin wished in his work to 
emphasize "the contrast between the standards and values of 
practical reasoning . . . and the abstract and formal 
criteria relied on in mathematical logic and much of 
twentieth century epistemology," Preface to the paperback 
edition. For a criticism of the approach, see Peter T. 
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argumen­
tation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, III 
(September, 1966), 83-94.
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warrant (a general proposition which "authorizes the step 
from data to claim"); backing (statements of fact which 
justify the warrant's authority); qualifier (that element 
which modifies the force with which the warrant justifies 
the conclusion); and rebuttal (circumstances in which the 
authority of the warrant would not be acceptable).
Toulmin examined field-dependent and field- 
invariant elements in argument, labeling data, backing, 
rebuttal and criteria for the qualifier, specific and 
field-dependent. He designated the warrant and the force 
of the qualifier, field-invariant. He also differentiated 
the meaning or force of modal terms and set out criteria 
for their use.^^





On account of 
B
250Argumentation and debate writers, however, 
generally ignored these latter distinctions.
251Toulmin, Uses of Argument, p. 104.
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He applied the structural model, moreover, to a sample
252argument as follows:
Harry was born} 
in Bermuda }"
{ Harry is a ►So, presumably,{Britis' subjsct
Since







Both his parents 
were aliens/he 
has become a 
naturalized 
American/...
The following statutes 
and other legal provisions:
Having described the function of the terms of his
model, Toulmin rejected the induction-deduction categories
in favor of a new system of classification: warrant-using
(only D-W-C required as the warrant is accepted without
question); warrant-establishing (data and conclusion are
already verified and warrant's authority is established by
253applying it to a series of such conclusions), substan­
tial (backing does not contain information in conclusion);
252Ibid., p. 105.
253Ibid., p. 121.
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and analytic (backing does contain information conveyed in 
conclusion).254
In 1958, Wayne Brockriede introduced the Toulmin 
analysis at the Speech Association of America's annual 
convention.2^  Two years later, a more specific adaptation 
of that model to argumentation and debate theory appeared 
in a joint publication by Brockriede and Ehninger entitled 
"Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Applica­
tion."2^  Three years later in Decision by Debate, those 
authors extended Toulmin's construct beyond its logical
role and used it as an analytical tool for exploring
257authoritative and motivational proof. In an unpublished
Master's thesis, Rita Alvis summarized Ehninger and 
Brockriede's modifications and extensions of Toulmin's 
theory and structural model as follows:
Ehninger and Brockriede extended Toulmin's 
definition of data to include materials of 
opinion as well as fact, and changed the term 
data to the term evidence in Decision by 
Debate. Describing the warrant essentially as 
Toulmin had, they distinguished between an 
inference (a relationship between evidence and 
claim) and the warrant (which certified that 
relationship). Backing became support for the
254Ibid., p. 125.
255James C. McCroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic 
Course," Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965), 91.
2 5 6Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument."
257Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate.
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warrant in Decision by Debate and could be an 
entire argument, standards or principles, as 
well as Toulmin's statements of fact. The back­
ing was not differentiated from the warrant on 
any basis other than function. This change in 
the concept of backing represented the greatest 
difference between the interpretation of the 
elements of argument by Ehninger and Brockriede, 
and Toulmin. Ehninger and Brockriede agreed 
with Toulmin's definition of the qualifier, but 
added the possibility that the qualifier could 
be a statement of probability or a refutation, 
as well as a single term. They placed rebuttal 
in a relationship to the claim based on the 
force of the warrant. They substituted the 
term reservation for rebuttal, moreover, and 
described three kinds of reservations.
In the physical layout, Ehninger and 
Brockriede added a line which connected the 
warrant to the reservation. They also included 
the qualifier in the claim statement.2-5®
Various other adaptations of the Toulmin model have
appeared in argumentation and debate texts,2^  most being
modifications of Ehninger and Brockriede's modifica- 
260tions. That Ehninger and Brockriede's pronouncements
were influential is demonstrated by the widespread agree­
ment on definition and function of terms, the imitation of 
revisions in terminology, and the popularity of their 
physical layout of arguments. Writers who followed did 
not, of course, accept all these vicissitudes. Freeley,
258Rita Alvis, "A Study of the Toulmin Model of 
Argument in Works in Rhetorical Theory" (unpublished 
Master's thesis, University of Alabama, 1971), pp. 53-64.
259For a bibliography, see Jimmie D. Trent,
"Toulmin's Model of an Argument: An Examination and Exten­
sion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV (October, 1968), 
252-59.
260See Alvis, "A Study of the Toulmin Model," for 
changes in terminology and structural model.
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for example, kept Toulmin's terminology, though he defined
similarly to Ehninger and Brockriede and followed the
261physical construct set out in their journal article.
Hastings, on the other hand, equivocal in his definitions,
followed Toulmin in defining data and claim and Ehninger
and Brockriede in delineating qualifier and rebuttal.
Hastings viewed the warrant as the reasoning process and
agreed with Ehninger and Brockriede in defining backing
as evidence or reasoning which explained the truth of the
262warrant. He altered slightly the physical model.
Mills's second edition of Reason in Controversy, on the
other hand, seemed to reflect a preference for the model
263as an analytical rather than critical instrument.
Not all contemporary texts have accepted
enthusiastically Toulmin's model. Some writers have
included it in their texts as a supplement to, rather than
264a substitute for, syllogistic patterns, Certain others
have ignored and/or rejected the paradigm. In one of the 
more comprehensive analyses published in argumentation
261Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed.,
pp. 115-17.
262Hastings, "Reasoning Processes," pp. 126-28.
See also Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, 
pp. 157-59.
263Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., 
pp. 110-11, 184-85.
264See Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed., 
pp. 115-18; 1966 rev. ed., pp. 139-43; Mills, Reason in 
Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., pp. 180-85.
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literature, Peter T. Manicas systematically refuted the
265construct both philosophically and structurally. Though
Manicas thought Toulmin "mistaken in the way in which he
wishes to bring logic into practice," he, nevertheless,
granted that "he [Toulmin] is clearly right in insisting
266that logic must be brought into practice." Manicas
267encouraged more attention to modern logics and "more 
sophisticated treatments of the features of non-deductive 
arguments."268
Testing Inferences
In contemporary theory, as elsewhere, one's view 
of the nature of the inferential process and the patterns 
of reasoning involved determine the tests he chooses.
Those who have included syllogistic reasoning as the common
Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," pp. 83-94. 
Other comprehensive critical reviews have been published 
in philosophical journals. See, for example, J. C. Cooley, 
"On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," Journal of 
Philosophy, LVI (March 26, 1959), 297-319; Joseph L. Cowan, 
"The Uses of Argument— An Apology for Logic," Mind, LXXIII 
(January, 1964), 27-45.
266Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 94.
267Mills and Petrie had also criticized a lack of 
attention to works in modern logic. Mills and Petrie,
"Role of Logic," p. 20 4.
268Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 93. 
Manicas suggested that "of recently published texts on 
argumentation and debate, the only one which shows any real 
sophistication in its grasp of logic and its application to 
debate is Arthur N. Kruger's Modern Debate," p. 93.
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deductive form have also cited its traditional tests. The 
same is true for rhetorical forms. These writers, moreover, 
have detailed numerous fallacies in reasoning. The intro­
duction of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate 
theory has occasioned some new criteria (or at least new 
terminology) for the testing of proof. Ehninger and 
Brockriede set out specific, though largely traditional, 
standards for the "patterns" of proof: cause; sign;
generalization; parallel case; analogy; classification;
269and statistics. More original was their testing of
deficient evidence, unwarranted claims, deficient warrants,
ignored reservations, and overstated claims, though the
270specific questions asked appear largely traditional.
Windes and Hastings advised the following procedure:
In testing arguments the first step is to 
isolate the argument from the surrounding dis­
course and to explicitly formulate [sic] the 
evidence, warrant, and conclusion. . . . Once 
the entire argument is made explicit it may be 
identified as one of the types described in 
this chapter [9 "modes" plus "others" category], 
in which case it should be evaluated according 
to the particular requirements of that type of 
reasoning. If it is not a process explained 
here, then the advocate must determine what 
process it involves and what its requirements 
of proof are.271
^^Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
Ch. X.
270Ibid., Ch. XII. For a summary of these tests, 
see pp. 186-88.
271Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy,
pp. 185-86.
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The Forensic
Though it is too simplistic to suggest that 
contemporary controversies regarding the nature of the 
forensic merely repeat those arguments of earlier years, 
certainly many issues have been the same. Of particular 
importance is the perennial conflict over the "proper" 
end or goal of debate. Ehninger pointed up the centrality 
of this controversy in 19 52 when he observed:
Apparently a few teachers of speech still 
believe that the success of a school's foren- 
sics program may be measured merely by count­
ing the number of cups in its trophy case.
Fortunately, however, the majority are now 
more interested in the contribution which that 
program makes toward the intellectual, social, 
and moral development of the students who 
participate in it.
But while the total growth of the student 
has generally come to be recognized as the 
broad aim of all forensic activities, there is 
considerable disagreement as to how this aim 
may best be achieved.272
Whereas the classic Wells-O'Neill discussions had 
focused primarily on criteria of judgment and dealt with 
ethical questions but peripherally, contemporary writers 
began with the ethical implications of the "game" approach 
to debate. The widespread practice of debating both sides 
of a question caused particular concern. Called by 
Robert M. O'Neill "the single feature of intercollegiate 
debate which has probably provoked more criticism and
211 Douglas Ehninger, "Six Earmarks of a Sound 
Forensics Program," Speech Teacher, I (November, 1952), 
237.
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2 7 3misunderstanding from the outside than any other,” the
"debating both sides" controversy— rekindled by Brooks
Quimby in 1953 and fueled by articles by Kruger and James
McGregor Burns2^ — reached bonfire proportions with the
publication in 1957 of Richard Murphy's "The Ethics of
Debating Both Sides."275 Insisting that "a public
2 7utterance is a public commitment" and implying that to
speak against one's convictions is an unethical act, Murphy
concluded that:
Debate would be in a stronger position if it 
were freed from the anachronistic practice of 
multiple positions. And those who believe in 
the essential processes of democratic debate, 
and wish to extend them, would no longer be 
held liable for a dubious practice, if the 
debate-both-sides policy were abandoned.277
In a review and analysis of Murphy's and rebuttal 
278positions, Ehninger pointed out that "the argumentation
Robert M. O'Neill, "In Print: McBath, Argumen­
tation and Debate (1963 rev. ed.)," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association, I (January, 1964), 40.
27^Brooks Quimby, "But Is It Educational?" Speech 
Activities, IX (Summer, 1953), 30-31. For earlier dis- 
cussions of the issue, see Ch. II of this study. See also 
Arthur N. Kruger, "Is It Educational? Yes," Bulletin of 
the Debating Association of Pennsylvania Colleges, XXII 
(December, 1956), 4-9; James McGregor Burns, "Debate Over 
Collegiate Debates," New York Times Magazine, December 5, 
1954, pp. 12, 30.
O 7 C Richard Murphy, "The Ethics of Debating Both 
Sides," Speech Teacher, VI (January, 1957), 1-9.
276T, . , 0 aIbid., pp. 8-9.
277Ibid., p. 9.
27 8See ibid., pp. 1-9; Nicholas M. Cripe, "Debating
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of neither party will always bear the test of close 
279scrutiny." Ehninger saw the "change-sides" question
280as a "dubious offspring" of the larger, more crucial
issue, "Is school debating a mode of public address or a
pedagogical device— a creature of the platform or of the 
281classroom?" He concluded, moreover, that "the game
concept of school debating not only embraces serious
pedagogical evils, but it is unacceptable socially and
m o r a l l y . H e  said:
The plain fact of the matter, it seems to me, 
is that anything that can be taught by playing 
debating as a game can be taught, and taught 
better, by practicing it as a mode of "real 
life" oral discourse; and, in addition, prac­
ticing it in this way will make a far greater 
contribution to the total development of the 
students who participate in it and to the 
salvation of the society in which they live. 83
Ehninger's statement reflected the philosophy set 
forth in 1952 that "the general development of the student 
is best promoted by a program in which the fundamental
Both Sides in Tournaments Is Ethical," Speech Teacher, VI 
(September, 1957), 209-212; Murphy, "Debating Both Sides," 
pp. 255-56; Donald K. Smith, "Debating Both Sides," Speech 
Teacher, VI (November, 1957), 336; George W. Dell, "In 
Defense of Debating Both Sides," Speech Teacher, VII 
(January, 1958), 31-34.
279Douglas Ehninger, "The Debate About Debating," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIV (April, 1958), 130.
280t, ,,,Ibid., p. 136.
2 81t, . ■, l o iIbid., p. 131.
282Ibid., p. 135.
283Ibid., p. 136.
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intellectual, social, and moral values are regarded as 
284paramount." He and Brockriede predicated Decision by
28 5Debate, moreover, on that commitment,
Ehninger's position was not a particularly popular
286one. As the Klopf-McCroskey survey indicated, directors
of debate were unwilling to reject that "offshoot" of the
contest approach, switch-sides debating. Rather, renewed
efforts appeared to reinforce O'Neill's original thesis.
Windes, for example, two years after the Ehninger analysis
averred that:
Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to 
argumentation. . . . If we set academic 
debating in this context, we can then properly 
assign to it certain goals and objectives well 
within our reach. We can also reject and 
refute criticism of academic debating which 
stems from a misunderstanding of what this 
type of debating actually is.^87
284Ehninger, "Six Earmarks of a Sound Forensics 
Program," p. 241. Ehninger believed such a program would 
be integrated with curriculum instruction in public speak­
ing and fundamentals of speech; student centered; dependent 
on educationally defensible principles regarding participa­
tion; a vehicle for teaching social responsibility; 
progressive; respected in school, community, and region of 
the country where it is carried on, pp. 237-41.
28 5Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate,
preface.
286Donald W. Klopf and James C. McCroskey,
"Debating Both Sides Ethical? Controversy Pau!" Central 
States Speech Journal, XV (February, 1964), 36-39.
287Russel R. Windes, Jr., "Part II. Competitive 
Debating: The Speech Program, the Individual, and
Society," in "A Symposium on Discussion and Debate," Speech 
Teacher, IX (March, 1960), 100.
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On the other hand, John E. Gow agreed with Ehninger 
that a "contest" perspective limits debate's potential 
contribution both to the participants and to society. An 
emphasis on skills "has the detrimental side effect of 
stimulating strategy and tactics that will 'win the 
trophy,'" he said. Gow found the "most unsettling revela­
tion" to be unethical practices in tournament debating,
288particularly in the use of evidence, though he cited
"other weaknesses that vitiate the efficacy of argument
under tournament conditions." He complained:
The language of the average debater runs stale 
with debate jargon— status quo, prima facie 
case, "we find" this and "we find" that; it is 
frequently laced with exorbitant overstatement 
as well. Further, one wonders about the 
instructive value of debate ballots.
Various other similarly negative charges have been
leveled at tournament debating during the contemporary
period. In a symposium, published in the Speech Teacher 
290m  1960, James L. Robinson noted "an increasing trend
John E. Gow, "Tournament Debating: A Time for
Changes," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV 
(Fall, 1967), 107-108. See Carl E. Larson and Kim Giffin, 
"Ethical Considerations in the Attitudes and Practices of 
College Debaters," Journal of the American Forensic Associ­
ation, I (September-) 1964) , 88-90; Robert P. Newman and ™ 
Keith R. Sanders, "A Study in the Integrity of Evidence," 
Journal of the American Forensic Association, II (January, 
1965), 7-13.
2 89Gow, "Tournament Debating," p. 10 8.
290The diverse topics considered m  that symposium 
represent some of the more critical issues surrounding the 
contemporary forensic. "A Symposium on Discussion and
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toward artificiality and . . . 'shysteristic'
2Q 1practices." Recognizing that lack of audiences, desire
to add hardware to trophy cases, and the hierarchy of
tournaments leading to the National Championship are
probably contributing factors, Robinson laid much of the
blame for such practices on the "overlegalism" of 
292debate. Merrill Christopherson, in that same series
of discussions, labeled tournament debating "mere exercises
in technique, instead of attempts at meaningful argu- 
293ment." For Christopherson,
A great debater seems to speak from a wisdom 
larger than himself, yet in a style wholly his 
own. He fills the mind of his listeners with 
his subject in a manner peculiar to him. 94
Debate (Glen E. Mills, Part I. "Audiences and Tournaments: 
Two Forms of Over-Emphasis," pp. 9 5-98; Russel R. Windes, 
Jr., Part II. "Competitive Debating: The Speech Program,
the Individual, and Society," pp. 99-108; James L.
Robinson, Part III. "Are We 'Overlegalizing1 School 
Debate?" pp. 109-115; Merrill G. Christopherson, Part IV. 
"The Necessity for Style in Argument, pp. 116-20; Austin 
J. Freeley, Part V. "An Anthology of Commentary on 
Debate," pp. 121-26; Kim Giffin and Brad Lashbrook,
Part VI. "'Group Action' in Perspective," pp. 127-30; 
Kenneth Anderson and Jerome B. Polisky, Part VII. "The 
Application of the Symposium-Forum to Contest Debating," 
pp. 131-34), Speech Teacher, IX (March, 1960), 95-134.
291Robinson, Part III in "A Symposium," p. 109.
292Ibid., pp. 109-110.
29 3Christopherson, Part IV in "A Symposium," p. 320.
29 4 .Ibid., p. 116.
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Not hesitant to indict certain tournament debate 
practices, contemporary writers have been no less deter­
mined to find remedies for them. Suggesting reforms both 
within and outside the framework of tournament competition, 
writers have revised formats, devised new methods of judg­
ing, and advanced techniques for insuring more ethical uses 
of evidence. Certain representative prescriptions follow.
To meet the criticisms of artificiality, Walter
Murrish— among others— proposed that persuasion in debate
295would be enhanced by new approaches to judging.
Accordingly, he advocated an increased use of lay judges,I 29 2Q 7"terminal" ballots, and ballots cast by debaters. A
purely statistical alternative to traditional methods of
29 8judging also emerged. Robert E. Litke devised a method
295Walter H. Murrish, "Training the Debater in 
Persuasion," Journal of the American Forensic Association,
I (January, 1964), 7-12.
296This would require a judge to give a tentative 
decision after each speech in the debate.
297For an evaluation of these proposals, see Gow, 
"Tournament Debating," p. 109. See also Donald Klopf, 
Diana Evans, and Sister Mary Linus de Lozier, "Comparative 
Studies of Students, Laymen, and Faculty Members as Judges 
of Speech Contests," Speech Teacher, XIV (November, 1965), 
314-18; Larry L. Barker, "A Comparative Analysis of 
Debater-Judge Ratings," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, I (January, 1965), 16-20.
^®See Jack W. Murphy and Wayne E. Hensley, "Do 
Debaters Know When They Win or Lose?" Speech Teacher, XV 
(March, 1966), 145-47. See also Roger Hufford, "Tie 
Breaking: The Quality Point System," Journal of the
American Forensic Association, V (Winter, 1968), 21-24.
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for selecting winning debate teams in tournament competi-
299tion based on matrix algebra. Litke believed that "the
method may be superior to win-loss and team-point methods 
because (1) the number of ties is reduced and (2) 'luck of 
the draw' is reduced."3^  The American Forensic Associa­
tion ballot represented another attempt at increasing 
reliability in judging.3^3-
Contemporary concerns with ethics gave rise to 
various codes of debating. Robert B. Capel and George
Cariker published a code in the Forensic of Pi Kappa 
302Delta; Robert P. Newman drafted The Pittsburgh Code
303for Academic Debate in 1962, and the American Forensic 
Association approved a code in December, 1967, which it 
amended in 1969 to include enforcement provisions.^04
299Robert E. Litke, "Dominance Matrices for Deter­
mining Winners of Debate Tournaments," Speech Teacher, XV 
(November, 1966), 295-98.
3Q°Ibid., p. 298.
3(33-See Journal of the American Forensic Association, 
I (May, 1964), 74-75.
302Robert B. Capel and George Cariker, "A Debate 
Code of Ethics," Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta, XLVII 
(October, 1961), 7, 30.
303Robert P. Newman, The Pittsburgh Code for 
Academic Debate (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1962) .
304See Journal of the American Forensic Association, 
V (Spring, 19687"!! 82-84; Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, VII (Winter, 1970), 53-56.
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Documented fabrications and misquotations of 
evidence3®^ called for further reforms. Keith Sanders 
suggested three: a requirement for the documentation of
all evidence; better informed coaches, since the responsi­
bility for error rests with them; and an increased number 
of tape-recorded debates.39  ̂ Ehninger and Brockriede
included an "ethic of evidence" as well as "a rhetoric"
307in Decision by Debate. Gow recommended the adoption
of an examination and penalty system and felt that
"experimentation in potential avenues of control and
30 8enrichment should be constant." He encouraged a
formal "challenge of the evidence" at the end of a debate
and advocated including "an item on the ballot which calls
for the judge to assess the overall ethical practices of
..309the competitors.
Believing that weaknesses in college debating 
often result from the nature of the forensic itself, some
30 5See Newman and Sanders, "Integrity of Evidence,"
pp. 7-13.
306Keith R. Sanders, "Toward a Solution to the 
Misuse of Evidence," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association, III (January, 1966), 8-10.
30 7Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 
pp. 116-21. See also earlier discussion of evidence in 
this chapter.
30 8Gow, "Tournament Debating," pp. 110-11.
309Ibid., p. 111.
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writers have investigated audience debating,forums,
312parliamentary, and problem-solving debating as well as
313contest discussion as supplements and/or alternatives
to traditional tournament debate competition. Audience
debating has been of particular interest. Questioning the
"seriousness of the charges brought against tournament
debating" and "the values of the intended reforms," Mills,
however, challenged "the wisdom of substituting one kind of
314over-emphasis for another." W. Scott Nobles and Herman
Cohen objected, moreover, to "the disjunctive premise about
forensics," i.e., "the assumption that a forensic program
must be based either upon tournament activities or upon
315non-tournament, public debating." Though aware of
problems such as budget, administration, number and 
capacity of students, Nobles and Cohen concluded that:
310John K. Boaz and George Ziegelmueller, "An 
Audience Debate Tournament," Speech Teacher, XIII 
(November, 1964), 270-76.
311See Owen Peterson, "Forum Debating," Speech 
Teacher, XIV (November, 1965), 286-90.
312See Bruce Markgraf, "The Parliamentary Debate m  
Action," Speech Teacher, XII (September, 1963), 219-22;
John Graham, "Something New in Student Legislatures,"
Speech Teacher, XII (January, 1963), 32-33.
313See Gow, "Tournament Debating," p. 109; Anderson 
and Polisky, Part VII in "A Symposium," pp. 131-34; Giffin 
and Lashbrook, Part VI in "A Symposium," pp. 127-30.
314Mills, Part I in "A Symposium," p. 95.
315W. Scott Nobles and Herman Cohen, "The Dis­
junctive Premise About Forensics," Speech Teacher, VIII 
(November, 1959), 316.
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Every forensic director must tailor the pro­
gram he plans and sponsors to his own local 
situation. . . . Whatever the details of his 
program, however, it must aim at the fullest 
possible training of his students in all 
facets of rhetoric. The attainment of this 
goal demands, not that he make the proper 
dicision about whether to emphasize tournament 
speaking or the public forum, but rather that 
he make the fullest possible use of these two 
valuable and complementary methods of speech 
training.
Gow agreed. "In addition to encouraging forensic directors
to increase the number of non-decision, audience-centered
experiences wherever possible," he said, "a wider variety
of tournament or conference offerings should be stimu- 
317lated." Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn proposed
318a challenge debate tournament. Gerald Phillips
suggested that town meetings, festivals, legislative
assemblies, problem-solving tournaments, and student forums
319be run in conjunction with tournament debating.
Not all the criticisms leveled at debating could 
be ameliorated by revisions in judging procedures or in 
formats or by a greater concern with ethics. Rather, some 
of the more incisive, more fundamental, barbs grew out of
316Ibid., p. 320.
317Gow, "Tournament Debating," pp. 110-11.
318Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn, "A 
Challenge Debate Tournament," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association, V (Winter, 1968), 1-9.
319Gerald M. Phillips, "Imagination— The Answer to 
Tournament Debate," Speech Teacher, IX (September, 1960), 
205-210.
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what Ehninger called "a failure to recognize important 
limitations of debate as a generic mode of argumentative 
deliberation." Ehninger recognized that debate is 
by nature indecisive, bilateral, verbal, and can deal 
only with means, not ends. Yet, he did not find these
limitations debilitating. His commitment to the superi-
321ority of the debate process rested on a belief in the
322reliability and humaneness of debate. Ehninger said:
Besides being self-corrective and hence 
reliable in a way that authority and intui­
tion are not, debate also is more humane in 
the sense that it elevates and dignifies 
man while the alternative methods minimize 
or degrade him. 3
Summary
Contemporary argumentation and debate writers have 
derived no consistent way of approaching their discipline. 
Despite a lack of continuity in treatments, a continuing 
interest has persisted in the methods and ends appropriate 
to argumentation and in the relation of argumentation to 
other subjects. Much justificatory rationale for debating
320Ehninger, "Debate as Method," p. 180.
321t, . ,Ibid.
322Ibid., p. 184.
323Ibid., p. 185. See also Henry W. Johnstone, 
Jr., "The Nature of Philosophical Controversy," Journal 
of Philosophy, XLI (May 13, 1954), 294-300; Ehninger and 
Brockriede, Decision by Debate, pp. 16-18.
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within the humanistic tradition has been stimulated by a 
renewed interest in debate as advocacy. The inquiry- 
advocacy dichotomy has pervaded notions about the analysis 
of propositions, their proof, and the judgment as well as 
the nature of the forensic.
Most contemporary writers have continued to include 
definition and stock issues as the major components of 
analysis. Also of interest have been developments in the 
classification of propositions: an expanding of the tri­
partite system; a trend toward combining fact and value 
propositions; and the exclusion in seme quarters of policy 
questions. Cronkhite presented what has been called the 
most radical approach which isolated both judgmental and 
temporal dimensions.
Inherency emerged as one of the more controversial 
constructs of the contemporary period. Involving the need 
issue in propositions of policy, demonstrating causality, 
and implying a restrictive view of the prima facie case, 
inherency forced reassessments of burden of proof and 
presumption. Its most vocal antagonists, advocates of the 
comparative advantage alternative, rejected its 
assumptions.
Most contemporary texts have depended on tradi­
tional notions of proof as evidence plus reasoning. They 
have continued to rely, moreover, on the logical syllogism, 
Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies. Some writers,
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however, have investigated other alternatives. Of par­
ticular interest has been reclassification of arguments in 
terms of common bases. Three other developments are note­
worthy: a behavioral approach to evidence in certain
works; the introduction of the Toulmin structural model 
into argumentation and debate theory; and a renewed interest 
by some writers in motivation and ethos as proof.
The strategy of attack and defense has forced 
reevaluations of the "appropriate" ends of argumentation 
and debating with controversy centering on the ethics of 
debating both sides of an issue, unethical practices in 
intercollegiate debating, and standards for judgment. 
Predispositions and premises regarding these issues have 
tended to follow the inquiry-advocacy dilemma.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In 1895, George Pierce Baker of Harvard College 
published The Principles of Argumentation, the first modern 
textbook on argument. It has been the purpose of this 
study to trace the development of argumentation and debate 
theory from that work. Neither a checklist nor an anno­
tated bibliography, the immediate study has identified, 
described, and analyzed important extensions, deletions, 
and modifications of theory. Central to its organizational 
pattern is the assumption that developments in theory may 
be isolated within prescribed chronological bounds; i.e., 
"early" (1895-1917), "middle" (1917-c. 1955), and "con­
temporary" (c. 1955-1970) periods. An examination of over 
1,500 textbooks and journal articles confirms that these 
divisions are not wholly arbitrary.
Though, in a strict sense, Baker's Principles 
launched neither the practice nor the theory of argumenta­
tion, his commitment to a "practical" application "for 
everyday life" gave the discipline new direction and 
impetus. Baker's rejection of a total dependency on Formal 
Logic, rhetoric, and rules of law, moreover, and his
337
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emphasis on the analysis of the argumentative proposition 
ran counter to Richard Whately's view of argumentation as 
the logical demonstration of a priori truth. Though Baker's 
students Raymond Alden, George Pattee, and William Trufant 
Foster professed a philosophical interest in a broad scope 
for argumentation, they emphasized the spoken debate. And 
though their texts retained Baker's exposition of analysis, 
these writers also included more traditional approaches to 
proof, derived from Formal Logic. Less concerned with 
"practical" argumentation than with the reality of school 
debating, Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales made no 
pretense at minimizing formal distinctions drawn from other 
disciplines. In the rewriting of their text, James M. 
O'Neill reemphasized the interrelationships.
The year 1917 may be established as a watershed in 
the development of argumentation and debate theory. The 
publication of two landmark works, Foster's second edition 
of Argumentation and Debating and O'Neill's revision of 
Laycock and Scales's Argumentation and Debate, entrenched 
the standard tradition. That same year, however, grave 
dissatisfactions surfaced in the journals. Mary Yost's 
protests for a sociological context for argumentation gave 
way to Charles H. Woolbert's restructuring of the dis­
cipline from the behavioral psychological perspective.
Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, objected to the 
narrow confines of the traditional logics embodied in most
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works. The Wells-O'Neill controversy emphasized the 
prevailing philosophical rift over the "proper" end of 
debate, that form of argumentation which had gained 
ascendency.
"Middle period" writers responded to the Yost- 
Woolbert-Graham criticisms variously and consistently 
with their philosophical predispositions. Whereas George 
Collins and John Morris rewrote the theory of argumenta­
tion in terms of persuasion and debate, James A. Winans 
and William E. Utterback, A. Craig Baird, and Charles 
Fritz updated traditional theory in terms of modern 
sociological and psychological principles with some 
attention to modern logics. Efforts, moreover, to 
restate argumentation's ends in terms of social goals, 
reminiscent of Baker's plea for a practical argumentation, 
resulted in a broadening of argumentation's scope to 
include discussion, an emphasis on a balanced rhetorical 
effort including persuasion as well as conviction as 
appropriate ends of argument, and expanded treatments of 
audience. Baird, who was instrumental in all these 
developments, spanned the entire period, both in his works 
and influence. Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer's 
widely used text reflected Baird's philosophy of discus­
sion. Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg's Oral 
Decision-Making and William Behl's Discussion and Debate 
built on both works.
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The standard tradition not only survived, but it 
prospered during the "middle period." Foster's Argumen­
tation and Debating continued to be among the most popular 
works, going through numerous printings and a "second 
revised edition" as late as 1945. O'Neill, meanwhile, 
began to co-author works with Andrew T. Weaver and James M. 
McBurney. These texts retained traditional notions of 
argumentation and emphasized the "game" approach to 
debating. W. C. Shaw's open advocacy of strategy rein­
forced O'Neill's position.
The philosophical split over the appropriate end 
of debate, anticipated by the shift from Whately to Baker 
but most clearly exemplified by the Wells-O-Neill contro­
versy, had influenced "early" and "middle" period discus­
sions of the forensic itself. During the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, in large measure, it also determined one's 
view of analysis and proof. The terms advocacy and inquiry 
denote the polarity of the controversy. Disciples of Baker 
and reared in the Baird, Ewbank-Auer tradition, Ehninger 
and Brockriede occupy that end of the continuum which 
perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry, an instru­
ment of decision-making. At the other end, one finds 
Kruger, heir to the O'Neill-Shaw philosophy, proponent 
of advocacy, logic, strategy, attack and defense. Freeley 
and Mills, among others, have attempted to bridge the 
intermediate chasm. Though probably most influential in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4 1
contemporary textbook treatments of the principles and 
procedures of argumentation, the critical underlying issue, 
the appropriate end or goal of debate, has pervaded most 
of the significant controversies and prompted many of the 
developments in argumentation and debate theory in all 
periods. A summary of the major areas of investigation 
of this study confirms this conclusion.
The Nature of Argumentation
Despite Baker's insistence on a "practical" 
argumentation independent of the strictures imposed by 
other disciplines, most "early period" writers continued 
to rely on prescriptions from Formal Logic, law, and 
rhetorical composition. Rhetoric provided principles 
of arrangement, style, and delivery and emphasized per­
suasion. Law included rules of evidence, a method of 
analysis (briefing) and a highly structured procedural 
system (including the concepts of prima facie case, burden 
of proof, and presumption) for the carrying on of argumen­
tation. Formal Logic, moreover, provided the concept of 
the proposition and set out specific rules and structures 
for its proof.
At one time or another, most of the preceding 
elements have been declared inappropriate or unnecessary 
for argumentation. Witness: Baker's contention that
rules of arguing in law courts are not essential for 
"practical" argumentation; a reviewer's astonishment at
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Baird's inclusion of a chapter on delivery; the decreased 
emphasis on brief-drawing; Kruger's conviction that 
academic debate is not primarily an exercise in public 
speaking; a contemporary interest in "deliberative" as 
opposed to "forensic" debating; a behavioral approach to 
evidence which rejects the quasi-legal perspective. The 
role of Formal Logic in argumentation and the relation­
ship— if any— of conviction to persuasion has created, 
however, most controversy.
Though Baker had rejected Formal Logic as essential 
for "practical" argumentation— preferring "applied logic" 
such as that set out by Alfred Sidgwick— most subsequent 
writers included detailed sections on the logical syllo­
gism, John Stuart Mill's canons of induction, and 
fallacies. "Middle period" writers attempted to update 
traditional treatments, moreover, by sandwiching Bernard 
Bosanquet and John Dewey between Mill and Aristotle.
Certain contemporary texts included the Toulmin analysis.
Traditional theory came under attack not only from 
those who wished to update its logic, but severe indict­
ments came from those who perceived persuasion to be within 
the scope of argumentation. Though Baker suggested that 
argumentation may be accomplished by either reasoning or 
the emotions, and although his revision with Huntington 
called the processes "complementary," evidence does not 
suggest that most "early period" writers thought a
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separation between conviction and persuasion to be 
"artificial." Rather, their treatments reflected the 
prevailing faculty psychology. Woolbert, a behaviorist, 
rejected the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and insisted 
that the mind must be viewed as "an organic unit." His 
reformulations— buttressed by "middle period" interests 
both in social context and in public discussion, i.e., 
audiences— prompted a reshuffling of priorities, the 
result being a more central role for persuasion in argu­
mentation and debate theory. The writings of such con­
temporary psychologists as William James, Carl Seashore,
E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and Floyd Allport added 
new dimensions and, in some instances, new "respectability 
to that theory. Not all "middle period" writers, however, 
accepted such an expanded role for argumentation. Foster 
for example, continued to treat the processes separately 
and emphasized conviction in his 1932 revision of Argu­
mentation and Debating.
Persuasion's "place" in contemporary theories of 
argumentation has been determined largely by one's view 
of the nature and end of debate. Whereas Ehninger and 
Brockriede, for example, emphasized motivational proof in 
their text, Kruger dismissed such proof as inappropriate 
for academic debate. Contemporary writers have subjected 
the role of Formal Logic in argumentation to the same 
criterion. Those who deem advocacy to be the appropriate
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end of argument have returned reason, if not logic, to a 
position of primacy in the discipline, though at least one 
writer has suggested that such treatments continue out of 
tradition only. At the other extreme is the position that 
Formal Logic's role in argumentation is one simply of style 
and plausibility. The contemporary search for alternate 
logical structures— most clearly demonstrated by the 
interest in bases of classification and the introduction 
of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate theory—  
suggests a continuing commitment to an "applied logic" for 
practical argumentation.
Analysis
Baker's discussion of analysis, considered by many 
his most influential contribution to argumentation and 
debate theory, included four major steps in its revised 
form— phrasing the proposition, defining the terms, 
finding the special issue, and case. Alden expanded the 
concept to include objections to affirmative propositions, 
thereby opening the way for a clash on issues.
The concept of the proposition, rooted in Formal 
Logic, had been applied to argumentation at least since 
the time of Whately. Alden, among the first writers to 
discuss the debate proposition, set out characteristics 
of a "good" proposition which other writers expanded.
"Good propositions," typical texts averred, place the 
burden of proof on the affirmative, contain an assertion
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about one central idea, and are unambiguous, interesting, 
clear, and unbiased. The comprehensive standards set out 
in the Foster and O'Neill texts provided the framework for 
most subsequent treatments.
Early period writers began to classify proposi­
tions according to subject matter— i.e., propositions of 
fact and policy. Though O'Neill thought such a procedure 
"hardly worthwhile," most "middle period" texts did include 
fact and policy classifications. Some writers attempted 
further subdivisions. Baird, for example, separated 
theoretically sound policy questions from those involving 
practical policy. Various divisions of propositions of 
fact, meanwhile, resulted from attempts to isolate the 
evaluative dimension. Wagner provided the most lasting 
label, propositions of value, which he treated as a sepa­
rate class. ihough most contemporary writers have fol­
lowed the fact-value-policy distinctions, further attempts 
to classify propositions have resulted in an expanding of 
the tripartite structure, the combining of fact and value 
propositions, and the exclusion of policy questions as a 
separate category.
Baker examined definition as a second step in 
analysis. Rejecting dictionary definitions as insufficient, 
he discussed one's own experience and a careful examination 
of the words themselves as sources of the meaning of 
propositions. Alden added the notion "under the
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circumstances." The Baker-Huntington revision included a 
study of the history of the question and labeled clearness, 
convincingness, and brevity as essentials of a good 
definition. Foster advised defining from etymology, 
authority, negation, exemplification, and explication. 
Subsequent writers, following these general distinctions, 
added other "methods": continuum; comparison-contrast;
function; example; context. Ehninger and Brockriede's 
approach— definition by classification, necessary condi­
tions, and operational description— is probably the most 
distinctive available in contemporary literature.
Discovering the issues was, for Baker, the third 
major step in analysis. He devised a method of residues 
(excluding unimportant, irrelevant, and admitted matter) 
for finding the "special" issue, that central idea or 
group of ideas around which the controversy centers.
Laycock and Scales located the "stress of the controversy" 
by "clash of opinion" and examined primary and subordinate 
issues. O'Neill, furthermore, insisted that issues are 
not simply main points or points on which there is a clash 
of opinion, but they are the smallest possible division of 
crucial points, each one of which the affirmative must 
establish to establish the proposition.
Whereas the "clash of opinion" provided the issues 
for most early period writers, and though such alternatives 
as Shaw's "phase system" of analysis appeared, most "middle
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period" texts tended to rely on stock issues. Rooted in 
the classical doctrine of stasis and discussed in argumen­
tation literature at least as early as J. R. Pelsma and 
Harry B. Gough, stock issues provided not only a method 
of analysis but also an outline of points in partition. 
Though O'Neill thought it "unsafe" to accept stock issues 
as "the exact issues," most middle period writers did just 
that. Dewey's reflective thinking model, meanwhile, became 
the primary tool for dissecting discussion questions. Most 
contemporary writers have continued to rely on standardized 
methodology for determining issues. Lee Huitzen introduced 
what is probably the most unique modern system. He 
included four stock issues (ill, blame, cure, cost) and 
three sub-issues (conjecture, definition, quality).
Though Baker considered case to be a step in 
analysis, most writers who followed him treated it as a 
result of analysis. Whereas the brief, moreover, consti­
tuted the points in partition for Baker, most subsequent 
writers redefined case in terms of the rhetorical outline. 
O'Neill's early comprehensive treatment of case set out 
both affirmative and negative prerogatives. An affirmative 
must establish a prima facie case which discharges the 
burden of proof and overcomes the negative presumption, 
O'Neill averred. The negative has four alternatives: 
pure refutation; defense of the present; adjustment; and 
counter proposition.
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Writers had applied the terms burden of proof and 
presumption to argumentation at least since the time of 
Whately. Though Baker largely ignored the concepts/ Alden 
gave them currency and identified them with debating.
Early the question arose as to whether the burden of proof 
shifts. O'Neill introduced the legal term burden of 
rebuttal to denote that part of the responsibility which 
does shift. Wells suggested that it is the burden to 
produce evidence which shifts, the burden of the issue.
The contemporary concept of inherency forced reassessments 
of traditional notions of burden of proof, presumption, and 
the prima facie case.
Though "early period" writers clearly separated 
the rhetorical outline, points in partition, or case from 
the brief, they continued to rely on brief-drawing both 
to provide the issues through the clash in opinion and to 
demonstrate the logical relationships between these issues. 
During the "middle period," however, the affirmative case 
evolved largely into an explication of stock issues, par­
ticularly in propositions of policy. The most radical 
departure from this traditional system was the comparative 
advantage affirmative which ignored the traditional need 
analysis. Proponents of inherency challenged the validity 
of the comparative advantages case, arguing that the 
alternative does not discharge the burden of proof, 
traditionally an affirmative responsibility.
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Although the use of the term is not new in argumen­
tation and debate theory, inherency as an important theo­
retical construct is a phenomenon of the contemporary 
period. As discussed by its most avid proponents, 
inherency involves the need issue in propositions of 
policy, being linked with "the essential characteristic 
of the status quo." It demonstrates causality and implies 
a restrictive view of the prima facie case. Inherency has 
inquired into the defining of propositions and into the 
main issues essential to proving one's case.
"Middle period," and particularly "contemporary," 
writers have attended more carefully to refutation and 
rebuttal than did their "early period" counterparts. 
Clarifications of negative alternatives, particularly the 
counter-plan, have appeared. Specific work for rebuttal 
speeches has been outlined and techniques of attack and 
defense have been detailed. Much praised and much 
maligned, the concept of strategy has served to focus much 
of the controversy. Associated with winning, with placing 
an opponent at a disadvantage, with what Musgrave called 
"outwitting" not "outplodding in the library," strategy 
pervaded the numerous "how to" books of the "middle 
period." Both during that time and in more contemporary 
works, strategy has reflected a shift from the traditional 
structuring and proof of arguments to the preparing of 
debaters for intercollegiate competition. The contemporary 
period includes a fair share of both approaches.
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Proof
Though Best's definition of proof as "anything 
which serves . . .  to convince the mind of the truth or 
the falsehood of a fact or proposition"^ left the way 
clear for the accommodation of ethos and pathos, tradi­
tionally most writers have restricted the concept of proof 
to logical appeals. Woolbert's insistence on the totality 
of response and Ehninger and Brockriede's application of 
Toulmin's structural model of argument to both motiva­
tional and authoritative proofs, however, are notable 
exceptions.
In an effort to minimize the role of Formal Logic 
in argumentation, Baker perceived evidence to be the 
integrating factor of proof, reasoning being a kind of 
evidence. Laycock and Scales, on the other hand, set out 
evidence and reasoning as the two major components of 
proof. Most subsequent works— Foster notwithstanding—  
followed the latter alternative and differentiated evidence 
(the material of proof) from argument (the machinery).
The Toulmin structural model represents a contemporary 
attempt at integration.
Argumentation and debate texts, regardless of 
period, have relied almost solely on legal definitions and 
classifications of evidence. Whereas "early period"
^William Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed. 
(Boston: Boston Book Company, 1908), p. 180.
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writers limited their definitions to fact, opinion being a 
kind of fact, later writers presented fact and opinion as 
two correlative parts of evidence. Some texts defined 
evidence, moreover, in terms of its "constituents" (facts, 
statistics, objects, et cetera). More significant, however, 
has been the contemporary development of assessing the 
function of proof as belief, not proof. The ramifications 
of this behavioral perspective relate, moreover, to one's 
view of the nature and end of debate.
Some contemporary writers have examined the rela­
tion of evidence to kinds of propositions, issues, or 
claims. Terris, for example, suggested that the fact- 
value distinction depends on the type of evidence used to 
prove it. Ehninger and Brockriede limited authoritative 
proof to designative and definitive claims. Robert Newman 
and Dale Newman correlated evidential forms with direc­
tional, positional, and predicative statements. Gerald R. 
Miller related goals to propositions from a belief, rather 
than probative perspective.
Treatments of evidence as the material of proof 
stimulated an early interest in research and in the 
recording and tabulating of materials. Contemporary texts 
demonstrate no such continuity. Whereas some writers have 
emphasized research materials, others omit them completely.
It has been suggested that traditional applications 
of Formal Logic to argumentation and debate theory faced 
fire from several directions. Baker dismissed Formal
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Logic's usefulness for a "practical argumentation for 
everyday life." Woolbert attacked Formal Logic's psycho­
logical bases. Graham indicted contemporary treatments 
of logic as "insufficient" and "fragmentary." Dewey argued 
that logical forms are essentially rhetorical and proposed 
a "scientific method" for the solution of problems. Most 
writers, however, unwilling to reject the methodology and 
security of Formal Logic, unable to accept the Collins and 
Morris analysis inspired by Woolbert, and uncertain about 
the application of Dewey's method of reflective thinking 
to argumentation, simply updated their bibliographies and 
followed the systems set out by Foster and O'Neill in 
1917.
Foster perceived the induction-deduction distinc­
tion to be critical. Within that framework, he examined 
the "typical forms" of reasoning— example, analogy, 
generalization, and argument from causal relation. O'Neill, 
on the other hand, believed that the real process of 
inference is the same in both induction and deduction. 
Accordingly, he separated rhetorical classes (antecedent 
probability, sign, and example) from logical classes of 
argument (induction and deduction). Both Foster and 
O'Neill detailed rules for the syllogism, discussed Mill's 
canons of induction (via Jevons' explanations), and set
out fallacies.
In addition to following preceding analyses, some 
writers sought to integrate old concepts. Others developed
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new methods for structuring and labeling arguments. Of 
particular interest in the contemporary period has been a 
reformulation of the modes of argument in terms of common 
bases of classification and the introduction of the Toulmin 
structural model into argumentation and debate theory. 
Interpreted initially by Brockriede, the Toulmin model has 
been transmitted to subsequent argumentation and debate 
texts primarily through the modified constructs set out by 
Ehninger and Brockriede. Various other adaptations and 
extensions have appeared, serving both as supplements to 
syllogistic reasoning and as a substitute for Formal 
Logic. The Toulmin analysis has not been without its 
detractors, however, Peter Manicas constructing one of 
the more incisive negative cases in argumentation and 
debate literature.
Traditionally one's view of the nature of proof 
has influenced his methodology for its evaluation. Baker, 
for example, differentiated external tests of evidence 
from internal tests of reasoning. Writers have appro­
priated legal tests of evidence to assess reliability, 
accuracy, verifiability, recency, representativeness, and 
competency of source. Audience acceptability has surfaced 
as a contemporary test of evidence in some works, though 
it is not a universally accepted criterion. Argumentation 
and debate writers have tested reasoning, moreover, by 
applying tests of the logical syllogism and by questioning
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the "representativeness" of induction. Some writers who 
included enthymematic reasoning or the Toulmin structural 
model have set out appropriate evaluative standards. 
Consistent with an emphasis on empiricism and pragmatism, 
an interest in material validity has also persisted with 
detailed sections on fallacies continuing into contemporary 
works.
The Forensic 
Whereas Baker had approached the forensic as a 
written composition, believing that common principles apply 
to both oral and written discourse, most subsequent 
writers— disciples and critics alike— emphasized the spoken 
debate. The resulting descriptions and treatments reflect 
differing notions about the forensic and its relation 
to argumentation. Some writers perceived debating to be 
a form of argumentation. Others used the terms synony­
mously. Another, less influential, group treated argu­
mentation and debating as kinds of persuasion.
Baker's view of the forensic stressed argumentative 
composition and demanded attention to rules of arrangement 
and style. Alden emphasized delivery and platform decorum. 
Most succeeding texts included discussions of these 
rhetorical elements, though certain contemporary theorists 
have accorded them less importance.
The carrying on of the spoken debate prompted 
dissension among "early period" writers, rules and formats
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 5 5
differing from one debate to another. Though the debate 
tournament helped to standardize procedures, it did not 
dispel anxiety over format. Conversely, it increased the 
concern in some quarters. The "middle period" emphasis on 
social context, moreover, prompted a demand for audiences.
An interest in public discussion stressed cooperation 
and minimized the "competition" fostered by tournament 
debating. Reassessments of traditional forms of debating 
resulted in revised tournament formats (cross-examination, 
direct clash, congressional debating) and in methods for 
discussing multi-sided questions (convention debating, 
discussion contests). The advent of no-decision debating 
led to still other possibilities, radio debating being 
particularly popular. Coaches and tournament directors 
experimented with heckling, dialectic, forums, and British 
forms, to mention some of the more obvious. Concerned with 
an overemphasis on "academic" debating and anxicus to 
discourage unethical practices in tournament competition, 
contemporary writers have offered similar alternatives.
Of particular interest have been non-tournament formats. 
Underlying these various alternatives to the forensic have 
been varying philosophical predispositions about the nature 
and end of argumentation and, more specifically, of 
debating.
What is the "proper" or "appropriate" end of 
debating? Should debating be a true to life venture or 
is it merely an academic contest, a game? Is a public
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utterance a public commitment? Is debating primarily a 
pedagogical device? The Wells-0'Neill discussions brought 
this pervasive tneoretical issue into sharp focus while 
the contemporary inquiry-advocacy split has given it 
currency. The divisiveness engendered by differing views 
of the "proper" end of debating has influenced not only 
format, but it has reached into such issues as judging and 
ethics.
The 0'Neil1-Wells controversy evolved into a 
discussion of standards of judgment. Wells advocated a 
"juryman" who would judge on the merits of competing cases. 
O'Neill insisted on a "critic judge" who would decide on 
the merit of the debating. This clash underscored the 
relativity of standards of judgment. Woodward, in an 
attempt to place judging on a scientific basis, proposed 
the shift-of-opinion ballot. Other standardized criteria 
appeared, the contemporary American Forensic Association 
ballot being among the more influential.
Whereas the Wells-0'Neill articles emphasized 
judging and dealt with ethical questions but peripherally, 
contemporary writers began with the "ethical" implications 
of the "game" approach to debating. The primary issue, the 
common tournament practice of debating both sides of a 
question, was not new, Foster having raised objections to 
the practice as early as 190 8. The Murphy-Cripe-Ehninger
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articles emphasized the broader implications of that 
controversy.
The preponderance of argumentation and debate 
theory, 1970, bears little resemblance to that "practical 
argumentation for everyday life" envisioned by George 
Pierce Baker seventy-five years ago. Baker perceived no 
"academic" debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate 
tournament competition. His commitment, rather, was to 
the discovery, selection, and structuring of arguments for 
the everyday affairs of men. This study has traced the 
developments which resulted in that philosophical shift.
Various indictments and/or justifications for
argumentation and debate have appeared since 1895 and
numerous alternatives to the structure and evaluation of
argumentation's most persistent form have been advanced.
Ehninger, however, probably expressed the consensus of
writers since Alden when he suggested debating to be
"superior to any alternative method for achieving the end
2at which it aims." The critical question, of course, has 
been: Toward what end does debate— or to raise another
problem— should debate aim? That question remains 
unresolved.
O Douglas Ehninger, "Debate As Method: Limitations
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